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 Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, announced in January 1968 that the 
British government would withdraw from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971.  For 
Britain, the decision indicated a re-prioritization of British global defense obligations.  
For the rulers of the Arab emirates of the Persian Gulf, Wilson‘s announcement signaled 
an end of British military protection, and the beginning of a process of negotiations that 
culminated in the establishment of the United Arab Emirates on December 3, 1971.  An 
examination of the process by which the individual Persian Gulf states became a 
sovereign federation presents an opportunity to examine the roles of nationalism and anti-
imperialism played in the establishment of the Union.  This work demonstrates that Arab 
rulers in the Persian Gulf strove to establish their new state with close ties to Great 
Britain, which provided technical, military, and administrative assistance to the emirates, 
while also publicly embracing the popular ideologies of anti-imperialism and Arab 
socialism, which dominated the political discourse in the Arab world through most of the 
twentieth century.   
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 This dissertation draws on primary source materials from British and American 
government archives, speeches and government publications from the Arab Emirates, 
memoirs and a wide variety of secondary sources.  These materials provide the basis for 
understanding the state-building process of the United Arab Emirates in the areas of pre-
withdrawal development, the decision to withdraw, the problems of establishing a federal 
constitution, and the problems posed by the need for security in the post-withdrawal 
Persian Gulf.   
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terms, personal and place names, and sources.  Commonly accepted English forms are 
used for some personal and place names.  In all other cases, words are transliterated in 




Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
On a day in February, 1972, Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan stood in front of 
the members of the new parliamentary body of the United Arab Emirates. It was the first 
meeting of the national parliament of the newly formed union. The last of the seven 
states, Ras al-Khaimah, had signed the constitution only a few days before.1 Sheikh 
Zayid, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the first president of the Union, articulated his vision 
for the new state and its place among other Arab states.   
The constitution aimed for the United Arab Emirates to be a federal state, 
independent and sovereign. And the Union is a part of the great Arab nation, 
bound to it by ties of religion, language, history, and shared destiny; and the 
people of the Union are one people and are a part of the Arab ‗umma and Islam is 
the official religion of the Union; and Islamic shar
c
iyah is the official source of 
law; and the official language of the Union is Arabic.2  
 
Zayid‘s words marked the culmination of three years‘ negotiations between Persian Gulf 
rulers and the British government, which had begun in the wake of British Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson‘s announcement that Britain would end its 150 year presence in the area.  
British informal rule of the Arab States in the Persian Gulf began as a series of 
maritime treaties between the East India Company and tribal leaders along the eastern 
Arabian Peninsula in the early nineteenth century. The truces gave rise to the states‘ 
                                                 
1 The United Arab Emirates consist of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Um al-Qaiwain, and 
Ras al-Khaimah. Each of these was considered part of the ―Trucial States‖ and collectively was known as 
the ―Trucial Coast.‖ Bahrain and Qatar, also tied to Britain through security agreements and truces were 
frequently referred to as Trucial States as well, though British administration and policy between the nine 
states was never as fully integrated as it was among the smaller seven that made up the final Union.  
2 ―Speech of His Highness Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahayan, President of the State, at the opening of 
the first national majlis of the Union,‖ (Arabic) in Al-Fara‟id min Aqwal Zayid (Abu Dhabi: Center for 
Documentation and Research, 2001), 15.  
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designation as the Trucial States or Trucial Coast. The treaties initially established 
peaceful relations between the prominent Gulf rulers and the East India Company. Over 
the course of the next hundred years, British involvement in the Persian Gulf expanded to 
include British authority over foreign affairs, effectively isolating the Trucial States from 
both western and Middle Eastern governments. The Trucial States never became colonies 
of the British Empire; nevertheless, by the twentieth century, British administrative 
structures effectively guided and dominated the politics and development of the Trucial 
States.  
 Wilson‘s decision in 1968 to leave the Persian Gulf shocked both members of the 
British government and the rulers of the Trucial States. The sheikhs had come to depend 
on the British military for security, as well as British financial and technical advisers who 
provided assistance in the running of expanding government administrations and growing 
economies. Equally significant, however, was the potential risk to Britain‘s economic and 
political interests in the Persian Gulf. By 1958, the Arab Gulf states were the last proof of 
British influence and power in the Middle East. The Gulf had also come to take on great 
strategic importance as the nexus of British naval and air power for its positions east of 
Suez. Finally, the oil wealth of Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai provided a strong 
incentive for Britain to retain a physical presence in the region for the foreseeable future.  
 Events in the Middle East as well as Britain‘s changing global defense role in the 
latter half of the 1960s forced Harold Wilson and his cabinet members to reconsider the 
nature of Anglo-Gulf relations. In the aftermath of World War II, Britain became 
increasingly committed to extensive defense responsibilities in Europe and the Pacific, as 
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well as a burgeoning nuclear security role in the Cold War. The British economy, already 
weakened by two world wars and colonial independence movements in the 1950s and 
1960s, could no longer support expenditure in the Persian Gulf.  
At the same time, pressure mounted from British officials in the Gulf urging the 
Foreign Office to spend greater amounts of money to build up the nascent states there. 
Under British protection, the Trucial governments had languished in isolation from the 
modernization going on elsewhere in the Middle East. The discovery, production, and 
export of oil from the Gulf raised their global profile and drew the attention of outside 
economic and political interests—particularly those of Arab nationalist leaders. Gamal 
Abdul Nasser of Egypt had made his career on political rhetoric denouncing imperialist 
powers as exploitative as had presidents in Syria and Iraq, and nationalists in the Yemen. 
The failure of the Trucial States to modernize, combined with their friendly and 
dependent relationship with Britain, placed Gulf rulers in a potentially precarious 
position.  
Arab nationalism in its varied forms had ousted Arab rulers and steadily curtailed 
British influence in the Middle East since the 1930s. Frustrated with the heavy 
handedness of the Veiled Protectorate in Egypt, the nationalist Wafd pressed for Egyptian 
independence in the 1920s. Britain responded by imposing an unsatisfactory and limited 
independence on the Egypt in 1922, but new constitutional monarchy proved corrupt and 
survived only with British support. The government finally fell in 1952 when a group of 
young Egyptian officers forced King Farouq into exile and replaced his government with 
a nationalist republic. Four years later, Nasser succeeded in ejecting Britain from the 
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Suez Canal, which had been the nerve center of British defense and trade operations since 
the nineteenth century. Only months before, the British head of the Arab Legion, John 
Glubb ―Pasha‖, had been ejected from Jordan by King Hussein—regarded by many as the 
most moderate and pro-Western of all the Arab leaders. Two years later, nationalists in 
Iraq toppled the Hashemite monarchy in a bloody coup, murdering the eighteen-year-old 
king and his pro-British prime minister, Nuri al-Said. British economic and strategic 
interests in the region increasingly centered on the Arabian Peninsula which, by the 
1960s, was the only place British officials in the region seemed welcome.  
Following Nasser‘s ejection of British soldiers from the Suez Canal, Britain 
relocated its naval base east to Aden and built up military support in the Persian Gulf. 
Aden had become a British colony in 1937 following one hundred years of occupation 
and administration under the East India Company and then British India. Britain had also 
expanded its influence in southwest Arabia to include formal agreements with rulers in 
the principalities surrounding Aden proper.  
Even as Britain re-centered its defense on Aden, it became increasingly apparent 
that Britain‘s stay in the region would come to an end sooner rather than later. By 1962, 
anti-imperialist nationalists in Aden were loosening Britain‘s grip there as well. With the 
outbreak of a civil war in the Yemen and its subsequent expansion into Aden and South 
Arabia, Britain once again determined to abandon yet another sphere of influence in the 
Middle East and move its military operations to the Persian Gulf by 1968. 
Britain‘s path through the Middle East, littered with broken policies and failed 
diplomacy, forced the Labour government to accept the limitations of its approach to 
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sustaining a relationship with the Trucial States. Past experience showed that continuing 
a formal, visible military and political presence only placed the stability of friendly Arab 
rulers—and British interests—at risk. Harold Wilson tacitly acknowledged this reality 
when he announced in January 1968 that Britain would withdraw its forces from the 
Persian Gulf and cancel its treaties with the Trucial States by the end of 1971. Wilson‘s 
decision did not amount to the official abandonment of British strategic and economic 
interests in the Arab Gulf. Rather, it represented a hope for the continuation of British 
predominance in the region through alternative means. Britain would withdraw from a 
Persian Gulf with stable, friendly rulers who would continue to invest in British 
businesses, rely on British expertise, and would build on the foundations Britain laid in 
the course of the previous century.  
Such was the British government‘s intent. In reality, however, the process of 
fashioning one or more loyal and enduring governments on the Trucial Coast exposed a 
shifting political dynamic between Britain and the Gulf rulers. The rise of Arab 
nationalism throughout the Middle East showed Foreign Office officials that they must 
concede power to the Trucial Sheikhs; and more and more frequently, the Trucial Sheikhs 
exercised influence in shaping the future Union, using the specter of anti-imperialism and 
Arab nationalism as leverage in their negotiations. By December 1971, the rulers of the 
Trucial States had broken the British monopoly of influence over the Arab Gulf and had 
established a seven-state Union that reflected local political alliances and economic 
circumstances, rather than a nine-state Union that the British government believed was 
convenient and practicable.  
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 Britain‘s need for the Arab Gulf states‘ stability and goodwill strengthened the 
rulers‘ positions in their negotiations with the local British administrators and, through 
them, the Foreign Office. As the threat of Arab nationalism in the Trucial Coast grew 
more potent, the Trucial sheikhs became more adept at using the specter of encroaching 
nationalism to gain British cooperation. In the 1950s, as the Foreign Office took over 
British-Trucial relations, the local British administrators had almost total charge of the 
rulers and could direct their general policies with impunity. By the 1960s, Arab rulers 
began to use nationalist rhetoric and to cooperate with Arab nationalist leaders to balance 
British power and occasionally to convince Britain to serve the local rulers‘ interests. 
They also invoked the threat of Arab nationalism against themselves in order to persuade 
British officials to support the rulers‘ policies over British-designed plans.  
 As Britain‘s Foreign Office resigned itself to withdrawing its forces from the 
Persian Gulf, Britain faced the further question of how to secure the region and its oil 
resources. The small Gulf States lacked the population and military force to safeguard 
themselves. To ensure the Trucial States‘ safety after 1971, the British Government 
enlisted the support of Iran and Saudi Arabia as the twin guardians of the Persian Gulf. 
After three years of working to secure the two powers‘ cooperation, Britain relinquished 




THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TODAY  
 
The United Arab Emirates today consists of a federation of seven individual 
states, or emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain and 
Ras al-Khaimah. The UAE is located on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula, east of 
Saudi Arabia and north of the Sultanate and Oman. Much of the country‘s 30,000 square 
miles is made up of desert and salt flats in the east, though the terrain is varied by the 
presence of the Hajar Mountain range that extends from Oman into the southern region of 
Abu Dhabi and also along the eastern coast near Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. Small 
strips of fertile agricultural land are situated on the Batinah Coast south of Sharjah. In 
addition to the mainland, the emirates include numerous small islands in the Persian Gulf, 
including Das Island off the north coast of Abu Dhabi.  
 The location of the United Arab Emirates on the Persian Gulf has made the 
emirates a center of trade and migration from the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia and Iran. 
The population of the Emirates today is estimated at approximate 4.4 million, though 
only a small percentage (between 15-20 percent) are legally recognized as Emiratis. The 
local Emirati population is largely Arab originating from the tribes that have historically 
inhabited the region, though marriage and immigration before the twentieth century has 
added a substantial number of ethnically Persians, Omanis, and South Asians to the 
population. The remainder of the population is comprised of migrant labor from Europe, 
South Asia, East Asia, and other Arab states.   
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Each emirate maintains its own government for local affairs. The ruler of each 
emirate is given the honorary title of ―sheikh‖ (shayukh, plural); members of the ruling 
families are also referred to as ―sheikh‖ or ―sheikhah‖ (feminine). The ruler of each 
emirate serves on the Supreme Federal Council, which manages foreign relations and 
inter-emirate cooperation on issues such as labor, immigration, and healthcare. The 
Supreme Federal Council elects a president and vice-president, who serve five-year 
terms. An additional national assembly serves as a consultative legislative body 
consisting of forty appointed and elected members.  
 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE  
 
Chapter one traces the development of British involvement in the region from the 
nineteenth century through the evolution of British informal empire in the Persian Gulf 
into the early part of the twentieth century. Britain initially established a dominant 
presence there to monopolize and protect its trade routes with India, but ultimately 
administered the foreign affairs of the Trucial Coast via the India Office. In the 
nineteenth century, the Government of India concerned itself primarily with resolving 
political disruptions between the Trucial Rulers themselves in order to prevent the 
disruption of trade. In the twentieth century, however, the British government became 
increasingly interested in the Arab Gulf‘s strategic position vis-à-vis India and the rest of 
Britain‘s East of Suez commitments. The region‘s importance grew further with the 
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discovery of oil in some of the Gulf States, and the expected discovery of oil in the 
others. 
Chapter two begins in 1952, when Bernard Burrows, the British Resident in the 
Persian Gulf, established the Trucial States Council. The Council began as a consultative 
body consisting of the rulers of the seven smaller states and the British resident. This new 
institution marked the beginning of an active development and modernization program 
under British leadership, and particularly the British Resident, Bernard Burrows. This 
new direction in British policy in the Trucial States was an attempt to prevent Arab 
nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiment from gaining influence in the Arab Gulf.  
Development throughout the Arab Gulf had been unequal. The larger Gulf States, 
such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, had benefited from the early discovery of oil 
deposits in the 1930s and 1940s. The lower Gulf States, however, would not find oil in 
commercial quantities until the mid-1960s. Thus, while Kuwait and Bahrain in 1952 
could boast of hospitals, expanded road systems, increased infrastructure, and an 
increasingly educated populace, the populations of the lower Trucial States struggled to 
obtain sufficient water for their small populations. Burrows worried that the discrepancy 
would encourage opposition within the Trucial States and sought to establish a 
development plan for public works, public services, infrastructure, and health care as 
necessary for preventing the appearance of anti-imperialist, anti-British feeling. 
Subsequent British Residents followed Burrows‘ lead, advocating for greater funds from 
the Foreign Office in order to expand services and infrastructure within the Trucial 
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States. Their urgency intensified through the 1950s and 1960s as anti-imperialist 
movements gained momentum all over the world, and especially in the Middle East.  
The chapter, then, considers the establishment of the Trucial Council and British 
attitudes toward development in the region. Significantly, however, it also considers the 
Trucial Rulers‘ attitudes toward British development priorities. In the early years of the 
Trucial States Council, the rulers‘ only reluctantly participated in the activities of the 
Council. Over time, however, Britain sought to create a greater sense of Trucial 
participation in Trucial Development, particularly after Gamal Abdel Nasser ousted the 
British from Suez. This move gave the Trucial Rulers more visibility in development 
programs; the rulers, though, also began to place more pressure on the British 
government to expand development projects more quickly, and to prioritize those projects 
along the lines delineated by Arab rulers. Egypt and the Arab League began making 
diplomatic overtures to the Gulf Rulers in the mid-1960s, and this gave the Trucial 
Sheikhs even greater leverage in their negotiations with British officials in the Gulf over 
the future of Trucial development.  
Chapter three focuses on the decision-making process in London that resulted in 
Britain‘s exit from East of Suez, and thus the Persian Gulf, by 1971. Between the end of 
World War II and January 1968, successive British governments attempted to balance a 
struggling economy with ambitions for a prominent role in global politics and defense. 
Economic limitations at a time of world-wide opposition to traditional imperialism led 
Harold Wilson and other British ministers to reevaluate the British strategy for retaining 
political influence. In the Trucial States, officials came to believe that a withdrawal 
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would help stabilize the British economy and place Britain in a stronger position to 
influence the development and political orientation of those states.  
 Chapters four and five consider the relationship between the Trucial Coast States 
and Britain in the context of state formation and Arab nationalism between 1952 and 
1971. The first efforts on the part of British officials in the Persian Gulf to establish 
cooperation between the smaller sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast occurred in 1952 and 
created the foundation for what would eventually become the United Arab Emirates in 
1971. These chapters examine the relationship between the British government and the 
Trucial States in the period before and during the creation of the United Arab Emirates, 
with special focus on the rise of Arab nationalism and its influence on the Anglo-Trucial 
relationship.  
The fourth chapter looks at the process of creating a federation following Britain‘s 
announcement in 1968. British policy makers pushed for a federation between the Trucial 
States that would include all of the Trucial Coast as well as Bahrain and Qatar. In the 
previous period, tensions had emerged between the Trucial sheikhs and British policy 
makers over the speed and direction of development and the Trucial States‘ connections 
with other Arab states. Between 1968 and 1971, these tensions became more pronounced 
as the various sheikhs attempted to exert their autonomy from the British government and 
create alliances amongst themselves to best preserve their own powers within the 
structures of a future federation.  
Internal security and national defense became a central area of debate between 
local rulers and British policymakers during the federation negotiations. Chapter five thus 
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examines the process of creating a federal defense structure for the future United Arab 
Emirates. The Foreign Office urged the rulers of the Trucial States to use the British-
created and British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts as the basis for the future federal 
military. At the same time, the individual rulers of the Trucial States wished to utilize 
individual state armies, parts of which could contribute to a federal force. Such an 
arrangement would provide the rulers with greater autonomy within the federal structure. 
 
COMMENT ON SOURCES   
 
Historical research in the Persian Gulf is complicated in myriad ways. Arab Gulf 
society relied heavily on oral tradition through the middle of the twentieth century. A 
relatively small number of the population had more than basic reading and writing skills. 
Among the nomadic segments of the population, paper records would have been 
impractical and cumbersome. Even within the governing structures in the Gulf, written 
records were largely unnecessary. The population was small enough that disputes were 
usually resolved directly by the leading sheikh, who listened to direct testimony of 
witnesses and decided and executed the outcome immediately. Such a small and mobile 
population required little in the way of government infrastructure. Transportation taxes 
were collected by the leading sheikhs in each of the Gulf States; but even in these cases 
records either do not survive or are not available from the period before 1971. The 
structure that was used for the purpose in Abu Dhabi is a small, one-room, wood and 
palm frond shack that still stands preserved as a heritage site under the modern highway 
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that now stretches from inland Abu Dhabi across to Abu Dhabi island. The employees 
that would have worked there would collect fees, but probably did not need to record 
detailed information about those who passed through the town.  
This is not to say that documentary evidence does not exist in the Persian Gulf 
states. Scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have succeeded in 
producing excellent studies based on merchant records and contracts.3 Anthropologists 
and cultural experts have also begun working to collect oral histories in order to preserve 
information about traditional social and cultural patterns in the area, as well as the 
changes in those patterns in contemporary society.4 
                                                 
3 For examples, see Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); James Onley, Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: 
Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth Century Gulf (London: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
and ―Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Gulf‖ The Gulf Family: Modernity 
and Kinship Policies, edited by Alanoud Alshareskh. (London: Saqi Books, 2007), 37-56; Gad G. Gilbar, 
―Muslim Tujjar of the Middle East and their Commercial Networks in the Long Nineteenth Century‖ 
Studia Islamica 100/101 (2005): 183-202.  
 Scholarship on the Gulf, for a time, was dominated largely by political scientists who were 
concerned with the structures of rentier states and the survival of monarchies into the late twentieth century. 
For examples of such works, see Christopher M. Davidson, The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy 
in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Kiren Aziz 
Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997); Gregory Gause, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994); John Waterbury, ―Democracy without Democrats: 
The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East,‖ Democracy Without Democracts? The 
Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salam, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1970), 23-47.  
4 For a sampling, see: Jane Bristol-Rhys, Emirati Women: Generations of Change (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010); Andrea B. Rugh, The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates 
(New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007) is a less rigorous but useful study based on interviews; Sulayman 
Khalaf. ―Dubai Camel Market Transnational Workers: An Enthnographic Portrait,‖ City and Society 22, no. 
1 (2010): 97-118.  
In regards to Union and Emirate-level preservation of culture, the Union government established 
the creation of a National Center for Documentation and Research, which serves as the national archive of 
the UAE. Additionally, the individual emirates have made efforts to preserve and advertise culture and 
heritage. Abu Dhabi has an Authority for Culture & Heritage, which sponsors ―heritage villages‖ and 
promotes the preservation of ―intangible heritage‖, see Abu Dhabi Culture Heritage, 
[http://www.adach.ae/en/portal/adach/about.authority.aspx] accessed August 6, 2010 at 3:51pm. Sharjah‘s 
Department of Culture and Information provides similar kinds of programs designed to preserve and 
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Scholars looking for more ―traditional‖ archival sources have access to 
voluminous records from Portuguese, Ottoman, French, Dutch and British sources. 
Several research centers in the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states purchased 
copies of these materials in order to establish their own national archives. These 
documents are in the process of being digitized and made easily available to scholars 
within the region. The National Center for Documentation and Research in Abu Dhabi 
serves as the national archive for the United Arab Emirates; the American University at 
Sharjah has also received grants from Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi to 
establish a similar archive there. Scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth century also 
have access to edited archive editions of British records on the Persian Gulf, which the 
British Stationary Office published in the 1990s.  
For the period under consideration in this study, the British residency and Foreign 
Office records in The National Archive (formerly the Public Record Office) provide the 
bulk of the primary sources. These records are extremely useful. British officials in the 
Persian Gulf had close and frequent contact with the various sheikhs of the Persian Gulf. 
They also kept lengthy and detailed records of their conversations with those rulers and 
often included candid reflections of their experiences there. Following their careers, 
several British officials also supplemented the historical record with their autobiographies 
and memoirs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
promote local heritage, including a historical district that houses several museums, as does Dubai‘s 
Ministry of Culture.  
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These sources, however informative, only provide part of the story. Though 
British officials recorded and summarized conversations with members of the Gulf 
governments, these conversations were often filtered through translators and were 
divulged in reference to the British government‘s goals and interests in the region. Such 
reports were also colored by the friendships and personality conflicts between the British 
officials and the local rulers.5   
Locally produced records are becoming increasingly available. Like many of their 
British counterparts, public servants, businessmen and even some of the rulers in the 
Persian Gulf states have been writing their own memoirs and autobiographies. Most of 
these have been published in English rather than Arabic. Few government documents 
have been made publically available, or even exist. Where possible, however, this work 
has drawn on government publications, such as the al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, or Official 
Gazette, which Abu Dhabi began publishing in 1968. This government quarterly 
published new laws and decrees issued by Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. Collections of 
speeches from before 1971 are not available; however, a collection of Sheikh Zayid‘s 
speeches do exist for the post-1971 in his role as the new president of the United Arab 
Emirates and in many of those speeches he refers back to goals of the federation and 
reflects on Britain‘s involvement in the region, and these materials help to shed additional 
light on the British relationship with the Persian Gulf states.  
                                                 
5 In his official report on political affairs in the Trucial Coast, for example, Political Resident Rupert Hay 
commented on the Ruler of Qatar, ―Sheikh Ali, with his increasing wealth becomes more self-opinionated 
and difficult.‖  ―Persian Gulf: Annual Review for 1952,‖ February 16, 1953. FO 371/104259. TNA.  
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New secondary literature on the development of the Persian Gulf states in general, 
and of the United Arab Emirates in particular, is being published as well. Scholarship 
from Britain as well as from the Persian Gulf states has grown in the last two decades in 
light of the rapid, and sometimes spectacular, development there. Once again, much of 
this material is available in English. Instruction throughout the Persian Gulf is taught in 
English. All of the major national universities in the United Arab Emirates conduct 
instruction in English, as do international studies programs in Qatari and Bahraini 
universities. Magisterial and doctoral students frequently receive their educations abroad 
in British, American, and European institutions. Consequently most of the academic 
research of scholars from the Persian Gulf states is published in English before being 
translated and published in Arabic in subsequent editions.6 That being said, this work has 
also tried to incorporate some of the scholarly research on the Persian Gulf that has been 




                                                 
6 More recently, there have been some exceptions to this—the ruler of Sharjah has published work on the 
British in Aden in Arabic, though his Myth of Piracy in the Gulf was published first in English and 
subsequently released in Arabic. His new memoir, however, was released first in Arabic (2009) and 
translated into English the following year (2010): Sultan ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, Sard al-That (Sharjah: 
Manshurat al-Qasimi, 2009); Ahtilal al-Britany li Aden, 1839 (United Arab Emirates: s.n., 1991); and The 
Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, 2
nd
 ed. (London: Routledge, 1988). This is not unique to the Persian Gulf 
states, but rather is a legacy of the colonial and semi-colonial experience throughout post-colonial states. 
Umaru Ahmed, ―The Cultural Content in Nigerian Education: The Language Curriculum,‖ Nigeria Since 
Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years, v. 7, Culture, eds. Peter P. Ekeh and Garba Ashinwaju, 
(Ibadan: Heineman Educational Books, 1986), 32-59 discusses English as the language of culture and 
education in Nigeria. 
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Figure 1: The Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf7 
                                                 
7 From Rosemarie Said-Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 




Figure 2:  The Gulf States8  
                                                 
8 Ibid., viii.  
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Chapter 2:  Protected Status, 1820-1952 
 
The nineteenth century witnessed the gradual expansion of the British Empire into 
the Persian Gulf, and ultimately, into the affairs of the Arab Gulf states. What began as a 
British economic enterprise in India led first to competition with Arab merchants and 
tribes in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and then to a series of British-brokered 
treaties binding the Arab Gulf to British protection. Over the next century, British 
administration increasingly interfered in the political affairs of the rulers of the Arab Gulf 
coast. The early twentieth century then witnessed a rise in British involvement in the 
Trucial States as the Persian Gulf. The discovery of oil in the upper Gulf in the inter-war 
years and the establishment of an air route to India via the Trucial States intensified 
Britain‘s reliance on the region. By the 1950s, the Trucial States and the Arab Gulf 
generally had become an essential component of the empire‘s strategic and economic 
strength. 
 
THE ARAB GULF BEFORE THE TRUCIAL AGREEMENTS 
 
Historians and geographers have expressed interest in the Persian Gulf since as 
early as the fifth century BC as a locus for trade. Trade networks between China and 
Arabs in the Persian Gulf existed as early as the eighth century and commercial traffic in 
 
 20 
the Gulf has remained a constant feature from that time forward.9 Pearls are the most 
famous of the goods transported from the Persian Gulf. Arab sources in the fifteenth 
claim that, at Bahrain, there were around 1,000 ships in use for pearl harvesting.10 Other 
trade in the region comprised inter-regional shipments of agricultural goods, including 
dried fruits, grains, eggplant, wheat, and sugarcane, as well as timber for boat building. 
There was also a strong market for dhow ship trade between Iran and the Arab Gulf 
states, particularly Dubai and Kuwait.11 More long range trade with the Subcontinent and 
East Asia included spices, textiles, and gold, and it is probably to India that much of the 
Gulf pearls traveled. 
From the sixteenth century onward, several empires attempted to establish 
economic and political footholds in the Persian Gulf. The discovery of a sea route from 
Europe to India allowed European merchants to compete for a portion of trade in the 
                                                 
9 C. Edmund Bosworth, ―The Nomenclature of the Persian Gulf,‖ Iranian Studies 30, no.1-2 (1997): 77-94 
serves as a useful discussion for the evolution of geographic labels for what is now known primarily as the 
Persian Gulf. At various times, the Persian Gulf was the ―Erythraean Sea,‖ the ―Green Sea,‖ as well as the 
―Sea of Fars.‖ The Persian Gulf, in the fifteenth century was subdivided into smaller areas of water 
including the ―Cape of the Arabs‖, which included several islands, and which Bosworth believes is likely 
Ra‘s Musandam today. As Bosworth notes, the Persian Gulf was not referred to as the ―al-Khaleej al-
c
Arabi‖, or Arab Gulf, until the 1960s in opposition to Iran‘s efforts to expand influence there. In the 
current work, I refer to the Arab Gulf to describe the Arab states of the Persian Gulf collectively. 
10 Robert Carter, ―The History and Preshistory of Pearling in the Persian Gulf,‖ Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient 48, no.2 (2005): 139-209, 152. Carter cites Ahmed ibn Majid‘s description 
of ―1000 ships‖; Bosworth also uses ibn Majid‘s estimation in his study: Bosworth, ―The Nomenclature of 
the Persian Gulf,‖ Iranian Studies (1997): 146.  
11 The most important study of the dhow trade in the Persian Gulf is Dionisius A. Agius, In the Wake of the 
Dhow: The Arabian Gulf and Oman (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002) which focuses on the technical 
aspects of the dhow trade in the medieval period, but is incredibly useful as background to the modern 
trade, as it demonstrates the connections across the Gulf between the Persian and Arab trading 
communities. Ya‘qub Yusuf al-Hijji, The Art of Dhow-Building in Kuwait (London: London Centre of 
Arab Studies and Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 2001) is a largely photographic study in the 
evolution and technicques of dhow building, but also provides a useful historical account of the 
development of the dhow trade in Kuwait and the connections between Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman; Alan 
Villiers, ―Some Aspects of the Arab Dhow Trade,‖ Middle East Journal 2, no. 4 (1948): 399-416 serves as 
a useful snapshot of the dhow trade in the 1930s and includes Villiers‘ personal account of a trip via dhow.   
 21 
Indian Ocean and nearby seas. European governments threw their support behind their 
merchants in the first half of the seventeenth century, granting state backed monopolies 
over trade in an effort to secure trade routes at the expense of their rivals. Britain 
chartered its East India Company in 1600; the Dutch followed shortly after in 1602. 
Portugal established its commercial monopoly in India in 1628, when King Philip IV 
granted a charter to the Companhia de India Oriental.12 France established its Compagnie 
Française des Indes Orientales relatively late, in 1664.13 These European companies 
competed with the established merchants in the Persian Gulf and surrounding trade routes 
of the Indian Ocean.  
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, regional trade remained largely 
in the hands of the Mughal and Omani empires. European merchants struggled to gain 
shares in maritime trade. At times, European companies succeeded in gaining control 
over trade routes in the region, but this control was intermittent and limited to some trade 
routes and goods.14 As long as the Omani and Mughal Empires remained strong, 
                                                 
12 Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto, Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 
1500-1700: A Political and Economic History (London: Longman Group, 1995); Portugal‘s expansion into 
the eastern seas and trade with Asia played an integral role in shifting world trade patterns and weakening 
trade through the Mediterranean. For more on how these changes impacted Persian Gulf trade, see Aqil 
Kazim, The United Arab Emirates A.D. 600 to the Present: A Socio-Discursive Transformation in the 
Arabian Gulf (Dubai: Gulf Book Center, 2000) 83-108.  
13 Glenn J. Ames, Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade (DeKalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1996). 
14 Om Prakash, ―The Indian Maritime Merchant, 1500-1800,‖ Journal of the Economic and Social History 
of the Orient 47, no.3 (2004): 435-57, 453. This is a helpful work discussing interactions between Indian 
merchants and early European merchants in the sixteenth century. Prakash observes that the Portuguese 
were able, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to control some aspects of trade in the Persian Gulf 
and Indian Ocean through issuing passports and limiting traffic on some trade routes. This, however, was 
limited in scope and intermittent. 
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however, European merchants failed to penetrate the commercial trade in a meaningful 
and lasting way.  
Significant changes in both the global economy and the regional political 
structures provided new openings in commercial trade, which the British East India 
Company in particular successfully exploited in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. Portuguese trade collapsed in the mid-seventeenth century as the British and 
Dutch cooperated to squeeze out competitors. By the middle of the eighteenth century, 
Dutch fortunes declined as well. By 1798, only the British and French remained active in 
the European contest for domination in the Indian Ocean.  
This coincided with the decline of the strength of the empires along the Persian 
Gulf. Merchants‘ successes in the subcontinent had increased wealth among provincial 
leaders who exercised greater autonomy from the central Mughal government. Along the 
Persian Gulf coasts, this pattern was repeated. The Ottoman Government held only 
nominal control over the province of Basra, while the Safavid dynasty that had ruled over 
Persia crumbled in the mid-eighteenth century. In the midst of these changes, Britain‘s 
rising sea power and influence allowed its merchants to take advantage of local rivalries 
and ultimately dominate the waters of the Persian Gulf.15 
                                                 
15 C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830 (New York: Longman, 
1989). Of great use for understanding the shifting balance from non-European trade in favor of European 
trade in the Persian Gulf is Patricia Risso, ―Cross Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the 
Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region During a Long Eighteenth Century,‖ Journal of World 
History 12, no. 2 (2001): 293-319. Risso describes the rise of the Qawasim and their interactions with 
Oman in the context of the rise of British power in the region and the application of ―piracy‖ to describe 
Qawasim maritime activities. 
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Among the most significant Arab maritime forces in the late eighteenth century 
was the Qasimi merchant fleet, based in what is now Ras al-Khaimah in the United Arab 
Emirates.16 Jutting out from the Arabian Peninsula just north of Oman, the Qawasim had 
come to rival Omani traders as well as smaller fleets of merchants in Bahrain and Qatar. 
They also maintained ports at Sharjah on the Arab coast and Linga on the Persian coast. 
The Qasimi fleet consisted of approximately 900 ships and included large numbers of 
dhows and some European-style ships.17 
The British rivalry with the Qawasim began in the late eighteenth century when 
the East India Company established an alliance with Oman. From that point forward, 
Oman‘s rivalry with the Qawasim became a British concern.18 Between 1797 and 1820, 
British and Qawasim merchant ships frequently attacked one another. Using international 
sea laws, the British at Bombay justified their attacks on the Qawasim based on claims 
that their acts of maritime violence constituted piracy.19 
                                                 
16 The plural of Qasim is Qawasim, while the adjectival form is Qasimi. Frequently, the word appears in 
primary and some secondary sources as ―Jasim‖ and ―Jawasim‖ because the qaf sound often changes to a 
jim in colloquial Gulf Arabic.  
17 The estimate of 900 is from the height of Qasimi power at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Charles E. Davies, The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An Investigation into Qasimi Piracy, 1797-1820 (Exeter: 
Exeter University Press, 1997); and al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf (1988). Al-Qasimi is 
the current ruler of Sharjah and his work very much reflects a vein of Sharjah-Emirati nationalism as a 
consequence.  
18 Risso, ―Cross Cultural Perceptions of Piracy,‖ Journal of World History (2001): 309-12. Risso argues 
that this alliance gave Britain the necessary power to define piracy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, 
and specifically to define Qawasim activities there as piracy.  
19 The debate over the legitimacy of this claim remains outside the scope of this work, though several 
historians have attempted to determine whether or not the Qawasim violated maritime. Davies, Blood-Red 
Arab Flag (1997) is a detailed work examining maritime laws and the Qawasim and British activities in the 
Persian Gulf. He refutes the idea that the Qawasim, broadly defined, were pirates, though some of their 
activities were piratical under the growing influence of the Wahhabi movement from the interior of the 
Arabian Peninsula. Al-Qasimi, Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf (1988) argues that the Qawasim were no 
pirates at all; rather, piracy was an excuse to justify the extension of British power in the Gulf and 
monopolize trade there. Perhaps most useful, though, is Risso‘s interpretation, which argues that ―piracy‖ 
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The East India Company sought, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, 
to crush Qawasim activity in the Persian Gulf. Conflict between the East India Company 
and the Qasimi fleet broke into war in 1809, when the British succeeded in occupying the 
naval port at Ras al-Khaimah. A second attack on Ras al-Khaimah in 1819 decimated the 
already crippled Qasimi navy. The Qasimi defeat opened up the whole of the Persian 
Gulf to British influence. After 1820 the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf became 
inextricably linked to the British Empire.20 The British negotiated a series of treaties with 
Arab rulers on the eastern Arabian coast between 1820 and 1861. The first treaties were 
General Treaties of Peace. These established peace between the leading sheikhs of the 
coast and also of Bahrain. Between 1835 and 1853, sheikhs from Abu Dhabi, Dubai and 
Sharjah also signed additional peace treaties under British auspices agreeing to truces 
amongst themselves, intended to end disruptive warring. This peace was made permanent 
in 1853 in the Perpetual Treaty of Maritime Peace.21 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
did not exist as a term in Arabic; instead, she argues that by the nineteenth century, British power in the 
region allowed Britain to determine who did and did not classify as pirates. Their determination, in part, 
that Qawasim activity constituted piracy came from the fact that they did not recognize the Qawasim as 
legitimate sovereigns capable of conferring the necessary permits to designate Qasimi merchants as 
―privateers.‖ Notably, in Risso‘s study, ―pirates‖ were almost always non-Europeans, whereas ―privateers‖, 
or legitimate merchants, usually were, or had the support of, Europeans. See Risso, ―Cross Cultural 
Perceptions of Piracy,‖ Journal of World History (2001). 
20 J. B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); and Onley, 
Arabian Frontier of the British Raj (2007) are both essential for understanding the rise of British 
involvement in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century. Onley‘s book, furthermore, provides an in-depth 
study of the native agents serving under the British Resident in the Gulf with special emphasis on the 
nineteenth century. For a clear explanation of the development and reorganization of the Residency system 
in the Gulf, see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates (London: Macmillan, 
1978), especially pp. 20-33. Zahlan argues that the administrative restructuring that took place in the 1930s 
and 1940s was in large part the consequence of the weakening of the British position vis-à-vis Iran and the 
rising interest of other states in the Persian Gulf.  
21 ―Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity,‖ May 4, 1853 in Arabian Treaties: 1600-1960. Edited by 
Penelope Tuson and Emma Quick. v.2, 469-72. 
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BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE ARAB GULF STATES  
 
The treaties not only established agreements among the Trucial States and with 
the East India Company. They also established a protective relationship between the 
British Empire and the Trucial Sheikhs. These agreements furthermore limited the 
Trucial Rulers to the administration of internal affairs. All negotiations with foreign 
governments would go through the British administration.22 Maintaining these protective 
agreements with minimal effort and expense required the British government to find 
sovereigns they could cooperate with and rely on to protect East India Company and 
British interests in the region.  
The Trucial agreements on the Trucial Coast recognized as leaders the two tribal 
groups that would come to dominate the future and politics of the area. The ruling 
families of the seven emirates are the same ruling families that were in place before the 
nineteenth century, when Britain established its first treaties. The primary tribal 
confederations in the Persian Gulf in the eighteenth and nineteenth century were the Bani 
Yas and the al-Qasimi. The branches of the al-Qasim family are based in what is now Ras 
al-Khaimah and Sharjah, and the rulers of both emirates are from the Qasimi tribe. The 
                                                 
22 This was first partially required under the Perpetual Maritime Treaty of 1853, which stated that, 
―aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement… we 
will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at 
Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation….‖ ―The Perpetual 
Maritime Treaty,‖ May 4, 1853 in Arabian Treaties, 467-72. This was further cemented by the Protectorate 
Treaties of 1892, in which the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Dubai, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-
Khaimah agreed not to correspond with foreign powers, not to accept any official agent, and not to cede or 
sell territory to anyone but the British Government. ―Protectorate Treaties, 1892,‖ 1892, in Arabian 
Treaties, 505-06. Al-Hamdani argues that this was the real mark of occupation by the British legal and 
political control, rather than the earlier treaties and bombardment of the Arabian ports. 
c
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Bani Yas was a confederation of in-land tribes largely based in what now makes up 
modern Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The two ruling families of those states—the al-Nahayan 
of Abu Dhabi and the al-Maktoum of Dubai—are actually branches of the Bani Yas 
confederation and were part of the same political alliance until the al-Maktoum broke 
away and established themselves as a rival power in the 1838.23 
 While the Qasimi agreements with the British were forged consequent to Britain‘s 
destruction of the Qawasim navy, the relationship between Britain and the Bani Yas 
families were reached out of a more mutually beneficial circumstance. At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, the Bani Yas families faced the possibility of becoming 
subservient to the expanding Wahhabist movement in the Arabian Peninsula.24  The 
Wahhabis had established themselves as the dominant power in the northeastern area of 
the Arabian Peninsula by the early nineteenth century and begun pushing toward the 
southern coasts in the direction of Oman. They certainly exercised some influence over 
the Qawasim until Britain destroyed their fleets and extended their protection to Qasimi 
territory; they were also beginning to push into the territories of the Bani Yas families in 
                                                 
23Al-Hamdani, Dawlat al-Amirat al-
c
Arabiyya al-Muttahida (1986), 18. For detailed lists of the various 
tribes of the emirates and their geographical origins, see Mahmood 
c
Abd al-Hamid al-Kufri, Al-Amaraat al-
c
Arabiya al-Mutahida Bayn al-Qadeem wa al-Hadith wa Mushkilat al-Juzr al-Thalath (Damascus: Dar al-
Qutaba lil Taba
c
a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzee
c
a, n.d.), 27-43, which also includes a useful map identifying 
the tribal groups and their territories.  
24 ―Wahhabists‖ or Muwahiddun are those who follow the teachings of the Islamic reformist, Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Abd al-Wahhab established an alliance with the al-Saud family in the eighteenth 
century. The religio-political alliance took on an active expansion policy through the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century in order to spread Saudi influence and expand Wahhabist doctrine and ―purify‖ Islam in 
the Arabian Peninsula.  
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the areas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Thus the relationship between Britain and some of the 
Trucial Rulers helped maintain the Arab sheikhs‘ independence from regional powers.25      
The East India Company, in order to maintain its political and protective role in 
the Persian Gulf and over the Arab states, established a system of political residents and 
native agents. The Residency system in the Persian Gulf was officially established around 
1850 when the new post of Resident of the Persian Gulf was created at Bushire. The 
British Political Resident served as the point of contact between the Trucial Coast and the 
                                                 
25 The aspect of mutual benefits of the Anglo-Trucial relationship has come under intense debate among 
Gulf historians. Was the relationship a coercive imposition on the part of the British, or was it forged by 
Trucial Rulers actively seeking British intervention and protection?  In part, the debate has centered on 
James Onley, Arabian Frontiers of the British Raj (2007), who has argued in that book and elsewhere that 
the collaborative relationship between the Arab rulers and the British ―protectors‖ was, in fact, mutually 
beneficial and that rulers sought out British protection as an extension of the Arab tradition of dakhala or 
zabana, in which protection is ―granted‖ to the ―protégé… ‗on the honor‘ of his protector.‖ James Onley, 
―Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection,‖ Occasional Paper, No. 4. 
(Georgetown University, Center for International and Regional Studies, 2009): 1-44, 3. Several historians, 
myself included, have argued that this argument, though perhaps true in specific case studies, fails to 
recognize the coercive nature of the overall structure of the Anglo-Trucial relationship during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For comments specific to this, see Nelida Fuccaro, review of The 
Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf,  
Reviews in History, accessed March 28, 2011 (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/726); Priya Satia, 
review of The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj, Journal of British Studies 48 (2009): 789-91; and also 
Kristi Barnwell, review of The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj, British Scholar 2, no.1 (2009): 162-63.  
This latter view, I believe, is in keeping with those studies by the early scholars of collaboration 
theory, who argued that the power of the British Empire rested on its ability to mobilize those willing to 
cooperate with and participate in the imperial project: Ronald Robinson, ―Non-European Foundations of 
European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,‖ Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, eds. 
Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. (London: Longman, 1972); C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: 
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) are two examples of several, which make the argument that for a collaborative relationship to 
exist, both the British Government and the ―collaborator‖ must benefit from the relationship. This does not 
suggest, however, that those benefits were equally beneficial or were available in all places of the empire at 
the same time. As is the case in the Trucial Coast, the protective relationship in the beginning benefitted the 
Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai; but the Qawasim originally signed the treaty as a consequence of their 
losses to British maritime power.  
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Bombay Office. On the Trucial Coast itself, a Political Agent, usually Arab or Indian, 
acted as the coastal extension of British authority in the Persian Gulf.26  
Administration of India transferred from the East India Company to the British 
Government in 1857 following the Indian Mutiny and administration of Anglo-Trucial 
affairs, consequently, shifted to the India Office.27 The India Office appointed a Political 
Resident for the Persian Gulf, who acted as the mediator between the British government 
in India and the rulers on the Trucial Coast. When India gained its independence from 
Britain in 1947, the residency remained in place in the Persian Gulf, but came under the 
authority of the Foreign Office.  
The structure of the British residency changed in the inter-war period in response 
to the need for streamlined communication between Bushire and the Trucial Coast. The 
Political Agent in Bahrain gained increased importance as the administrative officer 
responsible for communications with the Trucial rulers, including the ruler of Qatar. 
Following World War II the Persian Gulf‘s importance grew further both because of the 
                                                 
26 Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj (2007). Also of great use is Vanessa Martin, The Qajar 
Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-Century Persia (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 
especially her chapter on Britain and the Qajars at Bushire, which looks at the period 1836-1850 and 
provides a useful picture of the interatctions between local merchants and the British Political Resident in 
the early years of the British Residency in the Persian Gulf. Her argument, that the local population there—
especially merchants— used points of conflict between the British and Qajar powers as a way of shaping 
policy is echoes aspects of the relationship between the local Trucial rulers and British administrators in the 
current study. Martin, ―The People, the State and the British in Bushire and Kharg Island, 1836-1850,‖ in 
The Qajar Pact (2005), 28-47.  
27 Zahlan, Origins of the United Arab Emirates (1978), 22-25 describes the ambiguities of administration 
in the Gulf in greater detail. Essentially, the Political Resident answered to both the Colonial Office and the 
India Office, which coordinated Gulf policy through inter-departmental committees. The Persian Gulf grew 
in importance in the 1930s with the establishment of an air-route to India via the Persian Gulf. In order to 
streamline policy and command decisions, the Persian Gulf came entirely under the purview of the India 
Office in 1933.  
 29 
creation of an air-route to India and speculation about oil reserves in the area.28  This led 
to the further expansion of the administration. The subordinate Native Agent at Sharjah 
was replaced by a Political Agent until the office was moved to Dubai in 1953. Abu 
Dhabi also gained a Political Officer directly subordinate to the Agent at Dubai until the 
office there rose to the level of Agent in 1961.  
 The reach and authority of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf was 
disproportionately extensive compared to the size of the area the office managed. Though 
the Trucial States were formally independent of the British Empire, the reality of the 
circumstances was such that the Resident could and did interfere in both local and foreign 
affairs of the Rulers. The Resident oversaw issues regarding customs, imports and 
exports from the Trucial States and the acquisition of any land required for foreign 
nationals. He also served as the appellate judge for all of the British courts in the Arab 
states of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, he was charged with preserving British economic 
interests in the Trucial States.29   
The Political Agents were responsible for a wide variety of administrative tasks 
within the Trucial States in addition to their responsibilities of implementing and 
enforcing decisions from the Political Resident. The Political Agent maintained contact 
between the Rulers and the Political Resident, was in charge of decisions concerning 
foreign affairs that could be resolved without the Resident, and served as judge for the 
British court in the Trucial States, which maintained jurisdiction over a growing number 
                                                 
28 Zahlan, Origins of the United Arab Emirates (1978), 22-25.  
29 Kazim, United Arab Emirates (2000), 213. 
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of British subjects and protected persons.30  The Agent also served as an assistant judge 
in the Joint Court for cases in which the parties fell under both British and local 
jurisdiction. 
The British Government provided ample military support to the Political 
Resident. At sea, he could rely on the Royal Navy‘s Gulf Squadron to enforce any 
decisions the British Resident enacted should the rulers refuse to cooperate.31 This was 
the primary source of military force throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. After 1951, the Political Resident also had an armed force at his disposal in the 
form of the Trucial Oman Scouts.32  The Scouts, originally called the Trucial Oman 
Levies, grew from seventy men to more than 1,000 and were under the sole authority of 
the Resident.  
These forces were ostensibly intended for the purposes of protecting British 
personnel and providing support for defense commitments in the area. The Trucial Oman 
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Scouts, in particular, were primarily a frontier force that secured disputed borders with 
Saudi Arabia.33  In a number of cases, however, the British intervened militarily in what 
were arguably local, internal affairs.  
During the 1820s, the British navy sought to establish an offensive policy that 
demonstrated Britain‘s commitment to maintaining the peace treaties. In cases of 
maritime violence during this period, naval leadership sought to establish precedents that 
would discourage future incidents. In 1825, for example, a Qasimi attack on a Bahraini 
vessel. In response, the Senior Marine Officer met with the ruler of Sharjah, Sultan ibn 
Saqr in order to gain his cooperation in punishing the offenders. This event caused Saqr 
to take a more proactive role in future incidents in order to forestall British interference. 
When, three years later, an incident between a Qasimi ship and another from Oman broke 
out, Saqr imprisoned and then killed the Qasimi commander.34 Such intervention, 
however, was not limited to ―piratical‖ activities. They were also extended to cases where 
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land-based rivalries extended into the sea, as was the case with the Bani Yas of Abu 
Dhabi and the Al Bu Falasah of Abu Dhabi. Between 1839 and 1841, Britain responded 
to reports of fighting on the pearl banks by dispatching a cruiser to order the sheikhs to 
control such activities.35 
After 1951, the Trucial Oman Scouts became the more readily available force 
involved in maintaining British interests in internal affairs. Despite the fact that they were 
intended originally for the purposes of maintaining frontiers, there were occasions where 
the resident used the TOS to enact political changes. In 1954, for example, the Trucial 
Oman Scouts assisted in preserving Sheikh Sa‘id bin Maktoum‘s rule in Dubai when it 
was potentially threatened by his brother, Juma.36  Of greater significance, however, was 
the 1966 removal of Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi from power and Britain‘s 
replacement of him with his brother Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan.37    
  
 
BRITISH AIR AND OIL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB GULF 
 
British involvement in the affairs of the Trucial States, and particularly the lower 
Arab Gulf, increased in the inter-war years with the discovery of oil in several of the 
upper Gulf States and the advent of the air route to India. The two developments 
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intensified British commitment to its position in the Persian Gulf. They would also serve 
to draw the Arab states into the world economy and regional politics. Before the Great 
War, the Arab Gulf had been isolated by British protection; by the end of World War II, 
the Gulf States were inextricably enmeshed in both the global strategy of the British 
Empire and, subsequently, the politics of the Arab world.  
The Trucial States had gained strategic significance in the 1930s as a stop on the 
Royal Air Force air route to India.38  The British government had begun to place 
increasing value on the use of air forces for the purposes both of maintaining 
communication between its positions in the Middle East and India, as well as in putting 
down anti-British rebellions in its Middle East mandates.39  Airpower had been used with 
success in various parts of the Arab world at the end of the war and after. After the war, 
Britain sought to withdraw its troops from abroad and reduce the expense of the war; at 
the same time, however, Britain had faced insurrections in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq. The 
British Cabinet lauded the successful use of airpower during and after the war in a report 
in 1921, stating that, ―In more distant theatres, however, such as Palestine, Mesopotamia 
and East Africa the war has proved that the air has capabilities of its own.‖40 The 
                                                 
38 Zahlan, Origins of the United Arab Emirates (1978), 92-106.  
39 Ibid., 93-97. Zahlan argues that the development of the air route to India was a crucial element in the 
deepening relationship between Britain and the Trucial States in the 1930s. This view has been endorsed in 
Kazim, The United Arab Emirates (2000), 189-93. Britain‘s growing dependence on air power for 
controlling dissident populations in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq and ―Arabia‖ is discussed in 
Priya Satia, ―The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia,‖ The American 
Historical Review 111, no. 1 (2006): 16-51.  
40 Air Staff, ―On the Power of the Air Force and the Application of that Power to Hold and Police 
Mesopotamia,‖ March 1920, AIR 1/426/15/260/3, PRO quoted in Satia, ―The Defense of Inhumanity,‖ 
American Historical Review (2006), 26. See also H. Burchall, ―The Politics of International Air Routes,‖ 
International Affairs 14, no. 1 (1935): 89-107.  
 34 
capabilities of airpower in the region led to the expansion of its use in the Persian Gulf in 
the following decade.  
In the course of the 1930s, Britain negotiated a series of concessions with the 
sheikhs of the Persian Gulf to establish air installations. Britain built a landing strip in 
Bahrain, as well as another in Muscat, Oman in 1930, and a third in Kuwait in 1931. In 
addition to landing facilities, Britain sought to create auxiliary facilities for fuelling and 
storage. These were more difficult to obtain permission for, as both the rulers of Dubai 
and Ras al-Khaimah attempted to resist pressure to concede to the establishment of fuel 
storage facilities and airports for night service between 1930 and 1937. Both rulers 
eventually capitulated; Sheikh Sultan bin Salim al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah permitted 
British storage facilities under threat of a naval bombardment and Sheikh Sa
c
id al-
Maktoum finally authorized an airport in Dubai in 1937. Another airport was built in 
Sharjah in 1932.41   
These installations further entrenched Britain‘s commitment to a military 
presence in the Persian Gulf; but it was the oil concessions established between the 1920s 
and 1930s which solidified Britain‘s long-term presence in the region.42 Britain had 
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begun the process of monopolizing oil exploration rights in the Middle East in the early 
twentieth century when William Knox D‘Arcy obtained the first oil concession from Iran 
in 1901. The D‘Arcy Concession, as it came to be known, secured exclusive rights to 
D‘Arcy and his company to search for petroleum in Iran for sixty years, and in exchange, 
he would pay royalty fees to the Iranian government.  
This concession served as the model for subsequent oil agreements throughout the 
Middle East, including the Arab Gulf States. Just over ten years later, the British 
Government began securing assurances from the Arab sheikhs in the Persian Gulf that 
they would not grant exploratory concessions without Britain‘s agreement. By 1922, all 
of the Trucial States and Kuwait had agreed to negotiate all concessions through the 
British Government.43  In the interwar period, the competition between Western powers 
to gain access to oil led Britain to press forward with exclusive rulers in the Persian Gulf. 
Britain‘s Anglo-Persian Oil Company partnered with the American Gulf Oil Company to 
gain exploratory rights in Kuwait in 1934. The following year the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company gained concessions in Qatar. The first oil concession agreement on the Trucial 
Coast was reached in January 1939 between Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the 
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd.44   
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The agreements came at a time when the economies of the Persian Gulf were 
suffering from the Global Depression. The Persian Gulf economies had become 
constricted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as British monopolization of 
maritime trade eliminated the diversity of the Trucial Coast. Consequently, the main 
source of revenue in the region came from the pearl trade. Pearling became the primary 
source of income for merchants in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai, especially. With the 
advent of the Depression, world demand for luxury goods, including pearls, dropped. At 
the same time, world preference for natural pearls from the Persian Gulf declined in favor 
of Japanese cultured pearls. By the end of World War II, the pearling trade in the Persian 
Gulf had collapsed almost entirely.45  The economic decline in the Persian Gulf made the 
oil concession agreements more palatable, though it is reasonable to assume that 
resistance to such negotiations would have followed a course analogous to that of 
airpower-related concessions.  
The concession agreements did provide some immediate economic relief to 
Persian Gulf governments. The rulers of the various sheikhdoms received guarantees of 
annual royalty payments for anywhere between sixty and seventy-five years.46  They 
would also receive a percentage of the profits from oil sales when oil was discovered.  
Almost immediately, oil exploration paid off in some areas of the Persian Gulf. 
The Bahrain Petroleum Company began drilling for oil late in 1931 and found oil in the 
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late spring of the following year.47  Before World War II, Bahrain Petroleum had even 
succeeded in being the first of the Arab Gulf states to export oil. The Kuwait Oil 
Company began exploring in 1935, but did not have success tapping oil until 1938; the 
outbreak of war prevented the oil companies in both Kuwait and Bahrain from continuing 
production until after the war.48   
Elsewhere, the Arab Gulf states waited much longer to achieve any substantial 
benefits from oil exploration. The first discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 
Trucial Sheikhdoms did not occur until 1958. The Abu Dhabi Marine Areas found oil off 
of Das Island in Abu Dhabi; but even then the company was not able to produce and 
process oil until 1962.49 Between 1958 and 1962, two more major oilfields were 
discovered on shore in Abu Dhabi, immediately increasing the wealth and political 
significance in the Trucial States.50 Elsewhere in the smaller sheikhdoms, oil discoveries 
took place even later. Dubai‘s first commercial oilfield was first discovered in 1966, and 
subsequent oilfields only began production in the 1970s.51 Until the late 1950s, then, the 
smaller Trucial States were critical not for their oil wealth, but mainly for their proximity 
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to the oil states of Bahrain and Kuwait, and for their convenience en route to other areas 
of Britain‘s Empire. 
 
ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE PERSIAN GULF 
 
Arab nationalism played a defining role in the establishment of the UAE. The 
development of Arab nationalism all over the Middle East informed the Foreign Office‘s 
administrative policies in the Trucial States through 1968. Britain‘s decision to withdraw 
from East of Suez and especially the Persian Gulf was, in part, due to Britain‘s 
recognition that its presence as an imperial power in the area no longer served its 
interests. Instead, their presence it drew attention and criticism to the rulers Britain 
supported and relied on. In leaving the Trucial Coast, Britain hoped to return to an 
informal role in the Persian Gulf that would allow the British government to sustain its 
economic and political connections without subjecting its collaborators to nationalist 
opposition.   
Arab nationalism incorporated the belief that the whole of the Arab watn, or 
nation, was bound through common language, history, and culture; the creation of 
individual Arab states was the consequence of imperial forces that divided the Arab watn 
in the service of European interests.52 Arab nationalism had been a driving force behind 
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politics in the Middle East through the twentieth century and continued to be influential 
even as late as 1968.53  Three major events in the wider Middle East, which determined 
the trajectory of the Arab nationalist movement, did permeate the political atmosphere of 
the Persian Gulf States and ultimately served to define the way the Trucial Sheikhs 
viewed federation in the period of 1968-71.  
The first of these events, the ―Great Revolt‖ of 1936 and the subsequent General 
Strike in Palestine was the first major nationalist event to send ripples of opposition to the 
Persian Gulf. The events in Palestine only created relatively minor disturbances in most 
of the Arab Gulf.  Kuwait, Bahrain, and Dubai each experienced political movements in 
the 1930s that were triggered by the events in Palestine.  These events did, however, 
serve to bring attention to growing tensions between the Arab populations and the British 
presence in the states where Britain‘s presence in the region had most significantly 
altered the local political and economic structures.   
Britain obtained the Palestine Mandate following World War I and administered 
the territory until it withdrew in 1948. British officers in charge of the mandate were 
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tasked with establishing control over the Zionist immigrant population there and the local 
Arab population, which had previously belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Britain had 
promised to help the Zionists establish there a ―national home for the Jewish people‖ in 
the now infamous Balfour Declaration during World War I.54  The Arab inhabitants of 
Palestine rejected the creation of a new nation state within the boundaries of Palestine; 
Zionists argued that the Balfour Declaration promised exactly that. British administrators 
and policy makers attempted to establish a two-state solution.55   
Tensions between the opposing populations reached a boiling point in 1936 when 
violence broke out between Arab nationalists, angered by growing Zionist immigration, 
attacked Jewish immigrants in April. On 19 April, Palestinians formed the Arab National 
Committee and organized a general strike to protest Jewish immigration and British 
policy. The General Strike called for Arabs to refuse to work and shut down shops and 
subsequently refused to pay taxes. Several armed rebellions broke out among Arab 
peasants, which increased in number and frequency until British forces succeeded in 
quashing the uprising in October. 
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A brief lull followed the initial strike while Britain formed a commission to 
investigate the origins of the violence and propose a solution. In July 1937, the Peel 
Commission endorsed a plan for partitioning Palestine. The territory would be divided 
into a Jewish State, an Arab State and a shared Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs responded to 
the recommendations with a peasant-based revolt directed primarily at British forces. 
Britain responded with great force, deploying between 25,000 and 50,000 of its own 
soldiers, along with Jewish policemen, Zionist Haganah fighters and members of the 
Palestine Police Force. Despite the large numbers on their side, the revolt continued into 
1939.56 
The events in Palestine triggered outrage throughout the Middle East. In many 
countries, members of the community collected money to support the Palestinian cause. 
Merchants in Kuwait sought to do just that, but British officials discouraged the sheikhs 
from taking public positions on the Palestine question and the ruler prohibited public 
contributions. Sheikh Ahmad al-Jabir also refused to denounce the findings of the Peel 
Commission in 1937 when Kuwaiti merchants formed a committee to organize a protest 
against Britain.57    
The dispute between the merchant community and the ruler of Kuwait over 
support for the Palestinian cause set off a political conflict that had been brewing there 
for several years. Before the 1930s, the economies of the Gulf States relied heavily on the 
wealth generated by regional trade, particularly the pearl trade. The merchant community, 
                                                 
56 Matthew Hughes, ―The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab 
Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39,‖ The English Historical Review 124, no. 507 (2009): 314-54. Hughes‘ article 
examines the extent to which British colonial violence was systemic in the case of Palestine in 1936-39.  
57 Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States (1998), 36-39.  
 42 
because of its relative wealth and access to capital, served as a center of finance for the 
states and loaned money to the ruler and his family both for personal and government 
expenses. This arrangement established strong personal and political ties between the 
merchants and the rulers.58   
The 1930s marked a dramatic decline in the influence merchants enjoyed, 
especially in the major merchant centers of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Dubai. The global 
depression destroyed the pearl market, which was the main source of trade. Additionally, 
western oil companies offered the rulers of the various Gulf States concessions for oil 
exploration.59 The concessions granted oil companies the exclusive right to explore and 
extract oil in exchange for paying the individual rulers a yearly sum. The influx of capital 
from the annual stipends to the rulers freed the sheikhs from their dependence on the 
merchants.   
A group of Kuwaiti merchants made a list of reforms calling for changes that 
would allow them greater oversight in questions of trade as well as social services. 
Merchants who were not rounded up and arrested appealed to Sheikh Ahmad to establish 
an elective council. The council, consisting of 150 notables, elected a Legislative 
Assembly (majlis). Many of the reforms passed by the assembly dealt with local matters: 
they reduced market taxes, regulated the sale of food products, established schools and a 
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police force and repaired municipal buildings. Other reforms, however, sought to 
reestablish the merchants‘ position of influence at the cost of British power. When, in 
December, the majlis attempted to force Sheikh Ahmad to reject the payments for oil 
from the British-owned oil company. Ahmad responded by dissolving the majlis and 
dispersed its members with force.60 
The initial successes of the Kuwaiti reform movement inspired two more 
movements in the Persian Gulf that same year. Four hundred merchants in Dubai 
attempted to establish a majlis in order to press for social reforms and improve their 
economic plight. The majlis there was a consultative one, with fifteen members including 
the ruler.61  The new majlis established a number of important reforms and placed heavy 
emphasis on establishing a stronger education system. As with the majlis in Kuwait, 
however, the Dubai majlis lasted only a few months; and as with Kuwait, the dissolution 
of the council came in response to the council‘s efforts to limit the ruler‘s control over the 
state revenue.62   
The reform movement in Bahrain in 1938 took on a more outwardly anti-British 
tone than that of the Dubai and Kuwait reform movements. In response to the General 
Strike in Palestine, people in Bahrain circulated publications in the general population, 
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but again, the ruler chose not to publicly take sides with the Palestinian cause at the 
recommendation of the Political Agent there. As had been the case in Kuwait and Dubai, 
the reform movement that appeared in Bahrain at the end of 1938 was inspired in part by 
the political agitations throughout the region, but the reforms were aimed primarily at 
changing local circumstances.  
The merchant community of Bahrain, which had previously enjoyed influence 
with the ruling family, became further alienated from their position as a consequence of 
the oil revenue that came to form the basis of state revenue. By 1938, oil revenue had 
extended opportunities for education in Bahrain from just 600 students in 1930 to almost 
2,000 students in 1938.63 Many of the newly educated Bahrainis found themselves unable 
to gain access to the best-paying jobs at the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), 
where all but the lower labor positions were filled by British and American technical 
experts. Furthermore, the bureaucratization of government in Bahrain consequent to the 
expanding role of government in developing schools, state and municipal infrastructure, 
and health industries, had the undesirable effect of distancing the ruler from a population 
accustomed to direct access.64 
This time, British officials aided the ruler to curb the development of a full-
fledged majlis movement. Reformers held a number of meetings in which they called for 
changes to the administration of a number of British-directed institutions, including the 
passport office, police force and customs office. In late 1938, rumors of a coming strike 
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64 Zahlan, Making of the Modern Gulf States (1998), 64-66.  
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among oil workers led British officials to deport two leaders; dissatisfaction among 
laborers and the student-merchant coalition spread. BAPCO, in consultation with the 
Political Agent at the time, agreed to fire any workers who participated in the strike and 
the movement subsequently lost momentum.65 
A second wave of nationalism came in the 1950s following Gamal Abdel 
Nasser‘s ascent to the position of regional leader and international spokesman for anti-
imperialist, pan-Arab ideology. By this time, Britain‘s presence throughout the Arab Gulf 
states had expanded to penetrate more deeply the smaller Trucial States, which had 
largely remained outside of the earlier anti-British movements of the 1930s.  Members of 
the populations in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Dubai, all demonstrated increasing awareness 
of Britain‘s presence and interference in local affairs through public demonstrations and 
individual attacks on British property.  
The pan-Arab nationalist of the 1950s that Nasser came to personify had grown 
out of Arab resentment for Britain‘s part in the establishment of Israel and the weaking of 
the Arab states through the Mandate system. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 at 
the expense of Palestinians living under the rule of the British mandate aroused the anger 
of Arabs throughout the region. Following World War II, Britain lacked both the will and 
the resources to continue administering the territory, which was erupting in violence with 
greater frequency. British forces withdrew from the area that year without first finding a 
workable solution to the Palestine question.  
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Following the British withdrawal, the conflict between the Zionist and Palestinian 
communities changed to a regional struggle involving most of the Arab states. Following 
the British withdrawal, the Zionist forces declared themselves victorious and announced 
the creation of the state of Israel. In response, the Arab states entered the fray. Nominally, 
the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were combined under the leadership of a 
committee formed by the Arab League. In reality, they were unable to establish a unified 
plan of war; they also were neither properly armed nor trained to undertake the task of 
fighting Israeli forces that had been mobilized as an underground army for several years 
under the mandate.66   
 The poor performance of the Egyptian army against Israel led to revolutionary 
changes in Egypt that quickly extended through the region and impacted even the most 
isolated states in the Persian Gulf. Within the Egyptian army, a group of junior officers 
banded together to establish a command council that led a coup in 1952 to overthrow the 
British-supported monarchy in Egypt. The following year, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged 
to take over the Egyptian presidency. His personal charisma and his determination to 
make Egypt independent of imperial powers created a strong popular following.  
A few years later, in 1956, Nasser stood up to western powers publically and 
successfully when he nationalized the Suez Canal. Despite being built at Egyptian 
expense and with Egyptian labor in 1869, the Canal had remained under the financial and 
military control of foreign powers since its opening. When Britain declared Egyptian 
independence in 1922, the British maintained sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Following 
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the establishment of the Egyptian Republic in 1953, Britain still maintained military 
control over Suez for at least another two years, with the right to return to the Canal for a 
further seven years.  
In an effort to weaken British influence in the Middle East, Nasser sought 
financial support from the United States for funding the Aswan Dam project that would 
increase the amount of arable land in Egypt. He also openly opposed the British-
sponsored Baghdad Pact that sought to create a military alliance between Middle Eastern 
states centered on Iraq, the monarchy of which had been installed by the British in 1938. 
As the result of Nasser‘s pressure, King Hussein of Jordan removed his British military 
advisor, John Glubb ―Pasha‖ and refused to join the Baghdad Pact.67   
Britain responded to Nasser‘s threats to British hegemony in the region in 1956 
with an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in an effort to take reacquire the Suez Canal. In a 
secret operation with French and Israeli forces, Britain orchestrated a military take over. 
On October 29, Israeli forces parachuted into the Sinai desert. Two days later, British and 
French bombers provided support with a bombing campaign. Fighting between the 
British, French, and Israeli forces on one side, and Egyptian forces on the other, 
continued until American pressure for a cease fire brought fighting to an end on 
November 6, 1956. Despite the military successes of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion, 
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international pressure forced them to withdraw their troops.68  Nasser‘s victory solidified 
his position as an effective leader in Egypt as well as throughout the Middle East. It also 
seemed to confirm the power of Arab nationalism in the face of imperial forces and 
inspired Arab nationalists throughout the region for more than a decade after Suez. 
This time, the Persian Gulf States felt the impact of nationalism much more fully 
than they had in the 1930s. Several Emirati figures recall the impact of Suez in their 
memoirs. Easa Saleh al-Gurg was nearly thirty and completing his studies in England 
during the Suez crisis and in the months following when the extent of Britain‘s 
involvement became public. When Anthony Eden resigned from office in January of the 
following year, al-Gurg recalled viewing the event ―…as a victory for what Nasser and 
Arab Nationalism represented.‖69   
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 49 
The most prolonged response in the Persian Gulf came from Qatar. Immediately 
following the invasion of the Suez Canal, shops in the market closed in protest and public 
demonstrations of outrage continued for several days more. Qatar‘s response also 
disrupted oil distribution in the Gulf. Not only did protesters cut off pipelines near the 
refinery in the wake of the attack, but Qatar‘s Sheikh Ali refused to export Qatari oil 
through Bahrain in objection to Britain‘s support of Israel.70  In December 1956, people 
in Kuwait sabotaged oil company installations.71 In the remaining Trucial States, there 
was not much of an organized response, but traces of nationalist and Nasserist activities 
surfaced in the Persian Gulf through the next decade.  
 
 
 The fate of the Trucial States was determined in large part by the British decision 
in 1947 to transfer the administration of the Trucial States from the India Office to the 
Foreign Office rather than the Colonial Office following Indian independence. The 
Colonial Office and Foreign Office were both considered as viable options for taking 
over the Trucial States. The Colonial Office, in many ways, was the more appropriate 
choice because of its experience developing infrastructure in colonies and because its 
staff seemed better equipped for the administrative needs of the Trucial sheikhs. The head 
of Near Eastern Affaires in 1966 added that though the Colonial Office would have been 
better suited to provide technical and administrative support, the decision to place the 
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Trucial States under the purview of the Foreign Office had been made, ―…out of concern 
for world opinion about the intrusion of British ‗imperialism‘ in this region and because 
of the major problems which arose for decision in the Gulf were seen as political in 
character.‖72  The Sheikhdoms, since 1947, were expected to function independently of 
the British Government at some future date. The question at the time was only ―when‖ 
and not ―if‖ they would become modern nation states.  
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Chapter 3:  Development, 1952-1967 
 
Britain‘s relationship with the Trucial Coast underwent significant changes in the 
1950s. The discovery of oil in Kuwait and Bahrain provided strong economic incentives 
for the British government to maintain its position of dominance in the region. To 
accomplish this, Britain established a greater political presence in the Trucial States 
where they hoped they would find greater oil reserves, and which they saw as an 
important strategic location for the protection of their economic interests in Kuwait and 
Bahrain in particular.  In order to boost stability in the lower Arab Gulf States, British 
officials began to exercise greater influence in the minutiae of the Trucial States‘ 
domestic concerns.  
The British government had been involved in mediating between the rulers of the 
various Trucial States since the early 19
th
 century. The British Residency arbitrated a 
number of disagreements between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai over the years, had 
determined the validity of rulers‘ claims in the smaller sheikhdoms, and had even in some 
cases, determined the very existence of the sheikhdoms by choosing whether or not to 
officially recognize those rulers‘ claims.73 In many ways, the rulers owed their very 
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sovereignty to the British government‘s intervention in local politics through the last 150 
years.  
 The economic and strategic changes in the Persian gulf during the inter-war 
period had not only drawn Britain further into the local politics of the region. They also 
attracted the attention of other Arab states. Money from oil concessions and exports 
flowed out to Palestine and Syria in the 1930s and 1940s from Bahrain and Kuwait, and 
merchants in the Persian Gulf followed the strikes and upheaval in the Levant with some 
interest. Perhaps more significantly, though, Arab laborers flowed into the Arab Gulf 
states looking for jobs in construction and oil. These new changes continued to occur at a 
time when the political milieu of the Middle East underwent dramatic changes as 
nationalist, anti-imperialist ideologies in Iran and the Arab Middle East came to dominate 
the public discourse.  
British officials in the Persian Gulf became increasingly concerned that 
nationalism would soon expand its influence to the Trucial Coast. British policy began to 
focus on expanding administrative and civic development to rebuff nationalist advances 
and keep the Trucial States closely aligned with British interests. The Political Residency 
developed a number of cooperative administrative institutions that were designed to 
streamline British decision making and policy implementation on the Trucial Coast in the 
post-war period. These included the creation of a Trucial States Council, which aimed at 
bringing the Trucial Rulers in the smaller sheikhdoms into greater cooperation with 
British policymakers.   
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These policies did help to increase the infrastructure and general coordination 
between the rulers of the Trucial States. Britain‘s increasing interference in the daily 
affairs of the Gulf, however, also served to intensify the tensions among the Trucial 
sheikhs, and between some of the sheikhs and British administrators.  Such frustrations 
tempted some of the Trucial rulers to seek alternative sources of patronage, including 
other Arab nations as well as regional organizations that threatened to undermine 
Britain‘s monopoly of political and economic influence in the Arab Gulf.   
 
THE TRUCIAL STATES COUNCIL  
 
The Trucial States Council, beginning in 1952, served as a forum for 
communication between the Resident and the seven rulers at a time when British 
involvement was growing in the Persian Gulf. The early agendas of the Council were 
determined by the Political Agent at Dubai with little input on the part of the rulers. As 
Arab nationalism gained currency in the wider Middle East and began penetrating the 
Trucial Coast, the Residency responded by encouraging the Trucial Rulers to take a 
greater part in the Council. This culminated in the creation of the Trucial States 
Development Council, which served to distribute oil wealth from the wealthier Trucial 
States, most notably Abu Dhabi, to the poorer states. By 1968, these two institutions had 
created the framework that would constitute the backbone of the federation in 1971; 
moreover, the role that Abu Dhabi came to play as the financier of development projects 
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within the Trucial Coast established that sheikhdom as a leading force in federation 
negotiations.  
 Administration of the emirates became increasingly complex following World 
War II. The Trucial States had gained strategic significance in the 1930s as a stop on the 
Royal Air Force air route to India.74 The discovery of oil added additional significance to 
the Persian Gulf‘s security. The oil exploration that began in the 1930s yielded significant 
results in the 1940s and 1950s. Kuwait and Bahrain began exporting oil in significant 
quantities in 1946 while Qatar‘s exports began in 1949.75 Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
continued to receive concession payments until the 1960s, when oil was discovered in 
commercial quantities.76 Consequently, British interest in the administration of the 
emirates grew exponentially in the decades after the War.  
The creation of oil and military facilities and their supporting industries required large 
numbers of people. The populations of the Trucial States were very small, and so laborers 
and experts were imported from throughout the Arab world and the British Empire and 
Commonwealth.77 An official census does not exist for most of the Trucial States until 
1968, so it is difficult to gain a clear picture of the population growth in the Trucial Coast 
before then. In Kuwait, however, Rupert Hay estimated in 1955 that the population there  
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1939 1962 1968 1970 
Abu Dhabi 
10,000 28,000 46,500 60,000 
Dubai 20,000 50,000 59,000 75,000 





10,000 24,500 30,000 





5,000 3,700 4,500 
Ajman -- 4,500 4,200 5,500 
Total  136,500 179,100 225,000 
Table 1:  Population Growth in the Trucial Coast in the mid-Twentieth Century78 
 
had nearly doubled from the approximately 100,000 people living there when oil was 
discovered in 1946.79 In Abu Dhabi, the picture of population growth patterns is less 
clear, but the population was estimated at 10,000 in 1939; in 1968, the population 
reached 46,500 and 60,000 in 1970. Similarly, Dubai grew from an estimated 20,000 in 
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1939 to 59,000 in 1968, and to 75,000 two years later. Sharjah witnessed an analogous 
expansion due to its position as a military post: between 1939 and 1968, the population 
grew from 5,000 to 31,500.80 The rapid population growth created a greater need for 
infrastructure and coordination. 
The British Residency created the Trucial States Council in 1952 to facilitate 
communication and coordination among the Trucial Sheikhs and the Political Agent in 
Dubai. The Trucial Council was organized as a consultative body in which the rulers of 
each of the lower seven sheikhdoms met to discuss and make recommendations on 
matters that affected all of the territories. The Political Agent at Dubai chaired the 
Council, which had no legal authority to implement laws and regulations. The Political 
Resident was not obliged to follow any of the recommendations made by the Rulers at 
Council meetings and the Rulers themselves were furthermore obliged by their special 
treaty relations to fulfill the requests of the Political Agent and Political Resident even if 
their decisions went against the recommendations of the council members.81  
 The Trucial States Council ostensibly began as a forum for including the Rulers in 
the decision-making process.82  Cynicism was apparent among the Rulers in the first 
meetings of the Council in 1952, however. Despite the Political Agent‘s request of the 
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Rulers‘ presence at the first meeting of the Council, the rulers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
both sent representatives rather than attend the meeting in person.83 Sheikh Shakhbut, the 
ruler of Abu Dhabi, also failed to appear at the second meeting in May 1952.84  
The tone and agendas of the first meetings did little to persuade the Rulers to take 
an active and meaningful role in the Council‘s proceedings. The Political Agent advised 
the Rulers on problems with efforts to control locusts and the establishment of a joint 
effort among the Trucial States to found a hospital in Dubai. More significantly, however, 
both the first and second Trucial Meeting addressed a problem of succession and 
sovereignty.  
The British Government had recognized the independence of the territory of 
Kalba from Sharjah in 1936. Until 1936, Kalba had remained part of the territory of 
Sharjah and was ruled semi-independently by a branch of the Qawasim. In the 1930s, the 
British Government attempted to gain an agreement with Sheikh Sa
c
id bin Hamad of 
Kalba through the ruler of Sharjah to gain permission to establish a landing strip. When 
Sheikh Sultan of Sharjah could not secure Sheikh Sa
c
id‘s acquiescence, Political Resident 
Trenchard Fowle opened direct negotiations with Kalba. In order to do this legally, the 
British Government recognized Kalba as an independent emirate on December 8, 1936.  
The Ruler of Kalba was assassinated in 1951 without an heir.85 The Political 
Agent notified the rulers that the British Government was abrogating its recognition of 
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the emirate of Kalba and would recognize the creation of the emirate of Fujairah from 
territory within Sharjah. According to the minutes of the first meeting, the Political 
Agent, ―reminded [the Rulers] of Her Majesty‘s Government‘s refusal to recognize Saqr 
bin Sultan bin Salim as Ruler of Kalba, or to accept murder as a title to succession in any 
Shaikhdom…,‖ and warned the Rulers against providing asylum to Saqr bin Sultan if he 
were expelled.86  Such a potent reminder of the British Resident‘s power in determining 
the legitimacy of any of the Sheikhs‘ sovereignty effectively stifled meaningful 
participation in the Council‘s proceedings.  
The Trucial Council met an average of twice per year through the 1950s and the 
1960s. Despite the difficulties the Political Agent faced in garnering the Trucial Sheikhs‘ 
interest and participation in the Trucial Council, and establishing cooperative efforts 
between them, the Political Officer at Sharjah commented that the Council nevertheless 
proved effective in bringing the Rulers together:  
…even in its present embryonic form… [the Council] serves a useful purpose in 
bringing the Rulers together, not only so that they may be faced with some of the 
problems that concern them all, but to instill in them a corporate sense which, 
owing to the distances between them, the lack of communications and their 
natural jealousy, has in the past been notably lacking.87 
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The very act of bringing the Rulers together, from the Political Resident‘s point of view, 
sufficed to begin the process of cooperation. 
 The view of the Trucial States Council from within the Trucial States and the 
wider Middle East did not reflect the optimism of the British civil servant. The Trucial 
States Council was viewed―…an entirely British institution....‖ 88 Throughout the 1950s, 
and 1960s, successive Political Agents complained about the Rulers‘ ―apathy‖ and 
―querulous‖ attitudes demonstrated in Council proceedings.89 
 The failure of the Trucial Council to garner the support of the seven Trucial 
Rulers became a more significant concern between 1952 and 1964 as the British Foreign 
Office became increasingly concerned about nationalist movements in the Persian Gulf. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the British Government faced growing anti-imperialist 
sentiment throughout its empire and particularly in the Middle East. By 1964, the Foreign 
Office felt sufficient pressure from Arab nationalist groups to create greater incentives for 
the Trucial Rulers participate in the British administrative structures. As early as 1953, 
the political agent recognized that the rulers would not contribute much energy to the 
Council meetings ―…until the Council has some real authority.‖90  
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DEVELOPMENT AND THE THREAT OF NATIONALISM   
 
The need to imbue the Council with ―real authority‖ and with some semblance of 
that authority coming from the local Rulers became a more pressing need as the 
nationalist, anti-imperialist ideology gained greater currency in the Middle East. Between 
the creation of the Trucial States Council in 1952 and independence in 1971 the under-
development of the Trucial States attracted criticism against the British from Arab 
organizations and independent nationalists.  
Bernard Burrows, as the Political Resident in the early 1950s, acted as the 
primary director of British policy in the Persian Gulf. He arrived at the Trucial Coast in 
1953 after serving the Foreign Office‘s interests from Cairo and Washington. He has 
been described as tall, imposing, and ―unflappable,‖ but also unpretentious and frank.91 
By the time Burrows had arrived in the Persian Gulf to serve as Political Resident, he had 
already faced the reality of nationalism and its impact on British strategic and economic 
interests in the region. Burrows had spent several years of his experience in British civil 
service in the United States, where he served as the Head of Chancery from 1950 before 
taking over as Political Resident in 1953. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company and the ensuing political crisis in Iran occurred during his tenure in 
Washington. He carried this experience with him to Persian Gulf.   
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 As Political Resident, Bernard Burrows and his subordinate administrators did 
not view nationalism as an immediate threat in the smaller Trucial States, but they were 
also determined to prevent it from becoming one.  Kuwait and Bahrain might be under 
nationalist influence in the nearer future because their oil wealth had created greater 
opportunities for those subjects to be exposed to the political ideologies of foreign 
workers and through education in Arab and European capitals.92 The remaining Trucial 
States, with their as yet unknown quantities of oil, were not immediately under threat of 
being exposed to Arab nationalism in the view of the Foreign Office. They were more 
likely at risk of being absorbed by Saudi expansionist policies. A small force from Saudi 
Arabia succeeded in occupying the Buraimi Oasis on the border of Abu Dhabi, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman. In order to gain support from the local populations, the Saudi 
Government drew attention to its ability to provide funds and support for development.93 
Burrows encouraged the use of the Trucial States Council as a means for improving the 
infrastructural development of the Trucial Coast for the purposes of maintaining their 
independence from outside regional forces. 
 Without the economic resources from oil in the Trucial Coast to fund local 
development, the states there lacked basic necessities. In 1952, the Trucial Coast only had 
one hospital, located in Dubai. The small hospital‘s finances were ―precarious,‖ 
employed only one British doctor, and had fewer than 20 beds. No formal schools at any 
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level had been established, either by the local Rulers of the British administration. Abu 
Dhabi lacked paved roads and electricity on most of the main island and in Al-
c
Ain until 
well into the 1950s.  
Water was the greatest concern for the Trucial Rulers. Throughout the Trucial 
Coast the sheikhdoms lacked sufficient water wells to provide for the local populations.94  
Drinking water for inland populations in Abu Dhabi had to be shipped in from Dubai, 
Qatar, and Iran. Even then, however, many Emiratis had limited access to fresh water, 
and had to dig shallow holes for short term wells. One Emirati woman described the 
experience from her childhood: ―It was hard work in the winter, and in the summer, when 
people needed more water, it was killing. And the water, it was bad, so bad-tasting that 
only people as thirsty as we were could force it down.‖95 
The dearth of government services such as health care and schools created 
resentment and frustration among the populations in the Trucial States. One account from 
Mohammad al-Fahim of Abu Dhabi, describes the consequences of this deficiency when 
his sister was injured in an accidental fire at home. The closest hospital was almost 85 
miles from his family‘s home in Al-Ain, Abu Dhabi.  
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My father and mother, myself and my other siblings all got into the Land 
Rover with my injured sister and headed across the desert from Al Ain [in Abu 
Dhabi] to Sharjah. Of course there was no road other than a sandy track that 
followed the route of the camel caravans so we got stuck many times along the 
way and the adults had to get out and push the vehicle. It took us two days to over 
a distance that can now be travelled in a couple of hours at most. By the time we 
arrived in Sharjah it was too late; my little sister had already died from the burns. 
It was an unfortunate accident. But equally unfortunate and completely 
unforgivable, was the fact that as late as 1957 there was not a single doctor in the 
Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi. Most of the rest of the world had easy access to 
doctors, medicine, and the latest in medical technology to treat the injured and ill. 
We, on the other hand, had nothing, not even the simplest and most basic medical 
services…it was only in 1961 that the first missionary clinic was established in Al 
Ain and not until 1967 that a hospital was built in Abu Dhabi.96  
 
These accounts and others like them had the potential to create hostility towards the 
British and the Trucial Rulers who cooperated with them, especially as the Trucial States 
came into contact with nationalist ideologies from the rest of the Middle East.  
 What Fahim‘s narrative also demonstrates is that it was not simply the lack of 
services that impacted local peoples‘ understanding of the Emirates‘ standing in the 
world.  In noting that, ―Most of the rest of the world had easy access [to services]… We, 
on the other hand, had nothing,‖ al-Fahim reflects a sense of injustice that other Emiratis 
have recalled.97 The increasing sense of frustration came from the awareness that other 
people in the region and throughout the world lived better. An older Emirati woman 
commented that ―God war merciful [in the years before oil]… Yes, merciful. We had no 
idea what was happening in other places; we did not know that other people took 
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hospitals for granted, we didn‘t know the whole world wasn‘t poor like us.‖98  Awareness 
of the disparity between the Trucial Coast and the surrounding states grew through the 
1950s and 1960s as nationalist movements in the Arab world sought to expose these 
conditions in the Persian Gulf. These inequalities provided nationalists with additional 
ammunition for their attacks on Britain‘s imperial presence in the region.  
 Nationalist movements had become a more significant threat to the British 
position in the Persian Gulf after 1952. The popularity of Mohammad Mossadeg‘s 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had alarmed the British Government. 
This incident in Iran caused members within the British Middle East Office to view the 
Trucial States and Kuwait as vulnerable to similar nationalist episodes. One official 
recommended that the Foreign Office consider focusing on pre-empting future nationalist 
activities in the Persian Gulf, ―…the more so because events in Persia and elsewhere 
have so clearly demonstrated the sensitivity of Great Britain and the Western Powers 
where oil producing areas are concerned.‖99 In the same year, junior officers in Egypt 
overthrew King Faruq and called for redistributing the country‘s wealth through land 
reform and government programs.100  
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Following Egypt‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, Britain‘s once 
ubiquitous authority in the Middle East had diminished significantly. By 1958, the 
popularity of Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism was 
widely apparent as rulers in Syria, Iraq and Jordan each attempted to demonstrate their 
independence from Western powers and their dedication to the cause of Arab 
nationalism.101 
Burrows‘ service in Cairo and Washington provided him with a unique 
perspective on the role of nationalism in the Middle East. The Egyptian monarchy had 
cooperated closely with the British government in the 1940s and early 1950s in an effort 
to limit the power of anti-British and anti-royalist political parties. Moreover, Burrows‘ 
time in Washington had coincided with Mossadeg‘s election and nationalization of the 
Anglo-Iranian oil company.102 He was thus an advocate of a pro-active policy that would 
preclude enthusiasm in the Trucial States stemming from the dissatisfaction created by 
poor living conditions. 
The growing public interest in nationalism and the nascent anti-imperialism in the 
Persian Gulf reinvigorated the British Resident‘s efforts to press for greater development 
in the Trucial States. The problem of financing development projects in the Trucial Coast 
became a central component in the thinking of Foreign Office officials, who hoped to 
prevent the extension of anti-imperialist and nationalist ideologies into the Trucial Coast. 
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To preempt criticism from the Arab League and Egypt, Bernard Burrows attempted to 
raise funds to improve development projects in the Trucial Coast. He approached both the 
British Government and the oil companies in an effort to raise funds in 1953. The oil 
companies refused to invest in development until they found oil in commercial 
quantities.103 The Treasury authorized £10,000 to help shore up the hospital and lay the 
groundwork for a single elementary school in Sharjah for the 1953-54 fiscal year.104  
The contribution towards development from the British Government provided 
sufficient funds to begin some small public projects on the Trucial Coast. In 1955, 
Sharjah opened its first elementary school.105  The hospital remained open, but by 1955, 
the Political Resident requested additional funds from the Treasury to expand the ward to 
18 beds, seating for a waiting area and provide electricity to the hospital.106   
Burrows recognized that annual funds from the British Government could not 
sustain the level of development necessary to keep Arab organizations out of the Persian 
Gulf. He approached Sheikh Shakhbut in 1954 and obtained the Ruler‘s promise to 
donate four percent of Abu Dhabi‘s oil royalties to a development fund for the whole of 
the Trucial Coast once oil became available.107 Even this promise, however, was 
insufficient, as he noted to the British Foreign Secretary:  
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Even if oil is discovered in Abu Dhabi this year, it will be at least three to four 
years before the other Trucial States start to benefit from the 4% of the annual oil 
revenue which Shaikh Shakhbut has promised to donate to the Trucial Council for 
the development of the Trucial States. If Her Majesty‘s Government is to 
maintain their position in the Trucial States in the interim period, they will have to 
bridge the gap between poverty of to-day and the plenty of to-morrow. If they fail 
to do this, Egypt, or some other Arab state, will step in and take their place.108 
 
 Burrows‘ concerns that Egypt would attempt to extend its assistance to the 
Persian Gulf proved valid. Between 1955 and 1965, Egypt began to approach the various 
rulers to offer its assistance in building schools, providing teachers and sending experts to 
the region. During a visit to Qatar, Anwar Sadat invited the Rulers of Sharjah and Qatar 
to participate in a conference on Islam. Fearing that the conference was a ruse for 
spreading Nasser‘s political ideology, Burrows discouraged the rulers from both states 
from sending representatives. By that time, however, it was becoming apparent that 
preventing contact between the Trucial Coast and the rest of the Middle East would be 
difficult at best.  
Burrows continued to push forward with development projects within the Trucial 
Coast, but it was becoming increasingly apparent that what the British Government was 
able or willing to provide was insufficient. The Ruler of Sharjah had accepted Egyptian 
teachers for the new school as well as two doctors. He had additionally agreed to send 
five boys as students to al-Azhar University in Egypt and ten more students to attend 
college in Damascus. Similarly, Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid of Ajman informed Burrows 
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that he would look to Egypt for help if he did not receive support from the British.109 
When Dr. McCaully of the Dubai hospital suggested creating a dispensary in each state, 
Shakhbut and his brother Zayid both ―expressed irritation‖ that they would not receive 
fully trained doctors.110  
Anxiety amongst British officials increased following Nasser‘s nationalization of 
the Suez Canal in the summer of 1956. Following the Suez Crisis in 1956, animosity 
between the British Foreign Office and the Egyptian Government increased. On July 26 
of that year, Nasser announced his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The canal, 
which had been opened in 1869, had remained under British administration even after 
Egypt‘s independence in 1924. Nasser had professed a foreign policy of non-alignment, 
which led to uneasy relations between Egypt and the American and British governments. 
When the United States and Britain refused to provide funding to build the Aswan Dam, 
citing Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, Nasser responded by taking over the Suez Canal. 
Britain cooperated with France and Israel in a failed attempt to re-capture the Canal.111  
British involvement in the Suez debacle severely damaged the British reputation 
throughout the Middle East. Nasser‘s charisma stirred feelings of nationalism within the 
Trucial States that autumn. Al-Gurg recalls his feelings for Nasser‘s vision, saying ―My 
friends used to tease me by saying that although my heart belonged to Gamal Abdul 
Nasser, my brain belonged to the British… my admiration for [British] dedication and 
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efficiency did not for one instant diminish my belief in the destiny of the Arab world 
which Nasser seemed to have come closest to realizing.‖112 Others saw Nasser‘s stance at 
Suez as inspiration to take action at home. A sixteen year-old Sultan al-Qasimi, the future 
ruler of Sharjah rebelled against the British presence in Sharjah. Al-Qasimi had watched 
British guards and planes in Sharjah during the Suez Crisis when he would visit the air 
base to play soccer on the British Labour Ministry team. Frustrated, he exhorted his 
friends to take action against the British along with him on November 7, 1956, saying: 
―We cheer daily for Egypt‘s victory and the disgrace and humiliation of the aggressors 
and we do nothing. Now we must do something!‖113 That evening, he and two of his 
friends sneaked out to the main communications station between the base and the city and 
set fire to it.114 
Throughout the Trucial States, there was not much of an organized response, but 
traces of organized nationalist and Nasserist activities surfaced in the Persian Gulf 
through the next decade. Bernard Burrows, the British Resident at Bahrain, reported the 
discovery of several ―subversive pamphlets‖ in 1956, which called on the people of the 
Gulf to  
…rise up and rebel against the enemy as other Arabs have done… [The British 
imperialists] stay as long as they can and will ignore the desires of the people. 
They take away the riches of the Gulf to their own countries. The battle is for life 
and death. The way to complete independence is by general strikes, co-operating 
together against the colonisers and their spies, demanding independence, joining 
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with our brothers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in Syria, Jordan and Yemen in a 
strong pact to enable us to fight together.115 
 
Such pamphlets continued to appear in the lower Gulf States through the 1960s and their 
messages were amplified by radio broadcasts from Egypt.116 
 The Political Agent at Sharjah reported that the Agency staff had increased 
security in Dubai and Sharjah, where rumors of possible strikes and demonstrations were 
circulating. Organized disruptions never materialized though there were several incidents 
of arson against British property and school boys from Sharjah had shouted anti-British 
slogans at British officers and members of the Trucial Oman Scouts. In Ras al-Khaimah, 
students were also suspected of defacing property, including the ruler‘s car.117 
Nasser‘s victory in Egypt inspired and influenced individuals in the Trucial 
States, but it did not manifest itself in organized political activity. In spite of this, British 
officials in the Persian Gulf became increasingly concerned that contact with Arabs from 
throughout the Middle East would lead to the radicalization of the populations there. 
Tripp discouraged the Trucial Rulers from importing employees from Egypt and Syria 
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who would spread of ―revolutionary ideas‖ at a meeting of the Trucial Council. He 
warned them not to, ―… uncritically accept the flashy and superficially ‗advanced‘ 
expatriates of other Middle East countries, who came to their States purporting to instruct 
them and to teach their children,‖ and that furthermore, the Rulers, ―… must be vigilant 
to see that their States were not undermined by the new and often revolutionary ideas 
which were being pumped into the Gulf by the emissaries of Egypt and Syria.‖118 The 
fear that Nasser‘s ideology would eventually reach the Trucial Coast guided British 
policy until the withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971.  
 
EXCLUDING THE ARAB LEAGUE 
 
Burrows, and the Political Residents that succeeded him, continued to rely on 
development to preserve British influence in the Persian Gulf. Britain‘s economic 
instability in the late 1950s and 1960s made it difficult for the British Government to 
provide sufficient material support for development at a pace that satisfied the rulers 
there. Increased contact between the Trucial Coast and the rest of the Arab world exposed 
Britain to frequent criticism and created tension between the Trucial rulers and British 
officials. In an effort to deflect comments from Arab leadership, the Political Resident 
increased the visibility of the Trucial rulers in administrative roles, particularly in the 
Trucial States Council and in the creation of a development fund.  
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Greater administrative roles for the rulers did not correspond to a lesser role for 
British officials. The Political Resident and the Political Agents continued to be involved 
in shaping administrative and development policies in the Trucial Coast. Between 1962 
and 1968 the Political Resident intervened directly in the internal politics of the Trucial 
States so that the political leadership of the Trucial Coast would remain aligned with 
British interests.  
The discovery of large quantities of oil in Abu Dhabi in 1962 provided the basis 
the Development Fund, which had been established for the purpose of advancing various 
programs for the modernization of the Trucial Coast. Abu Dhabi‘s new position as the 
wealthiest state on the Trucial Coast gave rise to tensions between Sheikh Shakhbut and 
British officials in the Gulf, and also between himself and the other rulers. Shakhbut 
sought to exercise autonomy in his spending, which brought him into conflict with British 
staff in the Persian Gulf. Abu Dhabi‘s potential as a strong political power also 
aggravated rivalries within the Trucial Coast; rulers of the poorer states attempted to find 
alternative means of support from the Arab League and Egypt. As a consequence, the 
Political Residents intervened in the internal politics of the Trucial Coast in the 1960s in 
order to ensure that the leadership there would cooperate with British policy.  
The arguments from the British Residency as to the wisdom of investing more 
extensively in the Trucial Coast fell on deaf ears in the Foreign Office. In 1955, Burrows 
submitted a five year plan for development in the Trucial States for the period of 1956-
‘57 through 1960-‘61. The plan detailed expenditures of £428,125 over the whole of the 
five year period to be spent on a wide variety of projects, including agricultural 
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development, water surveys for fresh water, public health, police forces, courts and 
schools.119 The Foreign Office had been providing only £31,000 each year and would not 
authorize further annual expense. 
The reason for the Foreign Office‘s failure to authorize the expense stemmed 
from the British Government‘s failing economic health. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
the British economy lurched from crisis to crisis. The trade deficit within the Sterling 
Area dropped off steadily as states that had been part of the British Empire, such as 
Nigeria and India, gained their independence and began to invest their financial surpluses 
in internal development. In response to Sterling‘s instability, the Treasury pressed many 
of the departments to cut their budgets.120  
Money for development came through alternative sources in the 1950s and 1960s. 
On several occasions, Burrows approached the Kuwaiti and Qatari governments for 
monetary gifts to provide new teachers and to improve harbor in Sharjah.121 The Ruler of 
Ajman provided 2,000 Rs in 1958 as a contribution to public health and education 
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projects in 1958.122 Sheikh Shakhbut also had funded several projects in Abu Dhabi, 
including a bridge connecting Abu Dhabi to the mainland and building public works in 
the form of desalination plants, a power station and a pipeline between the Buraimi oasis 
and Abu Dhabi town.123 Sheikh Rashid of Dubai had been more active in implementing 
projects, particularly in the realm of economic and administrative development. By the 
end of the 1950s, Dubai enjoyed the claim of not only being the home of the only hospital 
in the Trucial States, but also boasted a British-style post office and a branch of The 
British Bank of the Middle East, as well as a functioning municipal council.124 
The donations from the myriad sources and the annual ―niggardly‖ sum, as 
Burrows described it, from the British government did improve the circumstances on the 
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ground in the Trucial Coast in comparison to the decade before.125 The new Political 
Agent at Dubai, Denis Hawley, toured the Trucial Coast and noted that the ―visible 
evidence‖ of the improvements being made was small, but that there were agricultural 
developments in Ras al-Khaimah, as well as dispensaries in the various states and two 
schools in Sharjah and Abu Dhabi.  
Nevertheless, Hawley expressed concern at the failure of the British presence to 
modernize the Trucial States after such a long relationship with the states, writing that, 
―There is comparatively little to show on the ground for our long association with the 
Trucial States and what we have been able to do, of course pales before what has been 
done in the oil-rich States.‖126 In Kuwait and Bahrain, the cities had been transformed by 
the early discovery of oil; but the Trucial States lacked even the most basic services.  
Peter Lienhardt has described Dubai in the 1950s as the main center of trade in the lower 
Persian Gulf, but even this town lacked electricity with the exception of a few private 
electric generators, and boasted only ―two shops in the whole town had glass 
windows.‖127 Moreover, there were neither foreign newspapers nor loal newspapers in 
circulation; even had there been, most of the population of the Trucial Coast were still 
illiterate until the 1960s.128 
Hawley also observed greater local responses to the spread of nationalism in the 
Middle East than his predecessor had. The region experienced further anti-imperialist 
                                                 
125 Letter, Burrows (British Residency, Bahrain) to Selwyn Lloyd (FO), April 2, 1957. FO 371/126900. 
TNA. 
126 ―Preliminary Impressions of the Trucial States,‖ Despatch no. 21. D. F. Hawley (Political Agent, 
Dubai) to Sir C. H. Middleton, (Political Resident, Bahrain). December 30, 1958. FO 371/140087. TNA.  
127 Lienhardt, Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia (2001), 123.   
128 Ibid., 10.  
 76 
changes in 1958. That February, Egypt and Syria merged to create the United Arab 
Republic, which created a single Arab state under Nasser‘s leadership.129 Six months 
later, junior officers in the Iraqi army overthrew the British-backed Hashemite monarchy. 
Though the Trucial States had been sheltered from nationalist ideology for much of the 
twentieth century, the developments in 1958 reached closer to home. Hawley had 
observed young Arabs celebrating in the souq in Dubai following the Iraqi revolution.130 
When war broke out in 1962 in South Arabia between nationalist groups in 
Yemen and South Arabia, it confirmed for some members of the British administration in 
the Foreign Office and the Persian Gulf that nationalism was spreading into the Arabian 
Peninsula and would soon infiltrate the Persian Gulf on a heretofore unseen scale. The 
war escalated to a regional conflict. Nasser sent in Egyptian forces to back the nationalist 
forces and the Saudi government sent money and arms to support the royalist faction that 
had been overthrown. The war continued on through 1968 when the British were forced 
to withdraw from their position in Aden.131 
 Other isolated events further fed fears that anti-imperial nationalist sentiments 
were beginning to take root within the Trucial States in the early 1960s. The lack of 
educational and vocational training on the Trucial Coast created demand for foreign 
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workers in virtually every new field of social and economic development. Expatriates 
from the Middle East arrived to serve in various capacities in the Trucial Coast. 
Jordanians, Egyptians and Palestinians filled positions as teachers and became the 
primary suspects among British Officials for the spread of nationalist ideologies in the 
young male populations.  
 Events came to a head in 1964 when the Arab League requested visas to travel to 
the Persian Gulf that October to discuss establishing formal relations with the Gulf States 
and immigration.132 The Resident at that time, William Luce, sanctioned the visit in order 
to prevent drawing criticism from the Arab world despite concerns that it would open the 
gates to Egyptian and Iraqi nationalism. Luce viewed the visit, however, as part of an, 
―overt form of penetration‖ aimed at weakening the British position in the Persian 
Gulf.133 To combat nationalist aims in the Gulf, Luce warned the rulers not to make or 
accept any formal overtures made by the League.134  
He also argued in favor of a proactive strategy on the part of the Foreign Office 
based on creating a substantial alternative source of aid: ―In order to weaken the impact 
of any Arab League aid which may be forthcoming we should do everything practicable 
                                                 
132 Letter, William Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to T. Frank Brenchley (FO). June 23, 1964. FO 
371/174492. TNA. Luce served as Political Resident in Bahrain from 1961-66, following several years of 
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133 Letter, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Stewart Crawford (Assistant Under-Secretary, FO). 
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to increase aid for the northern Trucial States from other sources.‖135 Additionally, Luce 
believed that the best way forward would be to separate development funds from the 
Political Agency, which oversaw the Trucial States Council.136 
  The Arab League visit in October 1964 seemed to go smoothly from the British 
perspective. There were no security breaches and the rulers did not make any formal 
agreements with the Arab League. There were, however, indications that the Arab 
League‘s tour would have important political complications. The rulers reported that the 
League offered to provide funds for development and the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-
Khaimah, two of the poorest states, seemed inclined to accept the League‘s offer of 
funds. When members of the Arab League asked Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al-Qasimi 
of Ras al-Khaimah about support he was interested in receiving, Saqr suggested experts 
in a variety of technical fields as well as £2 million for building a bridge to connect Ras 
al-Khaimah and Dubai.137 Additionally, the Arab League continued to make overtures to 
Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan of Sharjah, who had welcomed the League‘s visit to the region 
enthusiastically.138 
Luce followed through with his earlier recommendations and responded to the 
Arab League‘s offers of aid with the creation of the Trucial States Development Office. 
The Resident had for some time been looking to imbue the Trucial States Council with 
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the appearance of greater involvement on the part of the Rulers. To that end, the Political 
Agent at Dubai relinquished his role as chair of the Council and the position was filled 
instead by one of the rulers. The Council then established a deliberative committee, 
which created the Development Office that would oversee the administration of funds for 
development. The new president of the Trucial States Council presided over the 
Development Office.139 These changes provided a semblance of local Arab control over 
the internal affairs of the Trucial States. 
The reality of the British role in the Trucial Council and the Development Office 
was that British officials and advisors retained active roles administering and steering 
development projects. The administration of the Development Fund fell to Development 
Secretary, Bryan Kendall, but within a month Luce began talking about Arabizing the 
leadership of the Development Office and appointed a prominent banker from Dubai, 
Easa Salah al-Gurgh to the position. Kendall stayed on with the Development Office 
under a different title.140 The Office expanded development in areas of agriculture and 
fishing, public health, public works and education. Higher positions in the Development 
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Office and its subsidiary offices were staffed almost exclusively by British staff and 
remained that way through 1971.141 
The Development Office had been intended to serve as a counter to the Arab 
League‘s offers of development aid. It did not serve to deter some of the rulers from 
continuing to work with the Arab League, though. Following the visit in 1964, the Arab 
League proposed setting up an office in Sharjah for funneling and distributing 
development funds to the Trucial States. Luce recommended quashing the idea at a 
Council meeting and instead to direct any monies from the Arab League through the 
Development Office.142  
Sheikhs Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and Rashid of Dubai agreed with Luce‘s position 
and Shakhbut offered to provide additional funds to the Development Fund to offset the 
League‘s offer. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia offered additional funds contingent upon the 
Trucial rulers‘ agreement to reject the Arab League. The rulers of the five smaller Trucial 
States refused to consent to those terms. The Political Agent at Dubai attempted to 
persuade the rulers of Ajman, Umm al-Qawain and Fujairah, but reported that they had 
rebuffed him, saying, ―Nobody has helped in the development of their States hitherto and 
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now they have an offer from the Arab League of extensive, cut-and-dried development 
projects with funds to carry them out.‖143  
Sheikh Saqr of Sharjah continued to be adamant in his support for the Arab 
League‘s offer. His acceptance of the Arab League‘s presence in the Trucial States 
threatened to undermine the British position there in the mind of the Political Resident 
and officials in the Foreign Office. Consequently, the Foreign Secretary authorized Luce 
to deny the Arab League members visas for future visits, ―… and to let the Rulers know 
that Her Majesty‘s Government are ready to forbid the establishment of an Arab League 
Office in the Trucial States and to take the necessary action if any Ruler should refuse to 
accept Her Majesty‘s Government‘s advice on this point.‖144 The Foreign Office was 
adamant that development, as a primary tool of British relations with the Trucial rulers, 
should remain the purview of the British officials in the Persian Gulf.  
Saqr continued to pursue the Arab League‘s invitation, and Luce responded with 
equal determination to prevent the establishment of the office. A flurry of telegrams and 
letters between Luce and the Foreign Office elaborated on the methods at the Resident‘s 
disposal to prevent League officials from entering the Trucial States. Owing to British 
control of air space and immigration, Luce believed he would be able to thwart any 
attempts at their arrival.145 In June 1965, Luce received consent from the Foreign Office 
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to close the airports at Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah; he also was allowed to use his 
discretion in withdrawing British protection to Sharjah.146  
The crisis gave rise to instability throughout the Trucial Coast as the rulers and 
the Political Resident waited to see whether a confrontation would emerge. Saqr‘s refusal 
to deny the Arab League an office in Sharjah appeared to infuse the rulers of Fujairah, 
Ajman, Umm al-Qawain and Ras al-Khaimah with the confidence necessary to defy 
British wishes. This gave rise to speculation among British officials that the rulers in 
those states would opt to withdraw their relations Britain.147 
Luce‘s efforts to keep the Arab League officials out of the Trucial States 
succeeded. On June 24, 1965, technicians from the Arab League attempted to fly into 
Dubai through the airport in Doha, Qatar. The airport at Dubai remained closed. A 
subsequent attempt to gain entry through Bahrain failed when the Arab League officials 
were denied entry there without visas.148  
The episode came to a close the following month when Sheikh Saqr of Sharjah 
was deposed and exiled. Easa Salah al-Gurgh describes the ambiguous circumstances of 
Saqr‘s removal in his autobiography:  
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The official version was that the deposition was the decision of a family 
council, the result of a loss of confidence in the Ruler‘s fitness to continue in 
office. The truth, as I understood it, was rather different.  
The Shaikh was invited to a meeting with the Political Agent. He set out, 
attended by various of his retainers and two armoured cars. On his arrival at the 
Agency a paper was waved in front of him which was alleged to be the record of 
the family council‘s decision. The Shaikh asked to see the paper; this was refused. 
In fact, it bore only one signature, that of the Shaikh who was to succeed him as 
Ruler—and who was later to be murdered by the exiled Shaikh. He was led out of 
the back door of the Agency, avoiding his armed retainers at the front, driven to 
the airport and put on a flight to Bahrain. He was said to have wept as he saw his 
sheikhdom disappearing below him.149 
 
The consequence of Saqr‘s removal was that the plan for an Arab League Office was 





 Sheikh Shakhbut served as another obstacle to British development plans. Though 
the ruler of Abu Dhabi did not incline toward revolutionary ideologies, neither did he 
agree with British priorities on the Trucial Coast. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, his 
resistance to the British Residents‘ pressure for more rapid modernization created 
tension. In the mid-1960s, the Foreign Office came to view his rule as atavistic, and 
worse, a potential threat to the British position in the region. As long as Shakhbut refused 
to cooperate in British-devised development schemes, he created opportunities for 
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nationalists to criticize the slow pace of development on the Trucial Coast. Once again, in 
1966, the British reached out to a ruling family—this time that of Abu Dhabi—to 
encourage and support Sheikh Zayid‘s ouster of his brother, Shakhbut. This move 
eliminated the last Trucial ruler whose contentious relationship with Britain could 
obstruct British policy and undermine British interests in the long run. 
 Shakhbut‘s rule in Abu Dhabi began in 1928. Throughout his rule, Britain‘s 
involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the Trucial States had grown, first through the 
growth of the new military presence with the air base in Sharjah; then through the influx 
of British technical and financial advisors with the establishment of the oil concessions 
and exploration; and then through the creation of the Trucial States Council and the 
management of development projects in the 1950s. As seen in the pages above, the links 
between Trucial affairs and British interests intensified as Britain‘s hold on other areas in 
the Middle East, particularly Suez and Aden, began to crumble.  
 Britain‘s plans for modernization were frequently at variance with Shakhbut‘s 
concerns about the immediate welfare of the people of Abu Dhabi and his concerns for 
the preservation of the tribal structures and links within the populations under his 
authority. One example of the disagreements over the prioritization of development 
between the British Residency and Sheikh Shakhbut came in the form of disputes over 
fresh water. Abu Dhabi‘s pre-oil economy depended heavily on the fishing and pearling 
seasons, which brought men from the inland oases out to the island where the city of Abu 
Dhabi is situated for part of the year. Fresh water on the island was limited to one main 
sweetwater well located at Qasr al-Hosn. As the population in Abu Dhabi grew in the 
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1950s, the well became an insufficient source of water.150 In numerous instances in the 
mid-1950s, Shakhbut and British officials argued over whether resources should be 
focused on the search for oil wells or for water wells. At one point in 1962, Shakhbut 
became so frustrated with British inaction that he brought in a man with a divining rod to 
search for water sources on the island. British officials watched and snidely criticized 
Shakhbut‘s efforts.151  
 British officials continually failed to recognize Shakhbut‘s concerns about the 
dislocation of tribal traditions that Shakhbut viewed as essential to preserve the fabric of 
local society. Shakhbut pressed forward with some development measures, including the 
establishment of a police force in 1959 and the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965. He 
also pursued some municipal developments at the behest of his British advisors, and 
invited Kuwait‘s Director General of Social Affairs and Labor to help plan a social 
services proposal.152 This concession on Shakhbut‘s part was a rarity, however.  In 
general, the sheikh preferred to avoid drawing on experts from Kuwait, Bahrain, and 
Qatar in particular because he viewed their influence with suspicion and viewed rapid 
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modernization as an unnecessary evil.153 Over time, the disagreements between Sheikh 
Shakhbut and British policy makers turned from contentious to suspicious and even 
fractious.  
Shakhbut‘s growing distrust of Britain and British development policies also 
seems to have created dissatisfaction within the al-Nahayan family.154 Shakhbut‘s 
reluctance to spend Abu Dhabi‘s revenue weakened the ruling family‘s ties with the 
tribes that had served as the support base. His brother and deputy ruler, Zayid bin Sultan 
al-Nahayan, met with British officials on several occasions in the 1950s and early 1960s 
to discuss the difficulties of Shakhbut‘s obstinacy and tight-fistedness and purportedly 
implied that his concerns were those of the whole family.155  
Zayid, Shakhbut‘s youngest brother had demonstrated his leadership skills in Abu 
Dhabi since 1946. He served as the wali, or governor, of Buraimi and was also the deputy 
ruler of Abu Dhabi. He attended the meetings of the Trucial States Council from its 
inception and maintained strong ties with tribal leaders throughout the emirate even in 
times of territorial wars with Dubai in the 1940s and 1950s. As wali, he had also moved 
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forward with several public service projects, including the building of the first hospital 
and lasting public schools in the emirate in the Buraimi oasis.156  
In 1966, in cooperation with British forces, Sheikh Zayid participated in the 
forcible removal of Shakhbut from Qasr al-Hosn in Abu Dhabi town. Most sources are 
vague or silent on the exact details of Shakhbut‘s removal. It is known, though, that a 
contingent of soldiers, led by Colonel Edward ―Tug‖ Wilson, took over the local state 
radio station, removed Shakhbut from his palace, and escorted the former ruler to the 
airport ―to start an honourable exile.‖157 From 1966 until his death in 2004, Sheikh Zayid 
served as the ruler of Abu Dhabi.  
 
 
 Between 1952 and 1968, the British government‘s policy toward the Trucial 
Coast came to depend increasingly on expanding development projects there. The lack of 
economic resources in the Trucial States until the mid-1960s prevented development 
from occurring at a rapid pace. Furthermore, Britain‘s reluctance, and perhaps its 
inability, to extend its own economic resources to the Trucial Coast development drew 
criticism from not only the Sheikhs of the Trucial States, but also from the wider Arab 
world. The rise of Arab nationalism in the Middle East during the period under study, 
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combined with increased exposure in the Trucial Coast to the ideologies of nationalism, 
created tensions between the British government and its protected states in the Persian 
Gulf.  
 British officials in the Persian Gulf attempted to promote British interests in the 
region by expanding the roles that Trucial rulers could play in the administration and 
development of their sheikhdoms. The Trucial State Council, and eventually the Trucial 
States Development Office, began as initiatives on the part of the British government to 
deflect criticism from the wider Arab world, and particularly from Egypt. The Trucial 
States‘ isolation from world politics could no longer be sustained. The very development 
that British policy makers hoped would uphold the British position in the Persian Gulf 
exposed the Trucial Rulers and the populations there to the changing global political 
atmosphere. Foreign workers from throughout the Middle East and South Asia brought 
with them their nationalist and anti-imperialist philosophies.  
 While it is difficult to quantify the degree to which the rulers subscribed to Arab 
nationalism, it became apparent by 1965 that nationalism at the very least provided the 
rulers with a powerful tool. In the mid-1960s, Britain still proved willing to use its 
political might to sustain its position in the Persian Gulf and promote its own interests 
there. Once the decision to withdraw was made in 1968, however, the largely superficial 
offices created for the Trucial Rulers in the Trucial Council and the Development Office 




Chapter 4:  Withdrawal, 1952-1968 
 
On 16 January 1968 the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announced to Parliament 
that the British government would withdraw all of its troops from the Persian Gulf no 
later than December 31, 1971.158 The decision came as a surprise to many in both Britain 
and the Persian Gulf. No one expected the British to remain in the Gulf forever, but this 
total withdrawal seemed precipitate. Members of the Foreign Office and British civil 
servants in the Trucial States had considered the mid-1970s as the earliest possible target 
for independence.159 Wilson gave no indication when he took office in 1964 that he 
seriously considered a substantial reduction in Britain‘s military commitments in the 
Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. Most ministers in his cabinet furthermore favored 
maintaining Britain‘s East of Suez role in order to protect economic interests and uphold 
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Britain‘s role as a global power. Four years later, however, Harold Wilson reversed his 
position.  
 Wilson‘s announcement came after the convergence of two crises that forced the 
government to reexamine its global strategy.  Following decades of economic instability, 
the Treasury devalued the British Pound.  Since World War II, Arab oil states‘ 
investments in Britain‘s economy had helped to buoy the Sterling Area.  Britain increased 
its commitment to the defense of the Persian Gulf in order to ensure the continued flow of 
oil money into Britain‘s imperial reserves.  In the 1960s, however, the threat of Arab 
nationalism continued to encroach on British-administered territories—moving further 
east to Southwest Arabia and dislodging Britain from its Crown Colony in Aden in late 
1967. It seemed increasingly likely that Britain‘s position in the Persian Gulf would come 
under threat next.  
 In January 1968, then, Wilson‘s decision to leave the Persian Gulf was not a 
withdrawal from Britain‘s interests there.  Rather, it was the reformulation of Great 
Britain‘s relationship with the Arab Gulf States.  Wilson was unwilling to invest 
militarily in the maintenance of Britain‘s military and administrative presence in the Gulf 
in the face of growing anti-British sentiment in the Middle East. Instead, he opted to 
protect the British relationship with the Trucial Rulers, and through them British 
economic interests, by publicly eliminating Britain‘s imperial profile there. This decision 
risked the possibility of other foreign powers gaining a share of the Arab Gulf‘s 
economic markets; but in leaving while the relationship with the Trucial Rulers remained 
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cordial, Wilson could hope to preserve British interests more effectively than if Britain 
were forced to leave as it had been in Egypt and Aden. 
This chapter examines the circumstances and decision-making process that led 
Wilson‘s Labour Government to abandon its military commitment to the Trucial States in 
the Persian Gulf. The decision was based on the convergence of an economic crisis in 
England and the rise of Arab nationalism in the Arabian Peninsula, the latter of which 
manifested itself in the fall of Aden to nationalist forces in South Arabia. The decision to 
withdraw by the end of 1971 was intended to protect British interests in the Gulf by 
preventing future economic crises. More importantly, a withdrawal at an early date— and 
on British terms, would favor the continuation of Britain‘s presence in the Gulf in an 
advisory role. In this way, Great Britain would continue to exercise influence and 
maintain informal control on the Trucial Coast without attracting the criticism of anti-
imperialists in the region.  
 
NATIONALISM AND EAST OF SUEZ 
 
 
The British Government faced pressure from anti-imperialist groups all over its 
empire following World War II. In Africa, Asia and the Middle East, nationalists 
undermined British influence in calls for independence. These movements, particularly in 
Egypt and Malaysia unbalanced British authority and drove up actual and future costs of 
maintaining the empire. Arab nationalism in Egypt in the 1950s forced Britain to shift its 
security policy from the Suez Canal to Aden. Even as Britain refocused its East of Suez 
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forces on the Arabian Peninsula it once again became the target for nationalist 
movements, which ultimately contributed to Harold Wilson‘s decision to withdraw from 
East of Suez by the end of 1971. 
Several events had already begun to dislodge the British from their traditional 
spheres of influence in the Middle East.160 British authority in the region waned 
following its retreat from Palestine in 1948. Britain‘s departure and the Arab armies‘ loss 
to the Zionists created popular frustration with the local governments throughout the 
Middle East. In Egypt, the defeat culminated in the ouster of King Faruq at the hands of 
junior officers in the army. The coup eventually brought Gamal Abd al-Nasser to power. 
He and his fellow junior officers cultivated popular support on the basis of Arab 
socialism.161 This doctrine primarily targeted internal reforms, such as land redistribution 
policies that would benefit the peasants of Egypt. An important element of Arab 
socialism, however, called for uniting Arab states against foreign governments that 
undermined the sovereignty of Arab governments.  
To many in the British government, this ideology smacked of Soviet influence.162 
When Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, it seemed to 
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countries that espoused Arab socialism and, more generally, non-alignment as Soviet allies. American 
Secretary of State John Dulles had commented in a memorandum to President Dwight Eisenhower that 
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confirm British policymakers‘ fears. This decision brought an end to the influence Britain 
had enjoyed in Egypt since the occupation in 1882 and threatened the very foundations of 
British influence in the Middle East. Until 1956, Suez had served as the nexus of British 
economic and security interests. At the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, approximately 
25% of Britain‘s total trade traveled through the Suez Canal. Moreover, oil from the 
Persian Gulf constituted some 65% of the total northbound traffic through the Suez Canal 
by 1955.163 Nasser‘s decision to nationalize the canal threatened Britain‘s economic 
security; its direct route to military bases located in the Indian Ocean and beyond; and 
marked a significant loss to British prestige in the Middle East. 
The British government, under Prime Minister Anthony Eden, responded in 
October with a joint military operation in cooperation with Israel and France. Combining 
a ground invasion and an air assault, the attack succeeded in advancing troops to the 
Canal Zone; international opposition, however, forced Britain, France, and Israel to 
retreat. Operation ―Musketeer‖ had succeeded only in diminishing British power in the 
region further while increasing popular support for Nasser and his strident opposition of 
                                                                                                                                                 
American foreign policy toward Nasser should, ―…let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as 
he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the 
United States. We would want for the time being to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser 
irrevocably into a Soviet satellite status….‖ Memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to President 
Eisenhower, March 28, 1956. #3.11. Britain and Suez: The Lion‟s Last Roar, ed. Scott Lucas (New York: 
St. Martin‘s Press, 1996). H. W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence 
of the Third World, 1947- 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Avi Shlaim and Yezid 
Sayigh, eds. The Cold War and the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). See especially 
the chapter by Adeed Dawisha, ―Egypt,‖ 27-47 and ―The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold 
War,‖ by Fred Halliday, 6-26. 
163 Alan B. Mountjoy, ―The Suez Canal at Mid-Century,‖ Economic Geography 34, no. 2 (1958): 155-67 
provides a detailed discussion of the changes in trade through the Suez Canal from the 1930s through the 
nationalization of Suez. Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East (2009) provides a clear 
discussion of the Suez Canal‘s place in the economic well-being of the British Empire in the 1950s as 
Britain attempted to shore up the Sterling area as cornerstone of British economic policy.  
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the British presence in the Middle East. Most distressing for the British, however, was the 
loss of Suez as their nerve center in the Middle East.164  
Aden became the new linchpin in British foreign policy following the retreat from 
Suez.165 From the time of the British invasion of Aden in 1839 until the 1950s, Aden 
remained secondary in importance to British foreign policy. The acquisition of Aden in 
the nineteenth century grew out of the same interests that drove the British to form 
treaties with the Trucial States in the Persian Gulf: namely, the monopolization of trade 
and sea routes in and around India. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
Aden remained a fortified base, but its role was that of a secondary line of defense. In the 
interwar years, Aden took on greater significance as an air base, but not until the 1950s 
did Britain begin investing heavily in infrastructure there. The city expanded as a coaling 
station, bringing ships and increased trade through sea traffic. In 1952, as commercial oil 
                                                 
164 A detailed account of the events of Suez remains outside the scope of this work, though the 
consequences of the nationalization cannot be overstated in regard to its impact on the British imperial will 
as well as the more concrete problems of security and influence in the Middle East. See Kyle, Suez (1991); 
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Port (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) is a unique approach to the study of Aden‘s 
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between Adeni trade and its economic interdependence with hinterland tribes, pp. 66-67.  
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exports from the Persian Gulf grew, Aden developed an oil refinery. When the British 
lost Suez in 1956, they shifted their Middle East naval base 1400 miles east to Aden.166 
The move to Aden did not alleviate the problem of growing anti-imperialism 
against the British. One by one, Britain was losing its toe holds in its former Arab 
mandates. Only months before the Suez crisis, King Hussein of Jordan limited Britain‘s 
influence there when he ejected John Glubb ―Pasha‖ from his position as commander of 
the Arab Legion in Jordan in an effort to deflect criticism from rival Arab leaders.167 In 
1958, a bloody coup in Iraq overthrew the monarchy there and effectively ended Britain‘s 
relationship with its last ally in the heart of the Middle East.168 The base at Aden and the 
handful of small states along the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula had thus become 
the last vestiges of the British Empire in the Middle East.  
British policy in the Gulf from the mid-1950s onward had focused on protecting Aden 
and the Persian Gulf from Arab nationalist movements, but Aden proved a less stable 
base than policymakers hoped. South Arabia became a regional hot spot in the 1960s 
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when a local conflict for power in the area developed into a battleground for Arab 
nationalism.169 British responsibilities in Aden consisted of the administration of Aden as 
a Crown Colony, but also maintained a treaty-based relationship with the principalities in 
South East Arabia. To the North, the Yemen was governed by the Zaidy Imamate.170 
Harold Macmillan had pushed for, ―the highest possible measure of internal self-
government,‖ in Aden soon after taking office.171 To that end, he supported a nascent 
federation of the protectorates in Southeast Arabia that bordered Aden. The government 
also spent approximately £1 million each year to strengthen the Federal Regular Army 
and Federal Guard.172 The Conservative Prime Minister did not consider full 
independence in the near future, though, because Aden and the South Arabian Federation 




                                                 
169 Gavin‘s chapter on Britain and the Civil War in Aden provides an excellent explanation of the various 
internal forces that brought events in Aden to a head. His discussion of the rise of unionism as an anti-
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possible to forecast when [independence] will be achieved.‖173 This strategy, the Foreign 
Office hoped, would allow the British government and local leaders to demonstrate 
progress toward independence to nationalists without jeopardizing oil supplies and 
British influence in the region. 
Nationalism bled over into the Arabian Peninsula in spite of the Foreign Office‘s 
plans. Economic and demographic changes that had been taking place in the Yemen and 
South Arabia for decades gave rise to discontent among the Adeni populations. The 
population within Aden was largely immigrant merchants and laborers in the early part of 
the 20
th
 century. When Britain built the new refinery and expanded the military industries 
magnified the immigrant labor population expanded exponentially. By the 1950s, the 
demographic shift created divisions between the urban and largely immigrant populations 
laboring in Aden and the nomadic and agricultural local populations outside the city. In 
Aden itself, the working population became increasingly restless over living standards 
and wages. Laborers organized no fewer than seventy strikes in 1956 alone. This general 
dissatisfaction found a voice and a cause to rally around in the person of Nasser, whose 
―Voice of the Arabs‖ radio broadcasts reached even Bedouin in the South Arabian 
hinterland.174  
The push for self-rule in South Arabia began in 1957. In establishing self-rule, 
Macmillan hoped to diffuse the growing hostility being focused on British rule. To that 
end, the Colonial Office encouraged the establishment of a federation among the South 
                                                 
173 “Future constitutional development in the UK dependent territories‖: CO memorandum for the US 
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Arabian principalities. The process of federation was initially meant to proceed slowly. 
Over several years, the principalities would establish a federal police and military force, 
and sufficient stability to preserve British interests in the oil refinery and naval base once 
they left.  
 Plans for the federation accelerated in 1959 as Nasser began making overtures to 
leaders in Yemen, north of the principalities in South Arabia. Ahmed bin Yahya, the ruler 
of Yemen from 1948, grew increasingly hostile to the British presence to the south of 
him. He began making overtures to Nasser and the United Arab Republic and joined in a 
confederation with the UAR. Britain‘s response to Nasser‘s growing influence in the 
Arabian Peninsula was to move forward with the federation project between six of the 
principalities in Southwest Arabia. In 1962, Ahmed died and his son, Hamid al-Din, took 
over. He was a much more conservative leader than his father had been, and was inclined 
to work with the British as such.  
Civil war broke out between Royalist forces in support of Hamid, and the 
republican nationalist forces that ousted him. In 1963, Nasser demonstrated his support 
for the Republicans by sending troops and supplies. Saudi Arabia, believing that Nasser‘s 
involvement in the Yemen was an extension of a communist threat the Saudi government, 
responded with arms and money to the Royalist faction supporting Hamid al-Din. 
 The war in Yemen quickly spilled over into South Arabia. Even as the British 
pushed for expanding the federation in South Arabia, the situation in and around Aden 
deteriorated. Egypt‘s support in the north inspired Republican supporters in and around 
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Aden to take action against the British police and Federal forces. Violence continued 
until Britain withdrew from Aden and South Arabia in November 1967.  
Nasser‘s involvement in the war led British policymakers to reconsider their 
position in Aden. In a brief for Macmillan, the Commonwealth Office posited that, while 
British policy, ―… is to lead the people of the Federation to sovereign independence as 
soon as practicable…‖ these plans would have to be delayed in order to maintain control 
of the base to protect the Trucial and Kuwaiti governments.175 The situation in Aden 
disintegrated rapidly. Nasser had immediately sent 15,000 soldiers to support the 
republican government in northern Yemen after they had overthrown the Royalist 
government; three months later, their numbers had doubled. By early 1965, Nasser sent 
approximately 45,000 Egyptian troops to aid the Republican forces in Yemen.176 The 
conflict quickly spilled over into the South Arabian Federation.177 Support for Republican 
forces from within Aden and in the hinterland began to clash with the Federal Army and 
British police forces.  
In response to Egypt‘s involvement in the north and growing instability in 
southern Arabia, the Ministry of Defense reported the need for increased commitments. 
British forces required additional funds and modern equipment as well as reequipping 
helicopters and ammunition. Additionally, military operations would have to expand to 
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approximately 75 kilometers north to the city of Radfan.178 Following a visit to the 
colony, Lieutenant General Baker reported that, ―The general situation, both political and 
military, had deteriorated markedly throughout the Federation since my last visit eleven 
months ago,‖ and he argued for imposing ―direct rule‖ in addition to expanding forces 
there.179  
Only nine months later, a defense review advised Harold Wilson‘s cabinet that 
Great Britain could not expect to stay in Aden beyond 1968. Military failures in Aden 
joined with a balance of payments crisis in 1964 to lead the Defense and Oversea Policy 
Committee to speculate about the benefits of withdrawing in 1968. 
If we withdrew from Aden (this is likely to be forced on us anyway) and built up 
our forces in the Persian Gulf to enable us to continue to meet the Kuwait 
commitment and to stay in the Gulf until we have prepared the Gulf States and 
Iran for our withdrawal, the cost in 1969-70 would be higher by £14 Million, i.e., 
£46 million (saving of £21 million) and there would be capital expenditure before 
1970 of £22 million.180 
 
It seemed possible that if the government could sustain its position in Aden through a 
withdrawal in 1968, Britain could leave Aden gracefully, cut back expenditure and fortify 
its relationship with Kuwait and the Trucial states. Wilson‘s advisors began drawing up 
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DEFE25/190, BDEEP—East of Suez, #39. Several recent works focus on the military strategies of the 
British government in Aden. For a detailed military history of British operations in Aden, see Walker, Aden 
Insurgency (2005); Jones,  Britain and the Yemen Civil War (2004) looks at the use of mercenary forces 
and covert operations in response to international disapproval of Britain‘s support of Royalist forces against 
the Republic of Yemen.  
179 ―Aden,‖ report by Lt. Gen. Sir G. Baker, March 31, 1965. DEFE 25/191. BDEEP—East of Suez, #41.  
180 ―Defence review‖: report to ministers by an Official Committee of the Cabinet Defense and Oversea 
Policy Committee. November 8, 1965. CAB 130/213. BDEEP—East of Suez, #6. 
 102 
plans for a 1968 withdrawal from South Arabia while considering contingency plans for 
staying on longer if necessary.181 
 The retreat from Suez, and then from Aden, represented a trend of declining 
British power East of Suez.182 Britain‘s interests in Suez and then Aden were linked 
directly to the goal of preserving political and economic influence in the Far East. But 
even as Britain tried to save its position in Aden, British military forces struggled to 
preserve its reach in the Far East, where they found themselves defending Singapore and 
Malaysia from guerrilla incursions originating in Indonesia.183 The Malaysian federation 
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grew out of the British attempt to disentangle their military from nationalist movements 
there in following World War II. The new federation, however, was viewed with hostility 
by local Indonesian leader, President Sukarno, who tacitly encouraged Indonesian 
nationalists and communists in their infiltrations of Malaysia through 1966.  
 Operations in the Middle East and the Far East against nationalist forces led 
British officials to question the value of staying on East of Suez. Late in the Macmillan 
government, Defense officials had argued that there was, ―…no clear economic interest 
in the Far East,‖ and that the only reasons to hold on to the base in Singapore were to 
appease the American and Australian governments.184 By late 1965, Wilson appeared to 
share this view, and the Cabinet concluded that the only way to promote British interests 
in the Far East was to push for a peace agreement with Indonesia and pressure Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States to make a more substantial contribution to Pacific 
defense.185  
THE ECONOMICS OF EAST OF SUEZ AND THE GULF 
 
 If, as Macmillan argued, the economic benefits of staying on East of Suez were so 
slight, why did the British government hope to hang on to its military role East of Suez? 
Initially, the British Government‘s desire to retain its status as a world power led both 
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Macmillan and Wilson to ignore economic instability while committing the government 
to extensive defense roles in Europe and East of Suez. By 1967, however, the British 
economy could not be stretched any further and Wilson was forced to choose between an 
economic collapse and a limited military role.  
 Economic benefits served as an important consideration for maintaining Britain‘s 
role East of Suez, especially as it related to the British presence in the Persian Gulf. The 
military presence in the Middle East originally served as a connection to the Far East. By 
the 1950s, however, the British government valued the Arab states of the Persian Gulf for 
the growth of commercial oil production and its contributions to the British world 
economy as much as for its strategic location. Both the Macmillan and Wilson 
administrations desired direct access to ―cheap oil‖ from the Persian Gulf.186 More 
importantly, Kuwait and the Trucial States participated in the sterling area and 
constituted a significant portion of the foreign sterling reserves.187  
Gulf oil provided a substantial buoy to the British economy. Britain began the 
process of monopolizing the potential for oil development in the Arab Gulf during the 
First World War. Kuwait and Bahrain signed concession agreements with Britain in 1913 
and 1914; the remaining Trucial States, including Qatar, conceded in 1922. Subsidiaries 
of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company discovered oil in Bahrain in 1932 and began actively 
searching for oil in Qatar, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Dubai by the end of the decade. 
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Exploration and oil production slowed during World War II, but by the 1950s, the 
demand for oil from the Arab Gulf States increased.188 Britain maintained a partnership 
with the Gulf Oil Company through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and a virtual 
partnership with Kuwait Oil Company through Shell.189 As oil production expanded in 
Abu Dhabi, so did concern for the stability of the other Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf. 
Petroleum Development Trucial Coast, later Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC), 
began exporting oil in 1962; a second company, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas, Ltd., (ADMA) 
shared ownership between British Petroleum and Compagnie Francais des Petroles.  
Arab Gulf oil sources became the most significant source of oil to Britain and 
Europe in the 1950s. Beginning in 1952, Kuwait became the greatest supplier of oil from 
the Middle East to Europe. Until that time Britain relied heavily on oil production in Iran 
through the Anglo-Iranian oil company. The rise of a nationalist government headed by 
Muhammad Mosaddeq in 1951 created a nationalization crisis of the oil company and a 
subsequent boycott of crude oil from Iran. Though the Mossadeq government was 
overthrown in 1953, Great Britain had already begun to rely more heavily on alternative 
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sources for oil, particularly in Kuwait and the Trucial Coast.190 As a consequence, 
defense of Kuwait remained a Foreign Office priority through the 1950s in order to 
maintain stability and protect British oil and sterling interests there.191   
A by-product of oil production became more significant to British policy makers 
when considering the advantages of continuing the Britain‘s role East of Suez and in the 
Persian Gulf in particular. The oil-producing states in the Gulf invested their enormous 
profits in the Sterling Area.192 A defense review estimated that oil from the Persian Gulf 
constituted £200 million of British balances for 1965.193 Nearly all of the sterling from 
the region came from Kuwait. Iraq spent almost all of its oil revenues on internal 
development; and as was seen above, Iran‘s contributions to the sterling area were 
severely curtailed following the nationalization crisis. Kuwait‘s sterling holdings alone 
were second only to those of Australia. As Abu Dhabi‘s oil wealth increased the Foreign 
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Office speculated, and hoped, that Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial States would invest 
their growing wealth in London.194  
As economic crisis after crisis threatened British economic stability in the late 
1950s and 1960s, the British Government became increasingly concerned about 
protecting its interests in the Persian Gulf. Economic instability had plagued Great 
Britain following World War II. The primary economic concern of post-War 
governments was the balance-of-payments deficit within the sterling area. In the 
aftermath of the war the sterling system appeared to work well. Trade within the sterling 
area in the 1940s constituted approximately half of British trade.  
The government devalued sterling in 1949 and 1950 in order to strengthen the 
Pound relative to its trade deficits. Sterling reserves subsequently rebounded in the 1950s. 
The success of sterling in the aftermath of World War II was short lived. though. Both the 
Conservative Macmillan government (1957-1964) and Wilson‘s Labour government 
(1964-1970) struggled with the instability of the British economy during their tenures in 
office. The balance of payment ratios did not stabilize over time. Trade within the sterling 
area continued to diminish dramatically. Sterling area members purchased 46.7% of UK 
exports in 1952; this number fell steadily to only 27.5% in 1968.195 Moreover, from 1958 
onward, British sterling reserves failed to meet British debts. The government 
                                                 
194 ―Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf,‖ Note by the Foreign Office for the Defense and Oversea 
Policy Committee. April 18, 1967. CAB 148/57. TNA.  
195 See Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism (2002), 619-44; and Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in 
Decline (1983) for discussions of the balance of trade deficits and its impact on economic policy.  
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increasingly depended on payments from foreign sterling reserves to make up the 
difference.196  
Much of this was the consequence of the pace of decolonization of the British 
Empire in the 1950s. Following its independence, India redirected substantial sterling 
reserves to economic development projects, reducing the international sterling pool. As 
Nigeria, Ghana and Malaya gained independence from the Empire, they were expected to 
follow suit, drawing down sterling reserves at a rapid pace.197 In the Middle East, Egypt 
was also expected to take over control of its more than £128 million for development 
projects in 1963; Iraq already spent nearly the entirety of its oil revenue on development, 
contributing negligible amounts to sterling reserves. This, combined with other spending 
projects throughout the Middle East led to a cumulative £300 million rundown of sterling 
after oil-producing countries expended their revenues.198 In light of these projections, 
Britain depended on Kuwait‘s £260 million contribution to the sterling area to help fill 
the gap.   
Sterling also suffered a crisis of confidence at times when British imperial power 
was threatened. Following the British invasion of Suez in 1956, several member states 
talked of leaving the sterling area in order to avoid open association with an imperialist 
power; and, in fact, the Sudan did leave in 1957, while Iraq left in 1959 following an anti-
                                                 
196 See Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline (1983); and Catherine Schenk, ―Sterling, 
International Monetary Reform and Britain‘s Applications to Join the European Economic Community in 
the 1960s,‖ Contemporary European History 11, no. 3 (2002): 345-369.  
197 ―Treasury and Bank of England report on the Sterling Area‖: Brief for Lennox-Boyd by A Emanuel 
(CO), February 19, 1957. CO 852/1677. BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 
1957-1964, #300. 
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imperial nationalist coup in 1958. Open anti-imperial and Arab nationalist groups staged 
strikes and rallies in the Persian Gulf. The most worrying of these, for the British 
Government, occurred in Kuwait, where a generation of educated, young Kuwaitis had 
begun to welcome the aims of Nasser‘s nationalist agenda.199  
Kuwait remained in the sterling area and maintained its ties to British advisors 
following Suez, despite burgeoning nationalist sentiment. Its loyalty to the sterling area 
made Britain determined to protect Kuwait from external threats. British forces in Aden 
remained the primary line of defense against potential attempts by the new Iraqi 
government, or even Saudi Arabia, to overthrow the Kuwaiti ruling family and annex the 
sheikhdom.  
As important as Kuwait‘s contributions to sterling were, they were not sufficient 
to stabilize the sterling area as it lurched from crisis to crisis in the 1960s. The British 
trade deficit rose as sterling reserves dropped. Both the Conservative Macmillan 
government (1957-1964) and Wilson‘s Labour government (1964-1970) concentrated on 
the sterling area in order to uphold the economic well-being of Great Britain. Over time, 
however, they both came to view the large British defense role East of Suez as 
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When Macmillan took office, his government faced grim economic news. The 
Treasury commented in a brief to the Colonial Secretary in 1957 that sterling liabilities 
that year were exceptionally high at ―over £4,000 million‖ while Great Britain only held 
reserves of approximately £700 million.200 Two years later, the Treasury reported that 
diminishing sterling reserves still posed, ―…the most notable economic threat… [which] 
could have far graver consequences in the sixties than in the forties.‖201  Macmillan 
believed the sterling system could stabilize if the government cut expenses. In 1957, 
defense expenditure constituted 10% of the national budget and seemed the likeliest place 
to retrench. Macmillan made it his goal to defense to only 7% of the budget.202  
Macmillan could not expect to reign in defense expenditures without reducing 
forces in Europe or East of Suez.203 This proved difficult in the post-War world. Britain 
had given up large swathes of its empire in the 1950s, only to obtain a substantial role in 
defending Western Europe from communist expansion.204 Halfway through Macmillan‘s 
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tenure, the Treasury warned that Britain‘s traditional role as an international force was 
entwined with sterling‘s well-being:  
Of all the major Powers, the United Kingdom has the most vulnerable economy… 
The gold reserves are less than one-third of the sterling liabilities to other 
countries—precarious backing for an international currency that by its nature 
must take the strain of political and financial pressures throughout the world.205  
 
Despite the warning, Macmillan proved unable to turn the economy around. In 1962, the 
Government estimated that defense expenditure would still outstrip its allotment by more 
than £50 million for the 1965-66 budget.206 Cutting corners in the Department of Defense 
proved ineffective in reversing the increasing sterling liabilities-to-reserves ratio.207 The 
Conservative Government fell in 1964 without having made headway in restoring sterling 
reserves and reducing British liabilities. 
 Harold Wilson‘s first priority as Prime Minister in 1964 was to review the 
economic situation. It appeared bleak. The Secretary of the Treasury noted that the 
government would need to raise taxes, improve industry and cut corners in, ―…resources 
now devoted to non-economic purposes, especially defence and ‗prestige‘ projects…‖ to 
reduce the budget deficit and prevent the devaluation of sterling.208   
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The dwindling economic power of the British government furthered Wilson‘s 
reliance on Britain‘s traditional role as a global military force. He looked to the British 
naval presence East of Suez as an important diplomatic tool vis-à-vis the United States, 
which depended on Britain to support American operations in Vietnam. It also helped 
cement Britain‘s relationship with Australia and New Zealand.209  
 Wilson came to office with ambitious goals for Britain‘s role in international 
affairs.210 He wrote to the American President, Lyndon Johnson, with an assessment of 
the impending economic crisis, stating that the deficit for 1964 could come to £800 
million and would continue to rise without extensive budget cuts. In that letter, he failed 
to mention any possibility of reducing defense commitments as part of his economic 
plan.211 Wilson also confided to Dean Rusk in the spring of 1965 that he had, ―a prejudice 
for the maintenance of the British role East of Suez.‖212 Wilson had no intention of 
making substantive defense cuts at the risk of losing international influence. Instead, he 
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hoped to secure financial support from the American Government in exchange for 
continuing the British defense role east of Suez.213  
In order to maintain both an international defense role while preventing an 
economic collapse, Harold Wilson began trimming the domestic and foreign budgets. 
Even as he pursued a foreign policy that over-stretched military commitments across the 
globe, members of Wilson‘s government began to rebel. The Minister of Housing, 
Richard Crossman noted with frustration in January 1965: ―So far [Wilson] has shown a 
singular failing in dealing with general economic policy.‖214  
Throughout 1965 and 1966 resentment within the Labour government grew. 
Crossman forfeited funds for domestic building programs, which delayed road projects 
and stopped progress on new housing, hospitals and schools.215 Wilson also demanded 
cuts of £100 million from the Foreign Office budget in 1966 without any corresponding 
changes in British foreign policy.216 
Tensions mounted over cuts, especially as defense costs grew on all fronts. 
Between 1959 and 1964, east of Suez expenditures nearly doubled from £76 million to 
£133 million, especially as the crisis in Malaya came to a head. In the Persian Gulf, costs 
began creeping up as the conflict in Yemen expanded. According to one estimate, 
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expenses in 1964 had more than doubled in the Persian Gulf by 1964, reaching £38 
million.217 In Aden, defense costs sky-rocketed because of the civil war there. The 
maintenance of the Aden naval base in 1962-1963 had totaled £7.93 million; in 1964-
1965, costs swelled to £14.64 million.218  
Macmillan officials in 1964 were concerned that, ―…the greater danger lay in 
oversea theaters,‖ but that due to cuts being made in the defense budget, ―The small size 
of [British] forces east of Suez cast some doubt on the extent of the influence which they 
could exercise.‖219 Wilson‘s continued commitment to an East of Suez presence while 
simultaneously cutting budgets to keep sterling afloat gave rise to concerns that Britain‘s 
position as a world leader would be damaged.220  
Members of the military branches began to complain openly. Without extensive 
defense cuts, there was little improvement in the deficit. Without a substantial reduction 
in defense commitments, the military could not perform effectively. In August 1965 the 
Minister for the Navy, Christopher Mayhew, complained to Defense Secretary Denis 
Healey that the Navy was stretched thin; officers and soldiers were underpaid and the 
ships were ―too old.‖ If Healey failed to correct the situation, said Mayhew, ―…we 
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should have a first-class showdown.‖221 With the Indonesian Crisis and the conflict in 
Aden in 1966 and 1967, the balance between sterling and East of Suez became 
indefensible.  
By late 1965, Wilson‘s ministers began to reconsider the British role east of Suez 
in order to bring foreign policy in line with the economic realities. Under the Macmillan 
government, some members of the Foreign Office and the business community had 
argued that a military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in particular could lead to 
increased stability in British relations with the rulers there. The President of the Board of 
Trade believed that the British government should eliminate the, ―imperialist traditions 
and associations,‖ in the Gulf and work towards a relationship, ―…based primarily on a 
mutually advantageous and straight-forward commercial relationship.‖222 Wilson‘s own 
ministers took up this line of reasoning and expanded it, arguing: ―Indeed our presence 
might even be disadvantageous to our interests by providing an irritant and a focus for 
Arab nationalist pressures.‖ 223 
Less than a year later, Wilson and his defense advisors seemed to have taken this 
advice seriously and began reorganizing British defense priorities. In response to the 
1965 defense review and subsequent White Paper, the Prime Minister laid out plans to 
cut British forces from east of Suez by half and from the Middle East by one third. This  
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Table 2:  Defense Expenditures for East of Suez, 1959-1964 (given in £ millions)224 
 
included arrangements for leaving Aden when the Arabian Federation became 
independent in 1968. This also incorporated an eventual withdrawal from the Persian 
Gulf.225 The withdrawal from Aden would not, however, mean the end of the British 
presence in the Gulf. Britain would abandon the base at Aden only to temporarily 
increase the forces in the Persian Gulf to two battalions, two ground squadrons and a 
long-range maritime patrol.226 This would allow the British government time to stabilize 
the Gulf and help ―modernize‖ the rulers of the Trucial States, which the Foreign Office 
estimated would continue into the mid-1970s at the earliest.227 
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44 46 52 52 64 77 
Hong Kong 
 
8 8 10 9 9 10 
Australia 
 
7 12 8 12 10 8 
Totals 76 90 103 108 118 133 
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The decision was met with skepticism in parliament. Why would the government 
incur more expenditure to shift the military forces from Aden to the Persian Gulf, if the 
ultimate goal was to leave the Gulf altogether?228 Denis Healey responded with Labour‘s 
new rationalization:  
The point is to ensure the continued stability of the Gulf until countries in the area 
are capable of maintaining stability on their own. We do not regard the base in 
Aden as being necessary for that purpose. But consequent on leaving Aden, we 
feel it necessary to make a small increase in our forces in the Persian Gulf to 
maintain our obligations.229  
 
The expense of such an increase continued to be a point of contention, even within the 
Labour party through the year. 
 Even as the Foreign Office laid plans for a tidy withdrawal and handover to the 
South Arabian Federation, events there spiraled out of control. Following the 1966 
decision to leave, violence in Aden increased. Local security forces in the Federation 
proved loyal to the National Liberation Front based out of Yemen. In June 1967, federal 
police revolted in an area of Sheikh Uthman, just a few miles north of Aden. The 
nationalists within the police force seized an arms cache, attacked a British truck carrying 
nineteen soldiers and later managed to take over the armory. By the end of the day, the 
National Liberation Front controlled the area.230 
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 British forces succeeded in reoccupying the area by July 5
th
. They failed, 
however, to provide sufficient support to the federal army in the months following the 
rioting. Between August and September, the states comprising the federation melted 
away. The National Liberation Front took over eight states by August 28; three days later 
they consolidated control over four more.231 By September 13, British forces handed 
control of Little Aden to the South Arabian Army, and withdrew behind its lines in Aden. 
Military command of the Persian Gulf forces was handed over to the commander at 
Bahrain in October. In late November, the federal army in Aden proper fell to the 
National Liberation Front. On November 29
th
, the last British soldier evacuated South 
Arabia. In a matter of a few short months nationalist forces had unceremoniously 
expelled a British presence that had been there for more than one hundred years.  
The crisis in Aden coincided with the nadir of the economic crisis. On November 
18, the Treasury took the steps Harold Wilson had hoped to avoid since coming to office. 
It devalued sterling from $2.80 to $2.40.232 The savings measures had failed to prevent an 
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The devaluation measures meant that the Government would have to make an 
immediate decision about its defense role. The growing presence of Arab nationalism in 
the Gulf and the forced withdrawal from Aden convinced the Foreign Office that staying 
on in the Gulf as a visible imperial power would reduce its influence and jeopardize 
British interests. Wilson‘s Cabinet pushed for an earlier withdrawal from the Persian Gulf 
in an effort to bring expenditure in line with the realities of Britain‘s economic 
limitations.233 The day before his announcement to parliament, Harold Wilson wrote to 
President Johnson. He soberly summed up his hopes for the future of British influence in 
the international arena:  
If there is any lesson to be learned from the somber way we have found ourselves 
obliged to lurch from one defence review to another in recent years, it is that we 
must now take certain major foreign policy decisions as the pre-requisite of 
economics in our defence expenditure. Put simply, this only amounts to saying 
that we have to come to terms with our role in the world. And we are confident 
that if we fully assert our economic strength, we can by realistic priorities 
strengthen this country‘s real influence and power for peace in the world.234 
 
The days of exerting British will through fire power had drawn to a close. All that was 
left, then, was to execute a clean withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf. 
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Chapter 5:  Federation, 1968-1971 
 
 Harold Wilson‘s announcement that Britain would retreat from its military role 
East of Suez alarmed both the rulers of the Trucial Coast and British officials there. 
Britain‘s intention to withdraw created the potential for instability in a variety of ways. 
Great Britain had been the primary protector since 1820s. Britain‘s very presence served 
as a deterrent against regional powers‘ ambitions to dominate the Gulf States and 
preserved a corner of the Middle East for British interests. The Trucial States, moreover, 
lacked the administrative infrastructures of the modern nation state. They also lacked 
sufficient indigenous security forces for both policing the state and protecting the Coast 
from potential attacks by regional powers.  
In leaving the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Office hoped not to give up Britain‘s 
privileged role as ally and advisor to the Trucial States. Rather, the Trucial States would 
continue to rely on Britain and preserve the economic ties that bound them together. A 
federation of the Trucial States provided a possible answer to the vacuum that the British 
withdrawal would leave in 1971.  
 Such was the hope of British officials. For the Trucial Rulers, however, British 
withdrawal presented a serious dilemma. The individual rulers in the Persian Gulf feared 
the effects of a new political order. Britain‘s presence had not only secured the rulers‘ 
positions, but British officials also mediated disagreements among the rulers, preserved 
internal security, and helped to prevent the infiltration of Nasserists and Arab nationalists 
in the Arab Gulf. Britain had also provided important economic opportunities. The 
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military bases at Bahrain and Sharjah had provided important revenues to both of those 
states. To confess these fears about the British withdrawal publicly, however, would 
subject the rulers to harsh criticism from anti-imperialists in the Gulf and throughout the 
region.  
This chapter considers the three-year period in which the rulers on the Trucial 
Coast and the British Government worked toward the establishment of a federation. Both 
British officials and Trucial Rulers viewed the establishment of a federation as the best 
method for maintaining the political balance in the Persian Gulf and safeguarding the 
interests of all parties. The following pages examine British expectations for a federation 
in the context of decolonization as well as in relation to the immediate circumstances of 
the Gulf States. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of nationalist and anti-
imperialist sentiment in the Gulf States in persuading Trucial rulers to cooperate in the 
process of federation. Federation had the potential to affirm the rulers‘ commitment to 
Arab nationalist ideals through reuniting a land that Arabs viewed as having been divided 
by British interests. For the Persian Gulf rulers, federation also allowed for sharing 
resources and responsibility in state building and internal security. Despite these 
advantages the rulers were required to overcome a number of obstacles. The success of 
the new state would require the cooperation not only of the nine protected states, but also 





THE ORIGINS OF FEDERATION: THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE  
 
The move toward a federation of emirates in the Persian Gulf was initiated 
subsequent to the British government‘s surprise decision in January 1968 to end its 
defense role East of Suez no later than December 1971. British officials believed that the 
best way to protect British interests in the Persian Gulf would be through the 
establishment of a federation of the Trucial States. A federation, ideally, would create a 
strong government that would prevent conflict among the various rulers and would allow 
for the sharing of resources for economic strength. Through the 1950s and 1960s, British 
administrators in the Persian Gulf encouraged cooperation among the rulers of the Trucial 
sheikhs to ease their own duties. It became increasingly apparent that the British would 
be forced by economic and political necessity to withdraw from East of Suez eventually, 
though, and administrators began placing greater emphasis on inter-state cooperation to 
prepare the way for future independence.  
 Federations became a relatively common aspect of state formation and 
decolonization in the mid-twentieth century.235 The Colonial Office had created 
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federations among colonized ethnic, religious and political groupings throughout the 
empire in order to form larger states that officials believed would be more viable 
economically than if there gained independence singly. Federation as a solution to the 
perceived problem of unevenly developed and small ―micro states‖, however, had not 
been a successful aspect of decolonization elsewhere in the British Empire.  
In considering options for the future of the Trucial States, members of the Foreign 
Office reflected on the Colonial Office‘s long record of federation failures: ―For what it‘s 
worth, recent British experience elsewhere suggests that political association between 
reluctant units is an unsatisfactory feature of the decolonization process. The West Indies, 
Nigeria, Central Africa and South Arabia are not the most encouraging precedents.‖236 
Each of the federations organized by the British Colonial Office failed to last long after 
Britain had granted the states independence. In 1958, the Colonial Office had created a 
federation between twenty-four primary islands and a number of smaller islands in the 
region; the federation collapsed four years later as a result of tensions among the several 
provinces over representation and the division of local and federal powers.237 Nigeria‘s 
federation of the 1950s led to a series of coups in the 1960s, instability, and finally civil 
war in 1967.238 The Central African federation, established in 1953, unraveled ten years 
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later as the constituent states broke apart into three independent states.239 By 1967, both 
the South Arabian Federation and the Malayan federations had both collapsed as well.240 
 These failures did not rule out the necessity of a federation when Foreign Office 
officials considered the circumstances on the Trucial Coast. It seemed that the 
sheikhdoms could not continue individually after the British withdrawal. There was little 
in the way of administrative infrastructure. What did exist was unevenly distributed 
between the nine sheikhdoms relative to their wealth. Bahrain, for example, had 
benefitted from oil discovery and exportation before World War II and had built and 
equipped schools, provided primary and vocational education to members of its 
population, and had begun to establish a sector of the populace capable of filling 
administrative and government functions. Abu Dhabi, though it had proved oil reserves 
by 1968, had only been exporting oil since 1966; until that time development of 
administrative offices and public services had been minimal. Other emirates, such as 
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Ajman and Ras al-Khaimah, were impoverished and depended almost entirely on 
financial contributions from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Great Britain, and could not afford 
to establish independent municipal offices and government agencies.  
The Foreign Secretary contextualized the federal concept in comments for the 
Overseas Development Committee in a note in 1967, saying:  
Indeed, now that the main work of decolonisation is complete, the majority of 
those [remaining] territories are small, scattered islands or ‗grains of dust‘ for 
which no other solution [except permanent dependence] seems feasible, even if 
formal colonialism is in some cases replaced by ‗free association‘ or integration. 
But we have never supposed that the Protected States of the Gulf will fall into this 
category. They may be small enough to qualify in theory. But they are neither 
remote enough geographically (cf. the Pacific Islands) nor British enough in 
character (cf. the smaller West Indies) to qualify in practice.241 
 
The Trucial States were too small for independence as they were, but neither did they 
qualify for a continuation of their quasi-colonial status under special treaty relations.  
 The Foreign Office suspected that a federation could not succeed. Seeing no 
alternative, they pushed ahead. Between 1968 and December 1971, British officials 
expressed doubts about the possibility that a federation of any kind could be achieved; 
and should it be achieved, they believed it would likely fail in the long term. While 
expressing private doubts amongst themselves, officials chose to, ―…give the impression 
that we assume it will [work],‖ in the hopes that the rulers of the Trucial States would 
continue working toward a union.242 
                                                 
241 ―Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf,‖ Note by the Foreign Office, April 1967. CAB 148/57, TNA.  
242 Minute from D. J. McCarthy (Arabian Department, FO) to R. I. Hallows (Bank of England), December 
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 In preparation for a forthcoming withdrawal, the Foreign Office posited several 
potential federal systems in 1967. These included a ―two-tier system‖ in which the 
Northern Trucial States (Dubai and the five smallest Emirates) federated and maintained 
a confederated relationship with Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Qatar, with each larger unit 
enjoying greater independence. Alternatively, Saudi Arabia might win a territorial dispute 
with Abu Dhabi, thus leaving Abu Dhabi small and sufficiently weak to be absorbed by 
Dubai; or Bahrain and Qatar might seek a loose confederation with Saudi Arabia for 
protection. The Foreign Office also theorized that a four-state solution could be created 
with Abu Dhabi and Dubai dividing the four smaller Trucial States between themselves, 
establishing Qatar, Bahrain, greater Abu Dhabi and greater Dubai.243 
 By the time the United Arab Emirates came into existence in December 1971, 
Agency and Residency staff in the Gulf and members of the Foreign Office had 
speculated further about federations of nine; federations of eight if Bahrain or Qatar 
dropped out; federations of seven if Qatar and Dubai left the Union; federations of seven 
if Bahrain and Qatar both left. The British Government looked for a federation of some 
kind as the only plausible approach to establishing the stability necessary to safeguard 
British interests in the area.  
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ARAB NATIONALISM AND FEDERATION  
 
 Popular Emirati accounts of the origins of the United Arab Emirates describe its 
formation as a movement toward unity borne out of a historic meeting between Sheikh 
Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, of Abu Dhabi, and Sheikh Rashid bin Saqr Al-Maktoum of 
Dubai. On February 19, 1968—only a month after Harold Wilson‘s sudden 
announcement— these two great rulers met near the border of their respective emirates. 
They came as rivals, but left as co-architects of a future union that would combine the 
Trucial States of the Arab coast into one federal unit that would provide stability, 
continuity, and prosperity for its population.244   
The great meeting of the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai did take place in 
February 1968 in response to the British announcement to withdraw its forces from East 
of Suez, and in particular, from the Persian Gulf. The Rulers of the Trucial Coast, 
however, initially were not enthusiastic about Harold Wilson‘s decision to end Britain‘s 
special treaty relations and withdraw Britain‘s military from the Persian Gulf. Several of 
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the Trucial Rulers offered to subsidize the British military presence if Wilson would 
reconsider his decision. The Ruler of Fujairah went so far as to suggest to the Political 
Agent in Dubai that he would consider forfeiting his sovereignty and allow the British 
government to rule the emirate as a protectorate.245  
British Conservative leadership exploited Labour‘s decision to withdraw, and 
Trucial Rulers‘ fears of the decision. Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative 
opposition, campaigned on a platform that included overturning Labour‘s withdrawal and 
in 1969 even toured the Persian Gulf states in order to discuss the possibility of reversal 
the British position if the Conservatives won the election in 1970.246 Some of the Gulf 
sheikhs expressed hope that a Conservative win would postpone or even prevent the 
withdrawal.247   
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Even as the rulers hoped for a continued relationship with the British government, 
they also recognized that the political climate within the emirates and the Middle East 
had shifted. Support for Arab nationalism had been growing in the Persian Gulf at an 
increasing rate since the Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The civil war in 
Yemen brought the Arab nationalist cause to the Arabian Peninsula for the first time. 
When the war broke out between the monarchy and the republican factions in North 
Yemen in 1962, Nasser quickly moved to support the republican forces with arms and 
soldiers. The conflict then spread into the British protected territories in South Arabia and 
then east into the Sultanate of Oman.248   
 The instability in Yemen and South Arabia encouraged emigration. The Gulf 
States were an obvious destination, particularly for those who had worked in industries 
connected with the oil refinery at Aden. The Trucial States were especially enticing. The 
discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the early 1960s generated demand for more 
labor than the small populations of the Persian Gulf states could provide. During the 
1960s and early 1970s, more than half of working male population of North Yemen left 
to find work in Persian Gulf oil states.249 Arabs from other states also flowed into the 
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249 Fred Halliday, ―Labor Migration in the Middle East,‖ MERIP Reports, no. 59 (1977):  3-17, 3.  
 130 
Trucial States, including expatriates from Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Palestinian 
refugees. By 1968, the population of the Trucial States had reached 180,000; 
approximately 74,250 of those were foreign workers.250  
 In addition to their skills in the oil industry, foreign workers brought their political 
ideologies to the Gulf States. Through the 1960s, British intelligence reports from the 
Trucial States noted an increased number of anti-imperialist political activities and 
organizations. In Ras al-Khaimah, the Trucial Oman Scouts kept a close watch on 
seventy-one foreign nationals from several Arab states, who they believed were tied to 
the rise of youth groups. These youth groups and soccer clubs included groups such as 
Nadi al-Itihad (The Union Club), Nadi al-Bahri (The Marine Club), and Nady al-Ahaly 
al-Watany (Club for the National Peoples).251 Officers in the local police forces, which 
consisted mainly of non-Gulf Arabs, were suspected of holding ―subversive meetings‖.252 
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The rulers in the lower Gulf States remained vigilant during this period, acting swiftly 
and, occasionally, even recklessly to prevent the spread of nationalist movements in their 
emirates. They especially feared Jordanian and Palestinian teachers who they believed 
would bring their nationalist ideologies to the Persian Gulf and indoctrinate young 
minds.253 In several cases in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, teachers sparked demonstrations 
among young school children.254  
 Fears of nationalist activities were not limited only to Palestinians and Jordanians. 
In 1967, Abu Dhabi‘s Sheikh Zayid pressed for the deportation of a Somali employee 
working for the British Consular section. Following the discovery of a fire in Abu Dhabi 
on March 23, 1967, the local police arrested Mohammed Adam Liban, who worked as an 
assistant passport clerk.255 There had been a similar incident of arson in Dubai several 
months before and the Abu Dhabi police responded quickly. They arrested Liban because 
he had been in the proximity of the fire, though there was no clear evidence implicating 
him. Liban remained in custody until he was tried in court and found not guilty.256 
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Despite the outcome of the court case, the Abu Dhabi government requested the British 
Resident to transfer him out of Abu Dhabi.257 
 Such incidents led the governments of the emirates to issue laws to aid in 
managing immigration and employment standards. In Abu Dhabi, for example, between 
1966 and 1969, several laws were decreed and elaborated on to clearly define nationality 
and labor status. Citizenship within Abu Dhabi required the subject to be a descendent of 
one of the major clans that had historically constituted the base of Abu Dhabi‘s tribal 
support; without those ties, citizenship could only be granted through royal decree by the 
ruler himself.258 Other laws, dealing specifically with workers, created direct government 
oversight of non-national employees. The Labor Law of 1966 and the Trade Permit Law 
of 1969 both required foreign workers to apply to the Abu Dhabi government for 
permits.259 Workers, under these laws, were restricted to the specific work for the 
company or business under which they had applied for the license and prevented workers 
from changing work or traveling for work in other emirates without the express 
permission of the Labor Administration.260 
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 Rulers in the Trucial States in 1968, then, saw Arab nationalism as a potential 
threat to the internal stability of their states; but they also recognized that they could not 
be seen to undermine the goals of Arab nationalism without undermining their own 
authority and legitimacy as rulers. When the initial shock of the British announcement 
had passed, the Rulers began to consider ways to maintain their political and economic 
ties with Britain while simultaneously working to create a new modus operendi that 
would support the emirates‘ sovereignty and legitimacy.  
 
THE DUBAI AGREEMENT, FEBRUARY 1968 
 
 The Dubai Agreement created by Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rashid 
of Dubai established a working framework for the negotiations that would take place for 
the ensuing three years. The pact was made at the initiative of the two Trucial Rulers of 
their own impetus, and it explicitly stated that the rulers would work toward the 
establishment of a federation that would include all nine of the emirates if they chose to 
participate. All nine rulers signed on to the initial agreement, but within months, the 
agreement became irrelevant under their mutual suspicions and ambitions.261   
The rulers, in publicly taking initiative toward federation, placed themselves in a 
position of independence from British initiatives, and demonstrated a movement toward 
the process of uniting Arab states that had been divided by British imperialism. Arab 
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news outlets, including Cairo‘s Voice of the Arabs heralded the announcement as a 
victory that would produce progress in achieving the regional goals of independence from 
Western imperialism. As the process of federation continued through 1971, the rulers of 
the emirates would use this popular encouragement to exercise greater authority in 
transforming the administrative departments that had been built and administered by the 
British government into Emirati spheres of government.  
 At the invitation of Sheikh Zayid, he and Sheikh Rashid met at al-Samih in Dubai 
near the Abu Dhabi border to discuss the post-withdrawal future. The meeting concluded 
with the Dubai Agreement, which affirmed the two leaders‘ commitment to the creation 
of a union that would establish inter-emirate cooperation in four matters:  
 
… Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the Ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 
with his brother Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al-Maktoum, the Ruler of the Emirate of 
Dubai, in pursuit of their search for the best future for their people, and in order to 
achieve the aspirations of the people of the region and meet their desires, have 
satisfactorily agreed to the following, praise God:  
 
The formation of a union comprising the two countries under one flag and 
entrusted with the following issues:  
 
Foreign affairs. 
Defense and security in case of necessity. 
Services such as health and education. 
And citizenship and immigration.262 
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This accord also determined that any of the other seven protected emirates would be 
welcome to join the union. Two weeks later, all seven of the other states accepted the 
agreement, which came into effect on March 30, 1967. 
The agreement, which seemed to begin with optimism and enthusiasm, quickly 
disintegrated under the weight of the numerous problems not addressed in the relatively 
vague articles of the initial agreement. The internal dynamics of the Trucial States and 
their links to the major powers in the region, stymied the federation. In late May, the 
leaders of the nine emirates met to begin clarifying negotiating details of power sharing 
among the states, representation, and the location of a future capital. The following day, 
the meeting ended without any progress and a public announcement postponing future 
discussions: 
Between 25 and 26 May 1968, the first meeting of the Supreme Council of the 
Federation of Arab Emirates was convened in Abu Dhabi. Rulers of the 
(aforesaid) emirates exchanged consultations about the best methods to 
implement the Dubai Accord for the realization of the noble objectives stipulated 
in this accord. From the consultations it transpired that there is a certain 
divergence regarding such methods. The conferees were of the opinion that this 
meeting be adjourned, and that another meeting of the Supreme Council be 
convened in Abu Dhabi on 1 July 1968, so that they can exchange more 
consultations with the aim of reaching an agreement which should guarantee at 
the soonest possible time commencement in taking necessary steps for the sound 
implementation of the Dubai Agreement.263 
 
 From May 1968 until December 1971, the question of whether or not the Federation 
would come into being at all.  
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The agreement between Dubai and Abu Dhabi had been tentative from the outset. 
The effort exerted on Zayid‘s behalf to bring about Rashid‘s cooperation created 
suspicion among Trucial Rulers regarding Zayid‘s ambitions for his role in the future 
state. A closer examination helps to demonstrate the complexity of the dynamics among 
the Trucial Rulers that overshadowed the federation process for the next three years.  
As part of the agreement between Sheikh Zayid and Sheikh Rashid, Zayid ceded 
approximately ten miles of Abu Dhabi‘s seabed to Dubai and also paid Rashid £3 
million.264  
The relationship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai had been characterized by tension 
since the 1830s. Both ruling families were branches of the Bani Yas and had been allied 
until the Al Bu Falasa, of which the Maktoum were descended, broke away from the 
confederation and migrated to the area of modern Dubai. The relationship between the 
two ruling families remained strained as Abu Dhabi attempted to regain control.265 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the two competing powers shifted their alliances back 
and forth, drawing in the al-Qawasim family into their power plays.266 In the early part of 
the twentieth century, the competition between the two emirates broke out into a series of 
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their alliances to side with Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Qaiwain in 1840.  These alliances remained fluid into 
the twentieth century.  
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skirmishes over territory.267 In securing the agreement with Dubai through his sea bed 
agreement, he raised concerns among some of the rulers that he was using Abu Dhabi‘s 
oil wealth in order to buy influence.  
The move, seen as an effort to enlarge Zayid‘s power, aggravated Sheikh Ahmad 
of Qatar who complained that he saw the move as a ―first step‖ by Zayid to taking over 
the whole of the Trucial Coast.268 Qatari‘s rulers had remained suspicious of Bani Yas 
expansionism at least since the mid-nineteenth century, when the two states had been at 
war.  Conflict between the two states had revived again in the 1880s.269 Now in the mid-
twentieth century, in the proposed federation, Qatar stood to lose a great deal of 
autonomy to its old rival. Until 1965, Qatar had the highest level of oil production among 
the Trucial States, including Bahrain. Oil production on the Trucial Coast had sky- 
rocketed between 1964 and 1965. Qatar‘s production in 1964 amounted to 77,885,000 
barrels, whereas production in the Trucial Coast was only 67,465,000. The following 
year, the Trucial Coast outstripped Qatar‘s production at 102,804,000 barrels-- nearly 20 
million barrels more than Qatar produced. The gap in oil production between Qatar and 
the smaller Trucial States continued to grow exponentially, making it clear that Abu 
Dhabi‘s oil wealth and influence in the region would continue to grow.270 The apparent 
purchase of an alliance between Abu Dhabi and Dubai confirmed that Qatar‘s sway was 
waning.   
                                                 
267 Maitra, Qasr al-Hosn (2001). 
268 ―Draft Report‖ in ―Tour of the Gulf, 18 April-6 May, 1968,‖ Papers of Sir William Luce, Special 
Collections, University of Exeter.  
269 Maitra, Qasr al-Hosn (2001), 140-42, 171-74. 
270 ―Arab Gulf States: Annual Oil Production, 1947-90,‖ in Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of 
Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 265.  
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Sheikh Ahmad signed the accord and agreed to participate in the initial meeting, 
but his subsequent actions belied his uneasiness. Before the meeting in late May had even 
taken place, Ahmad seemed to be putting pressure on Sheikh Rashid to slow any progress 
toward implementing the Dubai Agreement. The result was that before the May 25 
meeting, one British observer noted that the relationship between Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
was, ―as bad as they have ever been.‖271 Relations between the rulers continued to 
deteriorate when Qatar forwarded several proposals to be included in the meeting‘s 
agenda. These included the election of a union president; the establishment of a capital; 
the creation of a union council and its functions; and the discussion and creation of 
several ministries for the administration of the Union.272 
 The move on Qatar‘s part seems to have been an attempt to force the talks to 
collapse by placing the remaining states in the position of taking the blame for Qatar 
leaving. This became more apparent as the states‘ delegates and advisors prepared for the 
May 25 meeting. The Trucial Rulers voted to exclude Qatar‘s proposals for the agenda of 
the first meeting. Ahmad nevertheless continued to press for the proposals‘ inclusion and 
publicly claimed that the move was ―an open violation of the agreement,‖ and, 
―[conflicted] totally with the higher interests of the federation.‖273  
 
 
                                                 
271 ―Draft Report‖ in ―Tour of the Gulf, 18 April-6 May, 1968,‖ G. 11, Papers of Sir William Luce, Special 
Collections, University of Exeter.  
272 ―Minutes of meeting of representatives and advisers of the rulers of the Gulf emirates, convened in Abu 
Dhabi on Saturday, 18 May and Sunday, 19 May 1968,‖ cited in Taryam, Establishment of the United Arab 
Emirates (1987), 96-97.  
273 Ibid., 98.  
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 Bahrain Qatar Trucial Coast 
(UAE) 
1962 16,446 67,9111 5,976 
1963 16,503 70,123 17,571 
1964 18,000 77,885 67,465 
1965 20,788 84,215 102,804 
1966 22,521 105,945 131,279 
1967 25,370 118,428 140,117 
1968 27,598 124,266 181,756 
1969 27,774 129,746 222,598 
1970 27,973 132,456 283,500 
1971 27,346 156,882 386,665 
1972 25,508 176,545 440,132 
 
Table 3:  Annual Oil Production in the Trucial States, 1962-72 („000s of barrels)274 
 
Ahmad‘s bid for leadership or independence from the federation was not the only 
source of conflict within the emirates. As already indicated, cooperation between Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi was only tentative in the beginning and suspicions between the two rulers 
continued to plague the negotiations until the union was finally formed in December 
                                                 
274 Ibid., 265. Owen and Pamuk list the production for the UAE, but not for the individual emirates. Oil 
production in Sharjah and Dubai, however, was only a small percentage of the oil production on the Trucial 
Coast. For more on details about the discovery and production of oil in Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and 
Sharjah see Butt, ―Oil and Gas in the UAE,‖ United Arab Emirates (2001), 231-248. Oil production in 
Dubai did not begin until 1966, while the remaining emirates began production only after the establishment 
of the United Arab Emirates, and in much smaller quantities than Abu Dhabi was able to produce. 
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1971. Among the poorer Trucial States, Zayid‘s financial gifts were always viewed with 
suspicion. In one instance, Abu Dhabi provided funds and police officers to the Sheikh 
Muhammad of Fujairah for the purpose of training a Fujairah police force. Both Qatar 
and Dubai commented that the Abu Dhabi officers in Fujairah wore Abu Dhabi uniforms, 
and that this could amount to an attempt to eliminate Muhammad through the police force 
and take over Fujairah.275 Bahrain‘s Sheikh ‗Isa intimated to a former Political Resident 
that he felt alienated and unwelcome in the federation by the other Trucial rulers.276 
The disunity between the nine rulers in the Trucial States continued to bog down 
the federation process through 1971. For the year following the failure of the May 25-26 
gathering, the rulers met intermittently in order to regain the momentum they had lost. 
Subsequent discussions in October and November failed to produce any substantial 
developments.  
 
MAINTAINING THE REGIONAL STATUS QUO 
 
 Any federation plans were further complicated by regional and international 
interests in the developments in the Persian Gulf. Britain‘s military and political presence 
in the Persian Gulf in the twentieth century had established a kind of neutral zone on the 
Trucial Coast that prevented both Iran and Saudi Arabia from monopolizing the region. 
Sustaining that buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran benefited British aims for a post-
                                                 
275 ―Abu Dhabi and Fujairah,‖ Letter from Julian L. Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai) to M. S. Weir 
(Political Resident, Bahrain). June 3, 1969. FCO 8/1218. TNA.  
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withdrawal Persian Gulf. The British Foreign Office sought to establish a stable 
federation that would secure the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf and continue to rely 
on long-standing economic and political ties with the British Government. The military 
withdrawal in 1971 would reduce British expenditure, but British officials planned to 
continue playing an active role in the commercial growth of the Persian Gulf states.  
Britain and the Trucial States required the endorsement and active support of both 
Iran and Saudi Arabia if the federation were to succeed. Both countries had ambitions to 
dominate the region, and both countries had territorial, political, and economic ties to the 
Trucial States. Saudi Arabia viewed the whole of the Arabian Peninsula as its own sphere 
of influence and hoped to extend that influence into the Gulf via a federation that would 
include Qatar and Bahrain.277 The Saudi Government had also attempted on several 
occasions to extend its rule into territory held by Abu Dhabi, especially across its 
boundary near the Buraimi Oasis. At the same time, Iran had an historical claim to the 
island of Bahrain and argued that a number of the mid-Gulf Islands were its sovereign 
territory, bringing it into conflict with Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimeh, the latter of which 
                                                 
277 For a general introduction to the history of Saudi Arabia, see Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi 
Arabia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Also see Naif bin Hethlain, Saudi Arabia and the 
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actually refused to join the UAE until February 1972 in part because of the dispute over 
those islands.278 
 When Britain had announced that it would abandon its military role in the Gulf, 
the question of securing the stability of the region was in the forefront of the Gulf Rulers‘ 
minds. In addition to asking Britain to reconsider, a number of leaders turned to the 
United States to guarantee their security. In many ways, the American government 
seemed a likely alternative. The United States did not have the history of colonial 
occupation as was the case with Britain. American influence in the region had also been 
growing, particularly in the Persian Gulf area, through its ties to Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
Saudi Arabia and the United States shared a close political and economic 
relationship almost since the monarchy‘s inception. The Saudi state, which was formed in 
the wake of World War I, exercised its independence from Britain by selling oil 
exploration rights to an American company, rather than to a British one. This company 
that owned those rights, which came to be the Arabian American Oil Company 
                                                 
278 There is a wide array of literature relating to international law and border disputes for off-shore claims. 
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(ARAMCO), began exploring oil in 1933 and discovered oil in 1938. The American 
economic and political investment in ARAMCO and the development of the Saudi oil 
company created extended links between the two governments in the areas of politics and 
technical and economic advising.279  
Ties between the American government and the Shah in Iran had a shorter history, 
but cooperation between the two had deepened following the 1952 nationalization crisis. 
The American CIA helped finance and organize the overthrow of Prime Minister 
Mohammed Mosaddeq and restore Mohammed-Reza Shah‘s rule.280 The United States 
in 1953, in the midst of the Cold War, feared any hint of instability in a western-aligned 
state on the Soviet border. Following the coup, Dwight Eisenhower and succeeding 
presidents continued to provide economic and political aid and encouraged development 
and increased independence. When Britain announced its decision to withdraw from the 
Persian Gulf, American relations with Iran were, ―close and cooperative.‖281  
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 144 
These circumstances made the United States an obvious alternative provider of 
security in the Persian Gulf after Britain could not be prevailed upon to continue the 
military role of its treaty relations with the Gulf States. During the negotiations in the 
Gulf for the creation of an Arab union of emirates, rulers from the Gulf— notably 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran—questioned American officials about their vision for 
future involvement and security in the Gulf. During Amir Sabah of Kuwait‘s visit to the 
United States in December 1968, he pressed Johnson to articulate the United States‘ 
vision for its role in the Gulf after the British withdrawal. The President deferred to 
Parker Hart from the State Department who responded with the administration‘s answer 
to similar inquiries from other rulers: 
 
Gulf affairs would continue to be of great interest to the United States. The US 
has no plans to take the unique place the British once held. The British position 
developed under circumstances that do not exist today….282 
 
The Johnson administration, harried by the escalating war in Vietnam and its other global 
security concerns, had no wish to become directly involved in state formation and 
security in the Persian Gulf.283 Instead, they sought to leave that responsibility with the 
British Government. 
                                                 
282 Memorandum of Conversation, ―US/Kuwaiti Relations,‖ Sheikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Sheikh 
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 Because of the United States‘ influence with Iran and Saudi Arabia, Britain 
remained in close contact with the American State Department on the two major points of 
regional conflict in the federation plans. The first of these problems was a conflict 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the median line in the Persian Gulf. The second was 
conflicting claims between Iran and the Trucial States over the sovereignty of the Tunbs 
and Abu Musa islands. Until these two issues could be resolved, virtually no significant 
progress could be made on the creation of the federation.  
Bahrain lay at the epicenter of the first of these disagreements. The Saudi 
Government pushed for a nine-state federation that would include both Bahrain and Qatar 
in the hopes that Riyaadh would be able to then bring all nine states into the Saudi sphere 
of influence. From the outset of the federation process, the Saudi government insisted 
that any federation must include all nine states and placed the greatest emphasis on 
Bahrain‘s inclusion in the federation. Following the initial collapse of discussions in May 
1968, the Saudi government co-sponsored several diplomatic missions with Kuwait and 
Jordan to encourage and mediated negotiations with the Trucial States.284   
Iran, however, had an openly defiant attitude towards the federation and its 
inclusion of Bahrain. The Shah based his objection on Iran‘s historical claims to Bahrain, 
which included its location on the median line of the Persian Gulf, as well as the large 
                                                 
284 A Saudi/Kuwaiti mission was sent out in the summer 1968, but made little progress. See FCO 8/981 
―The Qatari Plan?‖  This was succeeded by several further missions, including one in January 1971: 
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Shi‟i population located on the island.285 In discussions with British administrators, the 
Shah maintained through mid-1971 that he would obstruct any attempts by a union to 
gain membership in the United Nations if Bahrain were included.286  To the Americans, 
however, he confided that he was not interested in beginning a war to regain Bahrain, but 
it would be too unpopular domestically for him to simply relinquish the area.287  
 Iran also used the same argument to dispute a federation that would recognize 
Arab claims to the mid-Gulf islands. The islands were an issue which the Shah would not 
give up access to easily. Geographically, Abu Musa lay on the Arab side of the median 
line in the Persian Gulf near Sharjah, and the Tunbs islands lay ten miles off the coast of 
Iran. The islands themselves had few inhabitants, according to British intelligence. The 
combined population of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs was about 150 Arabs; Abu Musa‘s 
inhabitants numbered 800.288 Their location near the Straits of Hormuz established them 
as an important strategic location for Iran. Sovereignty over the islands, particularly the 
Greater and Lesser Tunbs, would allow Iran to control traffic coming in and out of the 
Persian Gulf. 
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Figure 4:  The Strait of Hormuz and the Locations of the Abu Musa and Tunbs 
Islands289 
 
 The island dispute was perhaps the most potentially explosive issue in the creation 
of the federation. Britain viewed the islands as ―intrinsically worthless,‖ but the Arab 
                                                 
289 Central Intelligence Agency, Strait of Hormuz (Political) (1980), 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg (accessed April 10, 2011) 
 148 
states with claims were unwilling to give them up.290 From the nationalist perspective, 
giving over the islands was a sign of weakness and could be construed by other states as 
another sign that western powers were constructing the federation for their own interests.  
More pressing, and more concretely, Ras al-Khaimah, hoped that an oil discovery on the 
Tunbs could bring him greater influence among the Trucial States and Sheikh Zayid‘s 
substantial oil wealth.291 Britain could not force the Arab states to give up the disputed 
territories. 
Without a concession from Saqr or the Shah, the federation was at great risk, as 
was Britain‘s ability to leave the Persian Gulf without incurring further loss of prestige 
and expense.292 Iran‘s apparent impatience to have the island question resolved forced the 
British Foreign Office to consider the possibility that the Shah would take preemptive 
action and take the islands by force before Britain withdrew. Britain‘s protective treaties 
with the Trucial States required Britain to defend the islands as long as the treaties 
remained in place.                                                                                                                                    
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 Both Britain and the United States consulted about the various ways to broker a 
solution. The Johnson administration was pleased to offer suggestions to the Foreign 
Office to prevent a military confrontation. The British ambassador to the United States 
discussed the possibility of pursuing a ―package‖ that would give the mid-Gulf Islands to 
Iran in exchange for an agreement on the median line and relinquishing Bahrain.293 As it 
became increasingly apparent that Britain would not be able to convince the Trucial 
Rulers to trade the islands for Bahrain, American officials began suggesting alternatives.  
  Walter Annenberg, in his capacity as the American ambassador to Britain, 
recommended to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home that the British take a more active role 
to bring an end to the island dispute. Annenberg pressed for Douglas-Home to resolve the 
issue in Iran‘s favor, arguing that  
…an Iranian civil presence, perhaps of a technical or developmental kind, should 
be introduced onto the islands before British military withdrawal (with no more 
than formal protests from the rulers concerned), in return for withdrawal of 
Iranian objection of a Union, and generous aid and technical assistance for the 
rulers concerned from Iran… The Shah had told him he had assurances from 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai that they would not… make trouble 
over Iranian possession of the islands.294 
 
The problem remained, however, that Sheikh Saqr would not withdraw his ―formal 
protest‖ and ease Britain‘s withdrawal. His opposition to Iran‘s claims over the islands 
continued until more than a month after Britain‘s withdrawal and the formation of the 
United Arab Emirates in December 1971.    
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A FEDERATION OF SEVEN  
 
 The establishment of a federation occurred despite the difficulties of internal 
rivalries and regional pressures, though not in the form originally planned. In December 
1971, only Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwan and Fujairah finally 
agreed to establish a federation. Bahrain and Qatar both defied Saudi Arabian pressure to 
join the federation and pressed for separate independence, while Ras al-Khaimah stayed 
outside of the Union until February 1972.  
The Foreign Office enlisted the help of William Luce, a former Resident in the 
Persian Gulf who seems to have enjoyed a close relationship with the Rulers.295  
Throughout 1970 and 1971, Luce traveled throughout the Persian Gulf to facilitate 
negotiations. Even with his efforts and those of Sheikh Zayid and other regional leaders, 
until the last months of Britain‘s treaty relationship with the Gulf States, neither the 
Foreign Office nor the Arab states were certain that a federation would be in place by 
Britain‘s withdrawal date.  
 Progress toward federation had begun to take on momentum in 1970 when the 
British government secured agreement with the Shah to hold a United Nations 
referendum on the status of Bahrain. A plebiscite ―…ascertaining the true wishes of the 
people of Bahrain with respect to the status of the islands…‖ determined that the subjects 
of Bahrain, ―…wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and 
                                                 
295 Balfour-Paul, End of Empire in the Middle East (1994) focuses on Luce‘s work in bringing the Union to 
fruition. 
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sovereign State free to decide for itself its relations with other States.‖296 Iran rescinded 
its claim to Bahrain and the pathway to Bahrain‘s membership in the future federation of 
Emirates seemed smoothed by the end of 1970.297 
 Bahrain‘s new independent status created a wholly new dilemma. The ruler 
seemed more hesitant to join the Union than before, inclining more toward total 
independence. Sheikh Isa confessed to Luce that his, ―…own inclination was for separate 
independence,‖ but that he was willing to ―make compromises‖ to ensure the Union‘s 
success.298 The idea of independence in Bahrain had taken hold in the minds of both the 
ruler and the population, while the idea prospect of sharing sovereignty with Sheikh 
Zayid Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Ahmed of Qatar became less attractive.299 
 In spite of both Isa‘s and Ahmed‘s reluctance to make a firm commitment to the 
Union, Saudi Arabia continued to press for their inclusion in the Union. At the end of 
1970 they sent another mission to encourage a nine-state agreement, but deadlock 
remained. As a consequence, Gulf rulers questioned William Luce in January and 
February 1971 as to what Britain‘s actions would be if the federation failed to 
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materialize. Luce responded that the decision to withdraw ―remained firm‖ whatever the 
outcome.300  
 With Britain‘s insistence on withdrawal, and Bahrain‘s determination to be 
independent becoming increasingly evident, Saudi Arabia capitulated. In May 1971, 
Bahrain decided to send an emissary to ask for King Faisal‘s permission to leave the 
Union.301 As late as June, Faisal continued to insist to Luce that a Gulf Union must 
include Bahrain.302 As the date for British withdrawal neared, it appeared that the 
creation of a Union would be no more likely than it had been 3 years before when Britain 
announced its plans. Luce persisted and finally received confirmation from Sheikh Sabah 
of Kuwait that the ―Saudis and Kuwaitis should be prepared to contemplate a smaller 
arrangement.‖303 In August 1971, Bahrain finally declared its independence. Three weeks 
later, Qatar followed suit.  
In many ways, this decision by Bahrain and Qatar tied Faisal‘s hands. Were he to 
object openly to the establishment of a subsequent union on the basis of Qatar and 
Bahrain‘s independence, he risked being seen as the cause of a union‘s failure. This 
would have been in direct opposition to what he had initially stated as his reasons for 
supporting a union of nine: that he did not believe a union would succeed, and this his 
support for a union of nine would prevent Saudi Arabia for being blamed for what he 
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considered to be the likely failure of the union after its establishment.304  Only the seven 
smaller emirates, then, remained to establish a union. 
The remaining Trucial States had, by that time reconciled themselves to a Union 
and as the British withdrawal date seemed to be closing in, they chose unity over insecure 
individual independence. On December 3, 1971 six of the remaining emirates ended their 
special treaty relations with Britain and established the United Arab Emirates. Only Ras 
al-Khaimah resisted. But Sheikh Saqr‘s resolution to maintain his independence until the 
Abu Musa and Tunbs island dispute was resolved faltered when Iran established new 
facts on the ground. Iran invaded the islands with military force and Ras al-Khaimah 
could not defend its own claims. Nearly two months later, Saqr signed the constitution 
and joined the United Arab Emirates. 
 In truth, the groundwork had been created decades before. Britain‘s 
establishment of the Trucial Council and the cooperation between the seven smaller 
emirates through the Trucial States Development Office had established basic shared 
government apparatuses and shared economic dependence on Abu Dhabi. Bahrain and 
Qatar, though linked with the other emirates via the British Residency, had never been 
fully incorporated into the power-sharing structures Britain had created in order to 
mitigate Arab nationalist incursions. Ultimately, all parties—Britain, the Trucial States, 
Saudi Arabia, and Iran decided that none of them could risk being responsible for the 
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failure of a federation, either for reasons of prestige and Arab nationalist pride, or for the 




Chapter 6:  Security, 1951-1976 
 
 Britain‘s withdrawal from the Gulf left a significant question unanswered 
regarding the future of the Trucial States. Without Britain‘s strong military presence to 
safeguard their territories, who would fill the role as the guarantor of their sovereignty? 
From the beginning of its treaty-based relationship with the Arab Gulf rulers, Britain had 
demonstrated its commitment to maintaining the rulers‘ independence in pursuit of the 
British Empire‘s own interests in stability in the Persian Gulf. Initially, this policy 
protected British trade routes with India, and later protected Britain‘s economic and 
defense interests in the Persian Gulf and East of Suez. The Trucial sheikhs were not ready 
to take up their own defense on the scale required to protect themselves. Even with a 
unified defense agreement, they did not have sufficient populations to build up a force 
capable of defending or even deterring attacks; furthermore, their indigenous military 
institutions were new, untested, and not yet fully organized. The most obvious Western 
power capable of taking up the role was the United States, but the American government 
had declared that it had no intention of stepping in to take over British commitments.305  
 The surprising solution came in the form of the two regional powers that posed 
the greatest threat to the Trucial States: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both states had been at 
odds with several of the Trucial rulers over territorial disputes, and both the Shah and the 
                                                 
305 Memorandum of Conversation, ―US/Kuwaiti Relations,‖ Dec. 11, 1968. NSF 
Country File: ―Kuwait: Cables and Memos.‖  LBJL. A member of the State Department 
told the visiting Kuwaiti amir that, ―The US has no plans to take the unique place the 
British once held. The British position developed under circumstances that do not exist 
today….‖   
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Saudi king sought to establish their own states as the unchallenged military and political 
force in the region. From the outset, the Foreign Office was determined to bring Saudi 
Arabia and Iran into the negotiation process and obtain their support for the future Union. 
This policy eventually evolved to include military and financial support from Western 
governments to support the two states as the local guardians and ―twin pillars‖ of the 
Persian Gulf.  
 Such a policy allowed for the regionalization of responsibility for the Persian 
Gulf. It also helped to resolve some of the potential hazards that would have been created 
by a continuing Western military presence. As was the case in other areas of British 
withdrawal and Union building in the Trucial States, Arab nationalism continued to be in 
the forefront of the minds of the Trucial Sheikhs, and particularly of Sheikh Zayid, who 
would highlight the difficulties that Arab nationalism posed to his sheikhdom and the 
future of the Union whenever conflict between himself and the Foreign Office arose on 
the question of security.  
When the Foreign Office proposed that the local security could be assumed by a 
reorganized version of the British-formulated and officered Trucial Oman Scouts, Zayid 
vehemently opposed the idea. He believed that such a move would leave the Union open 
to criticism and attack from nationalists. Instead, he preferred to take a longer view, 
which emphasized the need for the Emirates‘ Union forces to be established under solely 
Union auspices, thereby eliminating a potential point of vulnerability and criticism from 
both outside and within the Emirates.  
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Zayid‘s arguments won the day, and on December 3, 1971, the Union Defense Force 
existed as a separate force from that of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The Scouts were only 
absorbed into the Union Defense Force in 1976, well after the Union had demonstrated 
its ability to be a viable state. Such a decision had been made possible by the change of 
Saudi Arabian and Iranian policy toward the Emirates over the course of 1968-71. For 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia, they had to grapple with the problem of nationalism in 
determining their stances towards the new Union. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had to 
determine whether or not giving up his territorial and political claims to parts of Abu 
Dhabi outweighed the risk of being seen as a contributor to the failure of the Union. For 
the Shah, he had to consider whether he could risk giving up some of Iran‘s claims to 
islands in the Persian Gulf, including that of Bahrain, in exchange for financial support 
from Western powers to strengthen his own military. In the end, both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran would determine that it was in their best interests to support the Union. 
 The current chapter looks at the development of the security policy that allowed 
for the creation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 in light of the withdrawal of British 
military commitments. It begins with an overview of the British forces in the Persian 
Gulf prior to withdrawal and particularly focuses on the creation and jurisdiction of the 
most important security force in the Trucial States during the time: the Trucial Oman 
Scouts. This is followed with an examination of the tension created by the Foreign 
Office‘s desire to quickly establish a local security force before Britain‘s scheduled 
evacuation from the Gulf, and the local rulers‘ hesitation to link its security forces 
directly with a British institution. The plan from the Foreign Office consisted of 
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reconstituting the Trucial Oman Scouts as the cornerstone of the new Union‘s defense 
forces. From the perspectives of the Trucial Sheikhs, and especially that of Sheikh Zayid 
in Abu Dhabi, such an initiative would undermine the very security the new state sought 
by inviting criticism from the very Arab states‘ whose support the Union would need if it 
were going to be seen as a legitimate, independent, Arab nation. Finally, the chapter 
traces the evolution of the shift from Iran and Saudi Arabia as rivals for influence in the 
Gulf to partners sharing the custodianship of Gulf stability.  
 
THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ARAB GULF 
 
 In the nineteenth century Britain‘s primary military presence came in the form of 
the Persian Gulf Squadron, when it began patrolling and stationing there in 1821. The 
Squadron was established in 1821 at the behest of the Political Resident under the 
Government of Bombay. The main focus of its duties was to patrol with an eye to 
protecting British ships and trade in the vicinity of India and the Persian Gulf. Over the 
course of the nineteenth century, as British and Arab Gulf rulers‘ interests began 
increasingly to overlap, and particularly as Arab rulers sought British intervention on 
their behalf in inter-emirate rivalries.306 The squadron was headquartered at various 
                                                 
306 See especially James Onley, ―Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection,‖ 
Occasional Paper, no. 4 (Georgetown Center for International and Regional Studies, 2009), 1-44. Onley 
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interests and policies that were in opposition to Arab rulers‘ wishes. For examples of this, see Heard-Bey, 
From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates (2007), 297-99; Kazim, United Arab Emirates (2000); and 
Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf (1968). 
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locations in the Persian Gulf as the British role there shifted from one focused on Indian 
trade in the nineteenth century, to one of protecting British strategic and oil interests in 
the Arab states in the twentieth century. In 1935, the squadron‘s base shifted to the Ras 
al-Jufair in Bahrain, where it remained until the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf 
in December 1971.307 
 As long as Britain‘s chief interests in the Persian Gulf revolved around the 
stability of its trade with India, the naval squadron served as the main enforcer of British 
power within the Gulf as well as the chief deterrent to prospective belligerent regional 
powers. The discovery of oil in several of the Gulf states and the expansion of British 
reliance on its air force in the 1930s, however, shifted British military strategy in the 
Persian Gulf to one focused on the territorial integrity of its Arab client states.308 The 
early discoveries of oil in Kuwait and Bahrain, in 1931 and 1938, and the belief that 
significant wells would be found in the other emirates, increased Britain‘s need for a 
stronger military presence on the Arab side of the Gulf. 
 British officials became increasingly convinced that the security of the Gulf 
emirates was integral to British economic interests. Development of internal 
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infrastructure and social services of the Arab Gulf states served as one part of the Foreign 
Office‘s strategy to encourage stability in the area. The financial contributions from the 
Emirati governments, which paid for these projects, came largely from the royalties paid 
to them through their concessionary agreements with petroleum companies there.309 
Concession agreements and payments made for exploration were based on the rulers‘ 
ability to maintain their legal claims to the territories under exploration.  
 The link between economic wealth and territorial boundaries created numerous 
points of contention along the border lines throughout the emirates. The most significant 
of these involved the Buraimi Oases, to which the Omani, Saudi, and Abu Dhabi 
governments all laid claim.310 The region of Buraimi oasis consisted of a collection of 
villages located on the northern edge of Oman at the border of Abu Dhabi. Saudi 
Arabia‘s own claims to Buraimi were based on tribal alliances between the Saudi Arabian 
government and the Buraimi population and Saudi‘s historical exercise of authority and 
patronage in the region.311 When it appeared likely that substantial quantities of oil would 
be discovered in Buraimi in 1951, all three governments asserted their claims to the area 
with force.  
 
 
                                                 
309 Footnote from previous chapters re: financing and rental agreements.  
310 Kelly, International Affairs 32, no. 3 (1956): 318-26.; Petersen, International History 
Review 14, no. 1 (1992): 71-91.  
311 Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (1980), 64-87 gives extensive detail about the 
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Kelly, International Affairs 32, no. 3 (1956): 319-20. 
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Map 4: The Buraimi Oasis312 
 
 Britain viewed the hostilities as a threat to both the economic stability of the 
Trucial States as well as a threat to Britain‘s role as the foremost Western power in the 
region. While Britain viewed Buraimi as the shared territory of Oman and Abu Dhabi, the 
Eisenhower government ―tacitly‖ approved ARAMCO‘s support and encouragement of 
the Saudi claims that potentially would have increased the American oil production in the 
Middle East.313 The expansion of Saudi Arabia‘s sovereignty would thus impact not only 
the purse strings of the British government, but also Britain‘s prestige. 
                                                 
312 Kelly, International Affairs 32, no. 4 (1956): 319. 
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  To protect the boundaries of Abu Dhabi and Oman, the Foreign Office 
established a local, ground-based military force in 1951. The Trucial Oman Levies drew 
soldiers largely from Omani tribes and staffed officers from Jordan‘s Arab Legion under 
a British Commander. Though the force began small, with only sixty-five men in 1951, it 
rapidly increased to a force of more than 500 by 1954.314 Following clashes between the 
Levies and Saudi forces at Buraimi in 1955, the force was reconstituted the Trucial Oman 
Scouts, an all voluntary army with officers and senior ranking soldiers from the British 
army. The Scouts continued to expand into the 1960s to incorporate as many as five rifle 
squadrons, a headquarter squadron, and various subsidiary troops to operate services such 
as a small hospital, training schools, and transport. By the mid-1960s, the Trucial Oman 
Scouts numbered approximately 1,400 in total, and worked frequently in cooperation 
with Oman‘s Armed forces and elements of the British regulars.315 
 The role of the Trucial Oman Scouts expanded from its work as a force defending 
Omani and Abu Dhabi claims to Buraimi to include the maintenance of general internal 
security throughout the Trucial Coast and also to prevent armed incursions and 
infiltration by adjacent states.316 To the latter end, squadrons were headquartered at 
Sharjah.  They were also stationed at Manama in Bahrain, at a fort in Buraimi and the 
Omani frontier, and another at Mirfa, near the Tarif oil field in Abu Dhabi. They also 
                                                 
314 Walcott, Asian Affairs 37, no. 1 (2006): 17-30, 19.  
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included a coastal patrol, which inspected sea vessels that might carry arms smuggled 
from Saudi Arabia and Qatar into the Omani frontier.317 
 All combined, the Trucial Oman Scouts formed the bulk of the military force in 
the Trucial Coast.  It provided internal protection in cooperation with local forces.  But it 
also served as a detterant to any outside powers—not only because of its size, but also 
because it was a British force.  Any conflict with the Oman Scouts had the potential to 
draw in the full political and military weight of the British Empire.   
 
LOCAL AND IMPERIAL FORCES  
 
 Britain‘s presence as a military power and protector created tensions within the 
Trucial States from their inception. Britain‘s treaty relations with the local rulers gave 
Britain extensive rights in the foreign affairs of the Arab Gulf states, but their ability to 
operate within the Trucial States‘ territories was limited, at least in theory, to the express 
permission of the local rulers. The Trucial Oman Scouts, though providing a valuable 
service to the rulers in terms of boundary disputes and general policing efforts, came to 
become a point of contention toward the end of Britain‘s tenure in the Persian Gulf. By 
then, the spread of Arab nationalism and the Rulers‘ need to demonstrate their 
sovereignty and independent strength in light of Britain‘s forthcoming withdrawal led to 
greater conflict about what the future role of the Trucial Oman Scouts would be.  
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 Relations between the Trucial rulers and the Trucial Oman Scouts were largely 
cordial and cooperative throughout the Scouts‘ existence. In 1956, the Trucial Scouts 
successfully defended Abu Dhabi and Oman‘s claims to Buraimi against Saudi forces. In 
subsequent years, the Scouts continued to patrol the area in order to prevent instability in 
Oman from spilling into Abu Dhabi.318 In other cases, the Trucial Oman Scouts provided 
valuable internal support to the local police forces, and the ruler of Dubai even offered to 
finance the expansion of the Scouts‘ police force.319 The police forces of the Emirates 
were all too small to effectively police large demonstrations and gatherings. The police 
force in Dubai, for example, only consisted of approximately 300 policemen as late as 
1967; that of Sharjah included only 57 men.320 Ras al-Khaimah had developed a force of 
157 policemen, but the smaller emirates could not boast of any substantial police force in 
the late ‗sixties; in fact, Fujairah, Umm al Qaiwain, and Ajman only began training small 
police forces with support from Abu Dhabi in 1968-69.321 Much of the time, the Trucial 
Oman Scouts served the interests of both the Arab rulers and those of Britain.  
                                                 
318 The Sultan of Oman‘s rule was threatened by a rebel named Imam Ghalib ibn 
c
Ali, who sought to break 
away from Omani rule. He received support from Saudi Arabia, who sought to encourage instability near 
Buraimi and re-gain control over the Omani side of the oasis. See Wolcott, ―The Trucial Oman Scouts,‖  
Asian Affairs (2006): 19; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of 
Security (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 124-25.  
319 Letter from M. Man (Political Resident, Bahrain) to A. R. Walmsley, (Arabian Department, FO). March 
10, 1962. FO 371/163045. TNA. When the War Office refused to provide additional funds for the purposes 
of expanding the Trucial Oman Scouts‘ police branch, the ruler of Dubai offered to finance the difference 
in cost, as policing was ―…a primary function of the force.‖  
320 ―Trucial States Intelligence Report No. 024,‖ June 26, 1967. FCO 8/901. TNA; ―Extracts from Mr. L. 
A. Hicks, Deputy Overseas Police Adviser, Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office‘s Report of Visit to 
Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States,‖ FO 8/905. TNA.  
321 ―Extracts from Mr. L. A. Hicks,‖ FO 8/905. TNA; ―Abu Dhabi and Fujairah,‖ Letter from J. L. Bullard 
(Political Agent, Dubai) to M. S. Weir (Political Resident, Bahrain). June 3, 1969. FCO 8/1218. TNA.  
 165 
 Occasionally, though, the Scouts‘ exercise of power could create difficult and 
potentially explosive situations between the British Residency and the Rulers. At the 
simplest level, conflict arose out of questions surrounding the jurisdictional divisions of 
labor between the Rulers‘ personal forces and police forces and those of the Trucial 
Oman Scouts. The problem of cooperation and jurisdiction ranged from speculation about 
potential traffic and crime problems in the Buraimi Oasis to more serious questions of 
murder and deportation of criminals.322 In one case, an Adeni man was accused of murder 
and had been arrested by the Trucial Oman Scouts. Upon his arrest, the Political Agent 
determined that the man was most likely mentally unstable and possibly unfit to plea. He 
wished to transport the man to an asylum, but needed to confer with Sheikh Zayid over 
whether or not the ruler of Abu Dhabi at the time, Sheikh Shakhbut, would allow for such 
an action given his generally suspicious attitude toward the exercise of British power.323 
Usually these problems were resolved quickly, though they required careful handling by 
the Political Agents and Resident.  
 Other encounters between the Trucial Oman Scouts and the rulers proved much 
more explosive. On August 27, 1960, Scouts stopped a vehicle during a road block and 
security checkpoint exercise. The car contained the Sheikh Rashid al-Nuaimi, the ruler of 
Ajman. Soldiers proceeded to hold him at gun point while they searched his vehicle and 
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then searched his person. In summarizing the events, Political Agent Dubai Donald 
Hawley reflected on the danger of similar future encounters:  
…I am disturbed that, when our whole position in the Trucial States depends on 
our treaties with the Rulers, some of the officers are adopting so narrowly military 
an approach that incidents like this one are even possible. It is fortunately 
unprecedented; this sort of incident, however, especially, if it were to be repeated 
in Abu Dhabi, is likely to lead to a shortening of our period of tenure in the 
Trucial States.324 
 
The incident was smoothed over with a sincere apology from the Scouts‘ commander and 
the Political Agent. But it was clear that the British force‘s presence in the Trucial States 
created potential for conflict.  
 The underlying tension that defined the relationship of the British military and the 
local rulers became significantly more pronounced with the rise of Arab nationalism and 
the British withdrawal. Arab nationalism had crept into the Persian Gulf beginning in the 
1930s and was increasingly apparent in the region following the hey-day of pan-Arab 
nationalism in the 1950s and early 1960s.325 As discussed in previous chapters, awareness 
of Arab nationalist ideology, and support for it from within the Arab Gulf states, grew in 
waves, following Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and 
his support for Republican forces in South Arabia. In 1967, the Arab-Israeli War, which 
ended in a resounding defeat for the Arab states and for Nasser‘s political career, 
weakened the value of Pan-Arabism as a workable political ideology. But it also 
strengthened anti-Western sentiment in the Arab populations throughout the Middle East.  
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 The British defeat in Aden in November 1967 drove the reality of this sentiment 
home. Britain had been embroiled in a civil war in Yemen that had spilled over into the 
South Arabian federation and Britain‘s crown colony at Aden since 1962. As nationalist 
Republican forces gained the upper hand there, Britain planned a withdrawal from Aden 
in 1968. British troops were forced to evacuate on November 30, 1967.326 Arab 
nationalism appeared to be moving closer and closer to the Arab Gulf.  
 While Britain‘s announcement only a month and a half later was based in large 
part on British economic problems, the threat of Arab nationalism and its potential for 
creating instability in the Trucial States most certainly shaped the way British policy 
makers envisioned their post-withdrawal role there. The Foreign Office‘s goal remained 
the long term independence and stability of the region. For Britain, the establishment of a 
strong and effective Union Defense Force to serve as a military deterrent to aggressive 
neighboring states would best be constituted through the restructuring of the Trucial 
Oman Scouts. Some of the Arab rulers, however, saw the Trucial Oman Scouts as too 
British an institution to provide the core of the Union‘s defense. 
For years, the Political Residency staff had been concerned that the Scouts should 
be seen as a local force. In 1960, the Political Agent at Dubai, Donald Hawley, began 
pressing to increase the number of Arab officers in the Scouts and sending them to be 
trained in Britain, which he viewed as, ―…a matter of some political importance….‖327 
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At that time, British soldiers and personnel made up approximately ten percent of the 
total force. He stressed the need to begin the process of a future ―Arabisation‖ of the 
Scouts.328 The following Political Resident agreed, arguing that, ―It has all along been our 
thesis that we should try to build up the [Trucial Oman Scouts] as a local force capable of 
winning the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Trucial States.‖329 
This was the line that most British officials took when discussing the future 
organization of the Gulf military forces with the Sheikhs. Among themselves they were 
more candid about the perception of the Trucial Oman Scouts in the region and 
potentially the rest of the Middle East. The Political Agent at Dubai in 1969, Julian 
Bullard, in talking about the future of Britain‘s military presence after the withdrawal 
admitted that the Scouts would be, ―…the one conspicuous British legacy after 150 years 
as the paramount power in the Trucial States.‖330 He nevertheless believed that the 
Trucial Oman Scouts should continue to provide its services to the Gulf Union once it 
came into being.  
 Some of the local sheikhs were more cautious in their approach to British and 
British-organized forces in the area after 1971. Even when asking Britain to consider 
continuing its defense role in the Gulf after the withdrawal, Sheikh Isa of Bahrain insisted 
that though, ―…a continued British military presence would be most welcome,‖ he 
believed such an arrangement would be difficult in the face of Bahraini and general Arab 
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opinion.331 The Bahraini government continued to resist open, permanent military 
arrangements with both Great Britain, and later, the United States well into the 1980s, 
rather than risk criticism for connections with Western powers.332 While they valued the 
protection outside military forces could provide, the Arab rulers were acutely aware of 
the danger of appearing to rely too closely on Western protection. 
 The British withdrawal and the future of the Trucial Oman Scouts remained 
unresolved well into 1969, just two years before Britain was scheduled to leave the 
Persian Gulf. In a report prepared by Major-General John Willoughby, the British 
government proposed the establishment of a Union Defense Force based on the Trucial 
Oman Scouts, with the addition of a small eighteen-plane air force and a twelve patrol 
boats for a naval branch.333 To the Foreign Office, such a plan provided a quick and 
efficient solution to the problem of establishing a nascent military force capable of 
providing a deterrent to external aggressors and shore up internal policing. Stewart 
Crawford summarized this view in a report to his Political Agent at Abu Dhabi, Julian 
Bullard, saying: ―It is fairly obvious that, in the short time scale ahead, the Scouts would 
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have to be one of the main sources [for the first Union battalion] at least for the senior 
personnel.‖334 
 Sheikh Zayid viewed such a move as politically dangerous. The ruler of Abu 
Dhabi insisted that the Trucial Oman Scouts could not be seen as the core institution of 
the future Union Defense Force. In his discussions with Bullard, he stressed that if a 
Scouts were incorporated in the first Union Defense Force battalion, it would, ―involve 
the Union force, in its first stages in being too closely associated with British military 
institutions and that use of TOS facilities could attract political criticism from other Arab 
countries… and so compromise the political future of the Union.‖335 Instead, he proposed 
that the Union should create the first battalion using only Union resources, giving it the 
outward appearance of being ―wholly independent‖ of Britain.336  
 For Crawford and members in the Foreign Office, this argument did not hold 
water. They saw Zayid‘s attempts to draw personnel from the Scouts for separate Union 
facilities as a dangerous move that would ―weaken the TOS‖ and leave the Emirates 
without a ―viable Union force‖ at the time when such a force would be necessary for 
defending the emerging Union.337 Drawing on arguments the Residency had used before, 
Crawford urged Bullard to remind Zayid that the Scouts had been undergoing 
Arabization over the last decade, with increasing numbers of non-commissioned and 
                                                 
334 Attachment to ―The Union Defence Force and the TOS,‖ Letter from Stewart Crawford (Political 
Resident, Bahrain) to Julian Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai), April 28, 1969. FCO 8/983. TNA.  
335 ―Points to be made concerning HMG‘s attitude towards Union Defence Force and TOS,‖ Draft by 
Stewart Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain). FCO 8/983 TNA. 
336 Ibid. 
337  ―Points to be made concerning HMG‘s attitude towards Union defence force and TOS,‖ Draft by 
Stewart Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain). FCO 8/983. TNA. 
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commissioned officers from the Trucial States. Furthermore, the administrative and 
financial burden of the Trucial Oman Scouts had been shared by the rulers of the Trucial 
States. For these reasons, the Scouts were, to Crawford‘s mind, a ―local force‖.338 
 Zayid remained unconvinced. Arab nationalism remained a specter hanging over 
the formation of the Emirates, and was a greater immediate threat to the Union than other 
potential adversaries. If the Union did not create a military force seen as a legitimate, 
―native growth‖, at least in the beginning, then the future Union would be at risk from 
propaganda. In a meeting with the Secretary of State, Zayid persisted in his contention 
that the Union needed to build its first battalion with its own resources and integrate the 
Trucial Oman Scouts at a later date.339 
 For much of the time between 1968 and 1971, both perspectives had a ring of 
truth. The pragmatic approach that concerned British officials was, in many ways, a tactic 
designed to preserve the British legacy as they left. While a lasting Union in the Persian 
Gulf would be ideal, the fact remained that Britain‘s withdrawal from East of Suez 
marked a retreat from British responsibility for the Trucial States beyond December 
1971. For Zayid, however, the Union‘s stability and future success was essential for his 
own political future. His own legitimacy, and that of the Union as an Arab state, 
depended on the acceptance of the Union as independent and unfettered by British 
institutions and trappings.  
                                                 
338 Ibid. As mentioned above, the rulers had helped to finance the Trucial Oman Scouts throughout their 
existence and had even paid additional funds in times of economic necessity. Crawford also noted that the 
Commandant of the Scouts reported to the Trucial Council, which had been chaired by the rulers since 
1958.  
339 Telegram, Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain) to FCO. May 6, 1969. FCO 8/983. TNA.  
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FROM AGGRESSORS TO “TWIN PILLARS” 
 
 The problem of balancing public perception and the need for expediency in 
creating the Union Defense Force remained unresolved until Britain and the Union 
overcame the two greatest obstacles to the Union‘s success. The Trucial Oman Scouts‘ 
very reason for existence had rested on the need to protect the Trucial States from 
aggression by Saudi Arabia and deter any efforts by Iran to extend power to the Arab 
coast. Support for the Union from both sides had been given on contingencies. For Saudi 
Arabia, the Union‘s formation required the inclusion of both Bahrain and Qatar in order 
to balance the strength of Zayid‘s position as an economic power in the Union. Iran 
required recognition of its claims to Bahrain and the Gulf islands also claimed by Sharjah 
and Ras al-Khaimah. These issues weighed heavily on the progress of the negotiations for 
a union and gained increasing urgency in the last two years of Britain‘s term in the 
Persian Gulf.  
The deadlock between Britain and Zayid remained a significant roadblock to the 
future of the Union until it gained the recognition and support of both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, which was only granted in 1971. By that time, the new strategic defense of the 
Persian Gulf had been determined and would rely heavily on the strategy of the ―twin 
pillars‖ of Saudi Arabia and Iran as guarantors of the region.340 
                                                 
340 Several works have dealt with the issue of the ―twin pillars‖ as an extension of the Nixon Doctrine, 
which gave carte blanche to Saudi Arabia and Iran as the two guarantors of Western interests in the Persian 
Gulf. See Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (1997); Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search 
for Strategic Stability (1986); J. E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1986), which is 
more concerned with the problems created in the Gulf by the fall of the Shah in 1978 and the changes since 
the Carter administration, but provides a useful analysis of the development of the ―twin pillar‖ strategy. 
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The British Foreign Office had begun to deliberate on the necessity of cooperation 
from Saudi Arabia and Iran well before Harold Wilson announced a date for British 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Even in April 1967, policymakers consider the two 
regional powers as significant determinants in the success or failure of a union or 
federation among the Trucial States. British policy in support of a union among the 
Trucial States, in whatever form, would 
…depend for its chances of success on the Saudis and Iranians developing a 
minimum understanding both towards ourselves and each other. Saudi Arabia and 
Iran are the two powers most directly concerned in the future of the Protected 
States; they are also the two best placed to bring force to bear in the area, the 
Saudis by virtue of their commanding geographical position and the Iranians 
through their growing naval supremacy in the Gulf. If they were at loggerheads 
with each other, local stability would be unlikely to survive our departure. 
Conversely, if they were to act in concert, or at least with mutual understanding, 
they could do much to ensure a peaceful transition to whatever new system 
follows our withdrawal. It will therefore be essential for us to secure Saudi 
cooperation and at least Iranian acquiescence as our policy evolves; and to bring 
                                                                                                                                                 
Also of great value is Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in 
Transition, 1968-1971 (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003) which examines the ―twin pillars‖ in the context of 
local and regional pressures.  
Other works are largely concerned not with the creation of the Twin Pillar strategy, but rather the problems 
created by the strategy in 1973 when oil prices sky-rocketed due to the Arab oil embargo.  The embargo 
was put in place in response to American and European support for Israel in the October 1973 war with 
Egypt and Syria. Following independence, the Trucial States joined OPEC to gain greater control over the 
pricing and production of oil.  During the embargo, oil production in the Arab Gulf declined by 
approximately five percent, which set off an energy crisis that lasted through the 1970s and created a sense 
of disillusionment among those who viewed this as the natural consequence of the British withdrawal from 
the region. For more on the oil embargo and its impact on the world economy, see Yergin, The Prize 
(1991). Bin Hethlain, Saudi Arabia and the US Since 1962 (2010) is one example of a work that ignores the 
creation of the ―twin pillar‖ policy, despite the significance of its evolution in the period covered in the first 
third of his study. Similarly, Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Strom: 
America‟s Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, Inc., 1993) spends almost no time discussing the development of the policy, saying simply that 
―the Nixon administration formulated a strategy that became known as the Twin Pillars policy, whereby 
Iran and Saudi Arabia were anointed as the protectors of U.S. interests in the Gulf,‖ pp. 23.  This is not 
only overly brief, but fairly inaccurate. Finally, Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf, and the West (1980), writing in the 
wake of the energy crisis as well as the Iranian revolution reflects the frustration of those who believed 
Britain should have stayed on to maintain more effective control in the region.  
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home to them how important their relations with each other are going to be, for 
their own interest as well as for ours and our present protégés.341 
 
The entire future of the Trucial States rested on the cooperation of two rivals for regional 
supremacy. 
The Trucial Sheikhs themselves recognized the potential danger of either state 
becoming too powerful along the Trucial Coast. In reporting on the rulers‘ opinions about 
the British withdrawal, a British Intelligence Officer from the Trucial Oman Scouts stated 
that their reactions indicated that, ―under no circumstances,‖ would they accept Iran in a 
role as Britain‘s replacement.342 Similarly, Saudi Arabia would be less unacceptable, but 
was not a desirable solution.343  
Both the Shah and the King had the potential to destroy the stability and 
sovereignty of the Trucial Sheikhs in their views. Between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial 
rulers, especially Sheikh Zayid, the main problem remained that of disputed boundaries.  
Buraimi had been the main flashpoint for disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the 
emirates; but there were also disagreements over the oil well at Tarif.  
The dispute over Buraimi had reached something of a stasis by 1966. At that time, 
the British government issued a formal warning to Saudi Arabia against taking further 
action at Buraimi. From that point onward, the Buraimi dispute took place in negotiations 
between British policymakers and King Faysal and Sheikh Zayid. No substantial 
                                                 
341 ―Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf,‖ Note by the Foreign Office. April 18, 1967. CAB 148/57. 
TNA.  
342 ―Trucial States Intelligence Report No. 2 of 17 January, 1968.‖ FCO 9/901. TNA.  
343 Ibid. 
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agreements were made, except to establish a neutral zone near Buraimi that limited Abu 
Dhabi‘s drilling for oil. 
Once the British withdrawal became an imminent reality, King Faisal became 
increasingly adamant that the boundary disputes were resolved. In 1970, Faysal invited 
Zayid to Saudi Arabia to open direct discussions on a variety of issues, including 
Buraimi. Faysal demanded that the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company end all drilling near 
Zarrara, an area within the disputed areas that Saudi claimed for itself, but which Britain 
recognized as unquestionably Abu Dhabi‘s own territory.344 The talks ended without the 
rulers reaching any satisfactory compromise.  
Faysal remained upset about boundaries and the extent of Zayid‘s power in the 
future union. During the course of a meeting with the British Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Faysal complained that Zayid was 
still drilling in the disputed ―no-man‘s land.‖345 When Ambassador Morris suggested 
Faysal give up boundary dispute for the sake of regional stability, Faysal responded that 
if a solution did not materialize, Saudi Arabia was willing to use force to, ―recover the 
occupied areas.‖346  
In the following year, the Foreign Office changed its tactics in order to align 
Faysal‘s interests more closely with the success of the Union. Faisal agreed to give up 
portions of his claim to the areas around Buraimi in exchange for coastal territory that 
would give the Kingdom access to the lower Gulf. When Zayid balked, the Foreign 
                                                 
344 Kelly, Britain, Arabia and the West (1980), 75-77. 
345 ―Record of conversation between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
[Luard] at Riyadh on 4 May, 1970,‖ May 11, 1970. FCO 1016/740. TNA.  
346 Ibid. 
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Office began to press him to make concessions to Faysal.347 Zayid could no more be seen 
to prevent the establishment of a Union than Faysal could. Ultimately, he agreed to pause 
drilling in the disputed territories. With this promise secured, Saudi Arabia withdrew its 
demands for immediate resolution to the boundary dispute, making it possible for the 
Foreign Office and the Trucial States to concern themselves with negotiations over 
constitutional aspects of the future Union.  
Iran presented another significant obstacle for Britain.  The Shah had begun using 
Iran‘s oil wealth in the 1960s to build up its forces and establish itself as the foremost 
military power in the Gulf.348 By 1968, the Shah had developed sufficient naval power to 
demonstrate its primacy in the Persian Gulf, but it required the islands of Abu Musa and 
the Tunbs to secure the entrance through the Straits of Hormuz. The islands, however, 
were also claimed by Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, and Britain‘s treaty relations with the 
Trucial States committed the Great Britain to protect the emirates‘ territorial integrity. 
Without the consent of the Trucial Rulers, Britain could not transfer the territory to Iran.  
Iran had gained the goodwill of the British government by 1970, when the Shah 
quietly assented to an international resolution to its other outstanding claim over Bahrain. 
Iran had long-standing ties to Bahrain through trade and territorial occupation prior to the 
nineteenth century. Disagreement about the sovereignty of Bahrain was settled by Britain 
when they backed the al-Khalifah family as the legitimate rulers of the island in 1820. 
                                                 
347 Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West (1980), 85-87. 
348 Iran had long viewed Britain‘s negotiations with the ruling family of Bahrain, the al-Khalifah, as 
illegitimate because it superceded their own claims to the island, which they argued had been part of 
Iranian territory for centuries. Alvandi, ―Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question,‖ British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2010): 159-77.  
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When Wilson announced the British withdrawal in 1968, the Shah stated that he would 
withhold his support for the Union unless and until the island disputes were settled. 
Following several talks between the Foreign Office and Mohammad Reza Shah, he 
quietly agreed to forego his rights to Bahrain if a United Nations-administered plebiscite 
determined that Bahrain preferred independence. The vote secured Bahrain‘s 
independence from Iran in 1970, and in August 1971, Bahrain became a sovereign nation.  
The Shah was less cooperative on the question of the remaining islands. Britain 
warned the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah that without an agreement between 
them and Iran before the withdrawal date, they would be on their own to defend their 
claims. Sharjah relinquished its claims in exchange for an agreement that would allow 
Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain to receive a sum of money and a percentage of oil profits if 
oil were discovered.349 Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah, however, refused to heed 
Britain‘s suggestion.  
Both the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office 
considered options for forcing an early solution to the Iran-islands dispute. Even in early 
discussions about Bahrain and the islands, US officials had been pressing Britain to find a 
way to establish Bahrain as an exchange for the Tunbs and Abu Musa. Without doing so, 
the State Department argued, the British were, ―…[ignoring] the unignorable, i.e., 
Bahrein [sic.] as well as Tunb and Abu Musa islands. As we see it, only way the Shah 
can save face re: Bahrein would be via British decision that Tunb and Abu Musa belong 
                                                 
349 Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (1984), 417. Sharjah received nine annual 
payments of $3.5 million; when oil was found in 1972, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain began to receive 
additional money. 
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to Iran….‖350 Such an argument failed to recognize the variety of opinions of the nine 
sheikhs in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, it proved to be the workable solution.  
On November 30, only two days before Britain abrogated its treaties with the 
Trucial States, Iran occupied the islands by force. Britain did not take action to re-secure 
the islands, instead leaving Ras al-Khaimah to choose its own course of action. On 
December 2, the United Arab Emirates came into being; but Saqr refused to join in 
protest of Iran‘s actions and Britain‘s refusal to support Ras al-Khaimah‘s claim. For 
Britain, however, Iran‘s seizing of the islands was a small price to pay for Iran‘s 
cooperation in the security of the United Arab Emirates and the Persian Gulf.   
 
  
                                                 
350 Telegram, Meyer to Secretary of State, March 15, 1968, NSF Country File Middle East, #136, Iran 
cables vol. 2, 1/66-1/69. LBJL.  
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion  
 
 On December 2, 1971, Britain ended its treaty-based relationship with the last 
seven Trucial States remaining in the Persian Gulf.  The following day, Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ajman, and Umm al-Qaiwain all came together to officially for 
the United Arab Emirates.  Though Ras al-Khaimah refused to join the Union at that 
time, it was clear to most that this would be a short-lived singular existence.  When it 
became clear that no solution between Iran and Ras al-Khaimah would be forthcoming, 
Sheikh Saqr accepted his fate and signed onto the Union constitution, only two months 
later.   
Britain‘s policy throughout its one hundred fifty year rule in the Persian Gulf had 
been the extension and preservation of its dominant position there.  This was also 
Britain‘s aim when it left in 1971. In creating the United Arab Emirates, the British 
Government had certainly relinquished its stronghold over Trucial States.  Legally, the 
rulers of the United Arab Emirates could make treaties and establish commercial ties with 
any other power, something which they had not been able to pursue before 1971 without 
explicit permission from the Political Resident. The defense of the United Arab Emirates 
and the other Gulf States, which had been entirely the purview of British naval, air, and 
land forces, was left in the hands Saudi Arabia and Iran, and to a lesser extent the 
Emirates themselves.  
The act of withdrawal had been implemented with the goal of protecting British 
interests by staving off the rising tide of Arab nationalism that had risen in the wake of 
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Britain‘s imperial ―moment‖ in the Arab world. As Britain had been forced to withdraw 
its presence from Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, it began to rely more heavily on the 
handful of sheikhdoms on the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf. The export of oil from the 
Persian Gulf, and Britain‘s visible military presence drew the Trucial States out into the 
regional politics of the region—and drew attention from other Arab states to the political 
and social circumstances in the Trucial States.   The British military and advisory 
presence in the Trucial Coast created an opening for criticism from Arab leaders looking 
to expand their influence there.  As early as the 1950s, Britain‘s very presence in the 
Persian Gulf had begun to create in the Trucial States many of the same problems there as 
it had elsewhere in the Arab world. By the end of the 1960s, it became apparent to policy 
makers that they could leave, or they could be forced out at potentially great expense.    
 The duality of Britain‘s situation in the Trucial States— the need to physically 
protect British interests, and the insecurity created by Britain‘s presence—became too 
precarious. The populations of the Emirates grew more aware of Arab nationalism. In 
Bahrain and Dubai, demonstrations against local economic and political difficulties came 
to take on outwardly anti-imperialist overtones. In other parts of the Trucial Coast, anti-
British and anti-imperialist sentiment largely remained less organized, but nevertheless 
threatened on several occasions to rise to the surface.    
The United Arab Emirates were formed in the years following the greatest activity 
of Arab nationalism in the wider Middle East. Its establishment nevertheless was shaped 
by the legacy of the Arab nationalist movement and its potential for revival in the face of 
continued British interference. The Trucial rulers, particularly Sheikhs Ahmed of Qatar, 
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Khalifah of Bahrain, and Zayid of Abu Dhabi, came to embrace Arab nationalisms 
potential for instability as a means for increasing their power in a post-Britain Gulf. For 
them, Arab nationalism provided a pivotal and persuasive argument in their negotiations 
with British officials. Once Bahrain was recognized by its own populations and the 
United Nations as an independent and sovereign state in 1970, there was sufficient 
evidence for the Khalifah to muster against British and Saudi Arabian pressure to join the 
Union. Denying the Bahraini people their right of self-determination in the face of 
overwhelming internal support and enthusiasm provided sufficient support for Khalifah‘s 
decision to forego the Union without open opposition from either Britain or Saudi Arabia. 
This also meant that Khalifah did not have to share his power within Bahrain with his 
rivals in Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Sheikh Ahmad was then able to use Bahrain‘s example to 
achieve the same goals for Qatar.  
 Sheikh Zayid utilized similar arguments throughout the Union negotiations in 
order to ensure his own position as the leading power among the Trucial States. This was 
most evident in his discussions with Britain on the future of the Trucial Oman Scouts vis-
à-vis the Union Defense Forces. When the immediate threat of Saudi Arabia‘s and Iran‘s 
goals for domination of the Union fell to the wayside in favor of greater Gulf unity, Zayid 
achieved his goals for the creation of a Defense Force with Union resources, rather than 
drawing its strength from the British-created Scouts. The more immediate threat became 
the question of the Union‘s recognition as an Arab state in the wider Middle East, rather 
than one of territorial integrity. The Union Defense Force began, then, as a military force 
paid for and trained under Union auspices. Significantly, most of those resources came 
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from Abu Dhabi, the richest of the seven emirates. And the Trucial Oman Scouts 
remained a separate entity until they were finally absorbed in 1976—several years after 
the Union had become independent and had proven its ability to weather regional crises, 
at least in the short term.  
 The United Arab Emirates‘ formation and its subsequent perseverance was a 
surprise to many of the British officials who had worked towards its creation.  Indeed, it 
may have even surprised some of the ruling sheikhs themselves, though they would have 








We, the Rulers of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al 
Qawain and Fujairah (1):  
 Whereas it is our desire and the desire of the people of our Emirates to establish a 
Union between these Emirates, to promote a better life, more enduring stability and a 
higher international status for the Emirates and their people;  
 Desiring to create closer links between the Arab Emirates in the form of an 
independent, sovereign, federal state, capable of protecting its existence and the existence 
of its members, in co-operation with the sister Arab states and with all other friendly 
states which are members of the United Nations Organisation and of the family of nations 
in general, on a basis of mutual respect and reciprocal interests and benefits;  
 Desiring also to lay the foundation for federal rule in the coming years on a sound 
basis, corresponding to the realities and the capacities of the Emirates at the present time, 
enabling the Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals, sustaining the identity 
of its members providing that this is not inconsistent with those goals and preparing the 
people of the Union at the same time for a dignified and free constitutional life, and 
progressing by steps towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime in an 
Islamic and Arab society free from fear and anxiety;  
 And whereas the realization of the foregoing was our dearest desire, towards 
which we have bent our strongest resolution, being desirous of advancing our country and 
our people to the status of qualifying them to take appropriate place among civilized 
states and nations;  
 For all these reasons and until the preparation of the permanent Constitution for 
the Union may be completed, we proclaim before the Surpeme and Omnipotent Creator, 
and before all the peoples, our agreement to this provisional Constitution, to which our 
signatures were appended, which shall be implemented during the transitional period 
indicated in it;  












 The United Arab Emirates is an independent, sovereign, federal state and is 
referred to hereafter in this Constitution as the Union. The Union shall consist of the 
following Emirates:-  
 Abu Dhabi – Dubai – Sharjah – Ajman – Umm al Qawain – Fujairah – Ras al-
Khaimah.351 
 Any other independent Arab country may join the Union, provided that the 
Supreme Council agrees unanimously to this.  
 
Article 2 
 The Union shall exercise [sovereignty] in matters assigned to it in accordance 
with this Constitution over all territory and territorial waters lying within the international 
boundaries of the member Emirates. 
 
Article 3 
 The member Emirates shall exercise [sovereignty] over their own territories and 
territorial waters in all matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the Union as 
assigned in this Constitution.  
 
Article 4 




 The Union shall have a Flag, an Emblem and a National Anthem. The Flag and 
the Emblem shall be prescribed by Law. Each Emirate shall retain its own flag for use 
within its territories.  
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 The Union is a part of the Great Arab Nation, to which it is bound by the ties of 
religion, language, history and common destiny.  
 The people of the Union are one people, and one part of the Arab Nation.  
 
Article 7 
 Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic Shari‘ah shall be a main 
source of legislation in the Union. The official language of the Union is Arabic.  
 
Article 8 
 The citizens of the Union shall have a single nationality which shall be prescribed 
by law. When abroad, they shall enjoy the protection of the Union Government in 
accordance with accepted international principals.  
 No citizen of the Union may be deprived of his nationality nor may his nationality 
be withdrawn save in exceptional circumstances which shall be defined by Law.  
 
Article 9 
1. The Capital of the Union shall be established in an area allotted to the Union by 
the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the borders between them and it shall be 
given the name ―Al Karama‖.  
2. There shall be allocated in the Union budget for the first year the amount 
necessary to cover the expenses of technical studies and planning for the 
construction of the Capital. However, construction work shall begin as soon as 
possible and shall be completed in not more than seven years from the date of 
entry into force of this Constitution.  
3. Until the construction of the Union Capital is complete, Abu Dhabi shall be the 
provisional headquarters of the Union.  
Article 10 
 The aims of the Union shall be the maintenance of its independence and 
sovereignty, the [safeguard] of its security and stability, the defence against any 
aggression upon its existence of the existence of its member states, the protection of the 
rights and liabilities of the people of the Union, the achievement of close co-operation 
between the Emirates for their common benefit in realizing these aims and in promoting 
their prosperity and progress in all fields, the provision of a better life for all citizens 
together with respect by each Emirate for the independence and sovereignty of the other 
Emirates in their internal affairs within the framework of this Constitution.  
 
Article 11 
1. The Emirates of the Union shall form an economic and customs entity. Union 
Laws shall regulate the progressive stages appropriate to the achievement of this 
entity.  
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2. The free movement of all capital and goods between the Emirates of the Union is 
guaranteed and may not be restricted except by a Union Law.  
3. All taxes, fees, duties and tolls imposed on the movement of goods from one 
member Emirate to the other shall be abolished.  
Article 12 
 The foreign policy of the Union shall be directed towards support for Arab and 
Islamic causes and interests and towards the consolidation of the bonds of friendship and 
co-operation with all nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the Charter of 




The Fundamental Social and Economic Basis of the Union 
 
Article 13 
 The Union and the member Emirates shall co-operate, within the limits of their 
jurisdiction and abilities, in executing the provisions of this Part.  
 
Article 14 
 Equality, social justice, ensuring safety and security and equality of opportunity 
for all citizens shall be the pillars of the Society. Co-operation and mutual mercy shall be 
a firm bond between them.  
 
Article 15 
 The family is the basis of society. It is founded on morality, religion, ethics and 




 Society shall be responsible for protecting childhood and motherhood and shall 
protect minors and others unable to look after themselves for any reason, such as illness 
or incapacity or old age or forced unemployment. It shall be responsible for assisting 
them and enabling them to help themselves for their own benefit and that of the 
community.  
 Such matters shall be regulated by welfare and social security legislations.  
 
Article 17 
 Education shall be a fundamental factor for the progress of society. It shall by 
[compulsory] in its primary stage and free of charge at all stages, within the Union. The 
law shall prescribe the necessary plans for the propagation and spread of education at 




 Private schools may be established by individuals and organisations in accordance 
with the provisions of the law, provided that such schools shall be subject to the 
supervision of the competent public authorities and to their directives.  
 
Article 19 
 Medical care and means of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics 
shall be ensured by the community for all citizens.  
 The community shall promote the establishment of public and private hospitals, 
dispensaries and cure-houses.  
 
Article 20 
 Society shall esteem work as a corner-stone of its development. It shall endeavour 
to ensure that employment is available for citizens and to train them so that they are 
prepared for it. It shall furnish the appropriate facilities for that by providing legislations 
protecting the rights of the employees and the interests of the employers in the light of 
developing international labour regulations.  
 
Article 21 
 Private property shall be protected. Conditions relating thereto shall be laid down 
by Law. No one shall be deprived of his private property except in circumstances dictated 
by the public benefit in accordance with the provisions of the Law and on payment of a 
just compensation.  
 
Article 22 
 Public property shall be inviolable. The protection of public property shall be the 
duty of every citizen. The Law shall define the cases in which penalties shall be imposed 
for the contravention of that duty.  
 
Article 23 
 The natural resources and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered to be the 
public property of that Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the protection and proper 
exploitation of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the national economy.  
 
Article 24 
 The basis of the national economy shall be social justice. It is founded on sincere 
co-operation between public and private activities. Its aim shall be the achievement of 
economic development, increase of productivity, raising the standards of living and the 
achievement of prosperity for citizens, all within the limits of Law. 







Freedom, Rights and Public Duties 
 
Article 25 
 All persons are equal before the law, without distinction between citizens of the 
union in regard to race, nationality, religious belief or social structures. 
 
Article 26 
 Personal liberty is guaranteed to all citizens. No person may be arrested, searched, 
detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the provisions of law.  
 No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading treatment.  
 
Article 27 
 Crimes and punishments shall be defined by the law. No penalty shall be imposed 




 Penalty is personal. An accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty in 
a legal and fair trial. The accused shall have the right to appoint the person who is 
capable to conduct his defence during the trial. The law shall prescribe the cases in which 
the presence of a counsel for defence shall be assigned.  
 Physical and moral abuse of an accused person is prohibited.  
 
Article 29 
 Freedom of movement and residence shall be guaranteed to citizens within the 
limits of law.  
 
Article 30 
 Freedom of opinion and expressing it verbally, in writing or by other means of 
expression shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law.  
 
Article 31 
 Freedom of communication by post, telegraph or other means of communication 
and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in accordance with law.  
 
Article 32 
 Freedom to exercise religious worship shall be guaranteed in accordance with 






 Freedom of assembly and establishing associations shall be granted within the 
limits of law.  
 
Article 34 
 Every citizen shall be free to choose his occupation, trade or profession within the 
limits of law. Due consideration being given to regulations organising some of such 
professions and trades. No person may be subjected to forced labour except in 
exceptional circumstances provided for by the law and in return for compensation.  
 No person may be enslaved.  
 
Article 35 
 Public office shall be open to all citizens on a basis of equality and opportunity in 
accordance with the provisions of law. Public office shall be a national service entrusted 
to those who hold it. The public servant shall aim, in the execution of his duties, at the 
public interest alone.  
 
Article 36 
 Habitations shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without the permission 
of their inhabitants except in accordance with the provisions of the law and in the 
circumstances laid down therein.  
 
Article 37 
 Citizens may not be deported or banished from the Union.  
 
Article 38 
 Extradition of citizens and of Political refugees is prohibited.  
 
Article 39 
 General confiscation of property shall be prohibited. Confiscation of an 
individual‘s possessions as a penalty may not be inflicted except by a court judgment in 
the circumstances specified by law.  
 
Article 40 
 Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights and freedom stipulated in 
international charters which are in force or in treaties and agreements to which the Union 
is party. They shall be subject to the corresponding obligations.  
 
Article 41 
 Every person shall have the right to submit complaints to the competent 
authorities, including the judicial authorities, concerning the abuse or infringement of the 




 Payment of taxes and public charges determined by law is a duty of every citizen.  
 
Article 43 
 Defence of the Union is a sacred duty of every citizen and military service [is] an 
honour for citizens which shall be regulated by law.  
 
Article 44 
 Respect of the Constitution, laws and orders issued by public authorities in 
execution thereof, observance of public order and respect of public [morality] are duties 




The Union Authorities 
 
Article 45 
 The Union authorities shall consist of:  
1. The Supreme Council of the Union. 
2. The President of the Union and his Deputy. 
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union.  
4. The National Assembly of the Union.  
5. The Judiciary of the Union. 
 
Chapter I—The Supreme Council of the Union 
 
Article 46 
 The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest authority in the Union. It 
shall consist of the Rulers of all the Emirates composing the Union, or of those who 
deputise for the Rulers in their Emirates in the event of their absence or if they have been 
excused from attending.  
 Each Emirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations of the Council.  
 
Article 47  
 The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the following matters:-  
1. Formulation of general policy in all matters invested in the Union by this 
Constitution and consideration of all matters which leads to the achievement of te 
goals of the Union and the common interest of the member Emirates. 
2. Sanction of various Union laws before their promulgation, including the Laws of 
the Annual General Budget and the Final Accounts. 
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3. Sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of the provisions of this 
Constitution are subject to the ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. 
Such sanction shall take place before the promulgation of these decrees by the 
President of the Union.  
4. Ratification of treaties and international agreements. Such ratification shall be 
accomplished by decree.  
5. Approval of the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Union, acceptance of his resignation and his removal from office upon a proposal 
from the President of the Union. 
6. Approval of the appointment of the President and Judges of the Supreme Court of 
the Union, acceptance of their resignations and their dismissal in the 
circumstances stipulated by this Constitution. Such acts shall be accomplished by 
decrees.  
7.  Supreme Control over the affairs of the Union in general.  
8. Any other relevant matters stipulated in this Constitution or in the Union laws.  
Article 48 
1. The Supreme Council shall lay down its own bye-laws which shall include its 
procedure for the conduct of business and the procedure for voting on its 
decisions. The deliberations of the Council shall be secret.  
2. The Supreme Council shall establish a general Secretariat which shall consist of 
an adequate number of officials to assist it in the execution of its duties.  
Article 49 
 Decision of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be by a majority of 
five of its members provided that this majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai. The minority shall be bound by the view of the said majority.  
 But, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be by a majority vote. 
Such matters shall be defined in the bye-laws of the Council.  
 
Article 50 
 Sessions of the Supreme Council shall be held in the Union capital. Sessions may 
be held in any other place agreed upon beforehand.  
 




 The Supreme Council of the Union shall elect from among its members a 
President and a Vice President of the Union. The Vice President of the Union shall 
exercise all the powers of the President in the event of his absence for any reason. 
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Article 52 
 The term of office of the President and the Vice President shall be five Gregorian 
years. They are eligible for re-election to the same offices.  
 Each of them shall, on assuming office, take the following oath before the 
Supreme Council:  
―I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the United Arab Emirates; that 
I will respect its Constitution and its laws; that I will protect the interests of te 
people of the Union; that I will discharge my duties faithfully and loyally and that 
I will safeguard the independence of the Union and its territorial integrity.‖  
 
Article 53 
 Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy for death or resignation, 
or because either one of them ceases to be Ruler in his Emirate for any reason, the 
Supreme Council shall be called into session within one month of that date to elect a 
successor to the vacant office for the period stipulated in Article 52 of this Constitution.  
 In the event that the two offices of the President of the Supreme Council and his 
Deputy become vacant simultaneously, the Council shall be immediately called into 
session by any one of its members of by a Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Union, to elect a new President and Vice President to fill the two vacant offices. 
 
Article 54 
 The President of the Union shall assume the following powers:  
1. Presiding [over] the Supreme Council and directing its discussions.  
2. Calling the Supreme Council into session, and terminating its sessions according 
to the rules of procedure upon which the Council shall decide in its bye-laws. It is 
obligatory for him to convene the Council for sessions, whenever one of its 
members so requested.  
3. Calling the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers into joint sessions 
whenever necessity demands.  
4. Signing Union laws, decrees and decisions which the Supreme Council has 
sanctioned and promulgating them.  
5. Appointing the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation and relieving him of 
office with the consent of the Supreme Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy 
Prime Minister and the Ministers and shall receive their resignations and relieve 
them of office in accordance with the proposal from the Prime Minister of the 
Union.  
6. Appointing the diplomatic representatives of the Union to foreign states and other 
senior Union officials both civil and military (with the exception of the President 
and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their resignations 
and dismissing them with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. 
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Such appointments, acceptance of resignations and dismissals shall be 
accomplished by decrees and in accordance with Union laws.  
7. Signing of letters of credence of diplomatic representatives of the Union to the 
foreign states and organisations and accepting the credentials of diplomatic and 
consular representatives of foreign states to the Union and receiving their letters 
of credence. He shall similarly sign documents of appointment and credence of 
representatives. 
8. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees and decisions through the 
Council of Ministers of the Union and the competent ministers.  
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-à-vis other states and in all international 
relations. 
10. Exercising the right of pardon and commutation of sentences and approving 
capital sentences according to the provisions of this Constitution and Union laws.  
11. [Conferring] decorations and medals of honour, both civil and military, in 
accordance with the laws relating to such decorations and medals.  
12. Any other power vested in him by the Supreme Council or vested in him in 
conformity with this Constitution or Union laws.  
 
Chapter III—The Council of Ministers of the Union 
 
Article 55 
 The Council of Ministers of the union shall consist of the Prime Minister, his 
Deputy and a number of Ministers.  
 
Article 56 
 Ministers shall be chosen from among citizens of the Union known for their 
competence and experience. 
 
Article 57 
 The Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Ministers shall, before assuming the 
responsibilities of their office, take the following oath before the President of the Union: 
 
―I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United Arab Emirates; that I 
will respect its Constitution and laws; that I will discharge my duties faithfully; 
that I will completely observe the interests of the people of the Union and that I 







 The law shall define the Jurisdiction of the Ministers and the powers of each 
Minister. The first Council of Ministers of the Union shall be composed of the following 
Ministers: 
1. Foreign Affairs 
2. Interior 
3. Defence  
4. Finance, Economy and Industry 
5. Justice 
6. [Education] 
7. Public Health  
8. Public Works and Agriculture 
9. [Communications], Post, Telegraph and Telephones 




 The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. 
He shall call it into session, direct its debates, follow up the activities of Ministers and 
shall supervise the co-ordination of work between the various Ministries and in all 
executive organs of the Union.  
 The Deputy Prime Minister shall exercise all the powers of the Prime Minister in 
the event of his absence for any reason.  
 
Article 60 
 The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive authority of the union, 
and under the supreme control of the President of the Union and the Supreme Council, 
shall be responsible for dealing with all domestic and foreign affairs which are within the 
competence of the Union according to this Constitution and Union laws. 
 The Council of Ministers shall, in particular, assume the following powers:-  
1. Following up the implementations of the general policy of the Union 
Government, both domestic and foreign.  
2. Initiating drafts of Federal Laws and submitting them to the Union National 
Council before they are raised to the President of the Union for presentation to the 
Supreme Council for sanction.  
3. Drawing up the annual general budget of the Union, and the final accounts.  
4. Preparing drafts of decrees and various decisions. 
5. Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of Union laws without 
amending or suspending such regulations or making any exemption from their 
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execution. Issuing also police regulations and other regulations relating to the 
organization of public services and administrations, within the limits of this 
Constitution and Union laws. A special provision of the law or the Council of 
Ministers, may charge the competent Union Minister or any other administrative 
authority to promulgate some of such regulations.  
6. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees, decisions and regulations 
by all the concerned authorities in the Union or in the Emirates.  
7. Supervising the execution of judgments rendered by Union Law Courts and the 
implementation of international treaties and agreements concluded by the Union.  
8. Appointment and dismissal of Union employees in accordance with the provisions 
of the law, provided that their appointment and dismissal do not require the issue 
of a decree.  
9. Controlling the conduct of work in departments and public services of the Union 
and the conduct and discipline of Union employees in general.  
10. Any other authority vested in it by law or by the Supreme Council within the 
limits of this Constitution.  
Article 61 
Deliberations of the Council of Ministers shall be secret. Its resolutions shall be 
passed by a majority of its members. In the event that voting is evenly [divided], the side 
on which the Prime Minister has voted shall prevail. The minority shall abide by the 
opinion of the majority.  
 
Article 62 
While in office, the Prime Minister, his Deputy or any Union Minister, may not 
practice any professional, commercial or financial occupation or enter into any 
commercial transactions with the Government of the Union or the Governments of the 
Emirates, or combine with their office the membership of the board of directors of any 
financial or commercial company.  
 Furthermore, they may not combine with their office more than one official post 
in any of the Emirates and shall relinquish all other local official posts, if any. 
 
Article 63 
 The members of the Council of Ministers shall aim to serve in their conduct the 
interests of the Union, the promotion of public welfare and totally renounce personal 
benefits. They must not exploit their official capacities for their own interests or that of 
any person related to them.  
 
Article 64 
 The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically responsible collectively 
before the President of the Union and the Supreme Council of the Union for the 
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execution of the general policy of the union both domestic and foreign. Each of them 
shall be personally responsible to the President of the Union and the Supreme Council for 
the activities of his Ministry or office.  
 The resignation of the Prime Minister, his removal from office, his death, or the 
vacating of his office for any reason whatsoever shall involve the resignation of the 
whole Cabinet. The President of the Union may require the Ministers to remain in office 




 At the beginning of every financial year, the Council of Ministers shall submit to 
the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council, a detailed statement 
of internal achievements, on the Union‘s relations with other states and international 
organisations, together with the recommendations of the Cabinet on the best and most 
practical means of strengthening the foundations of the Union, consolidating its security 
and stability, achieving its goals and progress in all fields.  
 
Article 66 
1. The Council of Ministers shall draw up its own bye-laws including its rules 
procedure.  
2. The Council of Ministers shall establish a general Secretariat provided with a 
number of employees to assist it in the conduct of its business. 
Article 67 
 The Law shall prescribe the salaries of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and the 
other Ministers.  
 
 
Chapter IV—The National Assembly of the Union 
 Section 1—General Provisions 
 
Article 68 
 The National Assembly of the Union shall be composed of forty members.352 
Seats shall be distributed to member Emirates as follows: 
 Abu Dhabi   -- 8 seats  
 Dubai     -- 8 seats 
 Sharjah   -- 6 seats 
 Ras Al-Khaimah  -- 6 seats 
 Ajman    -- 4 seats 
 Umm Al-Qawain  -- 4 seats 
 Fujairah   -- 4 seats 
                                                 




 Each Emirate shall be free to determine the method of selection of the citizens 
representing it in the Union National Assembly. 
 
Article 70 
 A member of the Union National Assembly must satisfy the following conditions: 
1. Must be a citizen of one of the Emirates of the Union, and permanently resident in 
the Emirate he represents in the Assembly.  
2. Must be not less than twenty-five Gregorian years of age at the time of his 
selection. 
3. Must enjoy civil status, good conduct, reputation and not previously convicted of 
a dishonourable offence unless he has been rehabilitated in accordance with the 
law.  
4. Must have adequate knowledge of reading and writing. 
Article 71 
 Membership of the Union National Assembly shall be incompatible with any 
public office in the Union, including Ministerial portfolios.  
 
Article 72 
 The term of membership in the Union National Assembly shall be two Gregorian 
years commencing from the date of its first sitting. When this period expires, the 
Assembly shall be completely renewed for the time remaining until the end of the 
transitional period as laid down in Article 144 of this Constitution. 
 Any member who has completed his term may be re-elected.  
 
Article 73 
 Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or its Committees, a member of the 
Union National Assembly shall take the following oath before the Assembly in public 
session:- 
―I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United Arab Emirates; that I 
will respect the Constitution and the laws of the Union and that I will discharge 
my duties in the Assembly and its Committees honestly and truthfully.‖  
 
Article 74 
 If, for any reason, a seat of any member of the Assembly becomes vacant before 
the end of the term of his membership, a replacement shall be selected within two months 
of the date on which the vacancy is announced by the Assembly, unless the vacancy 
occurs during the three months preceding the end of the term of the Assembly.  




 Sessions of the Union National Assembly shall be held in the Union capital. 
Exceptionally, sessions may be held in any other place within the Union on the basis of a 




 The assembly shall decide upon the validity of the mandate of its members. It 
shall also decide upon disqualifying members, if they lose one of the required conditions, 
by a majority of all its members nad on the proposal of five among them. The Assembly 
shall be competent to accept resignation from membership. The resignation shall be 
considered as final from the date of its acceptance by the Assembly.  
 
Article 77 
 A member of the National Assembly of the Union shall represent the whole 
people of the Union and not merely the Emirate which he represents in the Assembly.  
Section 2—Organisation of work in the Assembly 
 
Article 78 
 The Assembly shall hold an annual ordinary session lasting not less than six 
months, commencing on the third week of November each year. It may be called into 
extraordinary session whenever the need arises. The Assembly may not consider at an 
extraordinary session any matter other than those for which it has been called into 
session.  
 Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, the President of the Union shall 
summon the Union National Assembly to convene its first ordinary session within a 
period not exceeding sixty days from the entry into force of this Constitution. This 
session shall end at the time appointed by the Supreme Council by decree.  
 
Article 79 
 The Assembly shall be summoned into session, and its session shall be terminated 
by decree issued by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of 
Ministers of the Union. Any meeting held by the Council without a formal summons, or 
in a place other than that legally assigned for its meeting in accordance with this 
Constitution, shall be invalid and shall have no effect.  
 Nevertheless, if the Assembly is not called to hold its meeting for its annual 
ordinary session before the third week of November, the Assembly shall be ipso facto in 
session on the twenty first of the said month.  
 
Article 80 
 The President of the Union shall inaugurate the ordinary annual session of the 
Assembly whereupon he shall deliver a speech reviewing the situation of the country and 
the important events and affairs which happened during the year and outlining the 
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projects and reforms, the Union Government plans to undertake during the new session. 
The President of the Union may depute his Vice-President or the Prime Minister to open 
the session or to deliver the speech.  
 The National Assembly shall select, from among its members, a committee to 
draft the reply to the Opening Speech, embodying the Assembly‘s observations and 
wishes, and shall submit the reply after approval by the Assembly to the President of the 
Union for submission to the Supreme Council. 
 
Article 81 
 Members of the Assembly shall not be censured for any opinions or views 




 Except in cases of ―flagrante delicto‖, no penal proceedings may be taken against 
any member while the Assembly is in session, without the authorization of the Assembly. 
The Assembly must be notified if such proceedings are taken while it is not in session.  
 
Article 83 
 The President of the Assembly and its other members shall be entitled, from the 
date of taking the oath before the Assembly, to a remuneration which shall be determined 
by law, and to travelling expenses from their place of residence to the place in which the 
Assembly is meeting.  
 
Article 84 
 The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President, a First and Second 
Vice President and two controllers. The Assembly shall select them all from among its 
members.  
 The term of office of the President and the two vice Presidents shall expire when 
the term of the Assembly expires or when it is dissolved in accordance with the 
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 88.  
 The term of office of the controllers shall expire with the choice of new 
controllers at the opening of the next ordinary annual session. If any post in the Bureau 
becomes vacant, the Assembly shall elect who shall fill it for the remaining period.  
 
Article 85 
 The Assembly shall have a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by a number 
of staff who shall be directly responsible to the Assembly. The Assembly‘s standing 
orders shall lay down their conditions of service and their powers.  
 The Assembly shall lay down its standing orders, issued by decree promulgated 
by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers.  
 The standing orders shall define the powers of the President of the Assembly, his 
two Vice Presidents and the Controllers and shall define generally all matters pertaining 
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to the Assembly, its committees, its members, its Secretariat, its employees, its rules and 
procedures of discussion and voting in the Assembly and the Committees and other 
matters within the limits of [the] provisions of this Constitution.  
 
Article 86 
 Sessions of the Assembly shall be public. Secret sessions may be held at the 
request of a representative of the Government, the President of te Assembly or one third 
of its members.  
 
Article 87 
 Deliberations of the Assembly shall not be valid unless a majority of its members 
at least are present. Resolutions shall be taken by an absolute majority of the votes of 
members present, except in cases where a special majority has been prescribed. If votes 
are equally divided, the side which the President of the session supports shall prevail.  
 
Article 88  
 Meetings of the Assembly may be adjourned by a decree promulgated by the 
President of the Union with the approval of the Council of Ministers of the union for a 
period not exceeding one month, provided that such adjournment is not repeated in one 
session except with the approval of the Assembly and for once only. The period of 
adjournment shall not be deemed part of the term of the ordinary session.  
 The Assembly may also be dissolved by a decree promulgated by the President of 
the Union with the approval of the Supreme Council of the Union, provided that the 
decree of dissolution includes a summons to the new Assembly to come into session 
within sixty days of the date of the decree of dissolution. The Assembly may not be 
dissolved again for the same reason.  
Section 3—Powers of the National Assembly  
 
Article 89 
 In so far as this does not conflict with the provisions of Article 110, Union Bills, 
including financial bills, shall be submitted to the National Assembly of the Union before 
their submission to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council 
for ratification. The National Assembly shall discuss these bills and may pass them, 
amend or reject them.  
 
Article 90 
 The Assembly shall examine during its ordinary session the Annual General 
Budget draft law of the Union and the draft law of the final accounts, in accordance with 







 The Government shall inform the Union Assembly of international treaties and 
agreements concluded with other states and the various international organisations, 
together with appropriate explanations.  
 
Article 92 
 The Union National Assembly may discuss any general subject pertaining to the 
affairs of the union unless the Council of Ministers informs the Union National Assembly 
that such discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Union. The Prime Minister 
or the Minister concerned shall attend the debates. The Union National Assembly may 
express its recommendations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Council of 
Ministers does not approve of these recommendations, it shall notify the Union National 
Assembly of its reasons.  
 
Article 93 
 The Government of the union shall be represented at sessions of the Union 
National Assembly by the Prime Minister or his deputy or one member of the Union 
Cabinet at least. The Prime Minister or his deputy or the competent Minister, shall 
answer questions put to them by any member of the Assembly requesting explanation of 
any matters within their jurisdiction, in conformity with the procedures prescribed in the 
standing orders of the Assembly.  
 
Chapter V—The Judiciary in the Union and the Emirates 
 
Article 94 
 Justice is the basis of rule. In performing their duties, judges shall be independent 
and shall not be subject to any authority but the law and their own conscience.  
 
Article 95 




 The Union Supreme Court shall consist of a President and a number of judges, not 
exceeding five in all, who shall be appointed by decree, issued by the President of the 
Union after approval by the Supreme Council. The law shall prescribe the number of the 
chambers in the Court, their order and procedures, conditions of service and retirement 
for its members and the preconditions and qualifications required of them.  
 
Article 97 
 The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court shall not be removed 
while the administer justice. Their tenure of office shall not be terminated except for one 




3. Expiration of term of contract for those who are appointed by fixed term contract 
or completion of term of secondment.  
4. Reaching retirement age.  
5. Permanent incapacity to carry the burdens of their duties by reasons of ill health. 
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and proceeding stipulated in the 
law. 
7. Appointment to other offices, with their consent.  
Article 98 
 The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court shall, before holding 
office, swear on oath before the President [of] the Union and in the presence of the Union 
Minister of Justice, that they will render justice without fear or favour and that they will 
be loyal to the Constitution and the laws of the Union.  
 
Article 99 
 The Union Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in the following matters:- 
1. Various disputes between member Emirates in the Union, or between any one 
Emirate or more and the Union Government , whenever such disputes are 
submitted to the Court on the request of any of the interested parties.  
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union laws, if they are challenged by one 
or more of the Emirates on the grounds of violating the constitution of the Union. 
Examination of the constitutionality of legislations promulgated by one of 
the Emirates, if they are challenged by one of the Union authorities on the 
grounds of violation of the Constitution of the Union or of Union laws. 
3. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations in 
general, if such request is referred to it by any Court in the country during a 
pending case before it. The aforesaid Court shall be bound to accept the ruling of 
the Union Supreme Court rendered in this connection.  
4. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when so requested by any 
Union authority or by the Government of any Emirate. Any such interpretation 
shall be considered binding on all.  
5. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union appointed by decree regarding 
their actions in carrying out their official duties on the demand of the Supreme 
Council and in accordance with the relevant law.  
6. Crimes directly affecting the interests of the Union, such as crimes relating to its 
internal or external security, forgery of the official records or seals of any of the 
union authorities and counterfeiting of currency. 
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7. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial authorities and the local 
judicial authorities in the Emirates.  
8. Conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial authority in one Emirate and the 
judicial authority in another Emirate. The rules relating thereof shall be regulated 
by a Union Law.  
9. Any other jurisdiction stipulated in this Constitution, or which may be assigned to 
it by a Union law.  
Article 100 
 The Union Supreme Court shall hold its sittings in the capital of the Union. It 
may, exceptionally, assemble when necessary in the capital of any one of the Emirates.  
 
Article 101 
 The judgments of the Union Supreme Court shall be final and binding upon all. 
 If the Court, in ruling on the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations, 
decides that a Union legislations or regulations under consideration contain provisions 
which are inconsistent with the Union Constitution, or that local legislations or 
regulations under consideration contain provisions which are inconsistent with the Union 
Constitution or with a Union law, the authority concerned in the Union or in the Emirate, 
accordingly, shall be obliged to hasten to take the necessary measures to remove or 
rectify the constitutional inconsistency.  
 
Article 102 
 The Union shall have one or more Union Primary Tribunals which shall sit in the 
permanent capital of the Union or in the capitals of some of the Emirates, in order to 
exercise the judicial powers within the sphere of their jurisdiction in the following cases:  
1. Civil, commercial and administrative disputes between the Union and individuals 
whether the Union is plaintiff or defendant.  
2. Crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent capital of the Union, 
with the exception of such matters as are reserved for the Union Supreme Court 
under Article 99 of this Constitution.  
3. Personal status cases, civil and commercial cases and other cases between 
individuals which shall arise in the [permanent] capital of the Union.  
Article 103 
 The law shall regulate all matters connected with the Union Primary Tribunals in 
respect of their organization, formation, chambers, local jurisdiction, procedures to be 
followed before them, the oath to be sworn by their judges, conditions of service relating 
to them and the ways of appeal against their judgments.  
 The law may stipulate that appeals against the judgments of these Tribunals shall 
be heard before one of the chambers of the Union Supreme Court, in the cases and 
according to the procedures prescribed therein. 
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Article 104 
 The local judicial authorities in each Emirate shall have jurisdiction in all judicial 
matters not assigned to the Union judicature in accordance with this Constitution.  
 
Article 105 
 All or part of the jurisdiction assigned to the local judicial authorities in 
accordance with the preceding Article may be transferred by a Union law issued at the 
request of the Emirate concerned, to the Primary Union Tribunals.  
 Circumstances in which appeals against judgments by the local judicial authorities 
in penal, civil, commercial and other litigations may be referred to the Union Tribunals, 
shall be defined by a union law provided that its decision in such appeals shall be final.  
 
Article 106 
 The Union shall have a Public [Prosecutor] who shall be appointed by a Union 
decree issued with the approval of the Council of Ministers, assisted by a number of 
members of the Public [Prosecutor‘s] office.  
 The law shall regulate matters relating to the members of the Union Public 
Prosecutor‘s Office with respect to their method of appointment, ranks, promotion, 
retirement and the qualifications required of them. 
 Besides, the Union Law of Criminal Procedure and trials shall regulate the power 
of this body and its procedures and the competence of its assistants from the police and 
the public security officers.  
 
Article 107 
 The President of the Union may grant pardon from the execution of any sentence 
passed by a Union judicature before it is carried out or while it is being served or he may 
commute such sentence, on the basis of the recommendation of the union Minister of 
Justice, after obtaining the approval of a committee formed under the chairmanship of the 
Minister and consisting of six members selected by the Union Council of Ministers for a 
term of three years which may be renewed. The members of the committee shall be 
chosen from citizens of good repute and capability.  
 Membership of the committee shall be gratis. Its deliberations shall be secret. Its 
decisions shall be issued by a majority vote.  
 
Article 108 
 No sentence of death imposed finally by a union judicial authority shall be carried 
out until the President of the Union has confirmed the sentence. He may substitute it by 




 There shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for specified crimes except by 
law.  
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 The promulgation of the law of amnesty shall consider such crimes being deemed 




Union Legislations and Decrees and the Authorities Having Jurisdiction Therein 
 
Chapter I- Union Laws 
 
Article 110 
1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of this Article 
and other appropriate provisions of the Constitution. 
 
2. A draft law shall become a law after the adoption of the following procedure:- 
a. The Council of Ministers shall prepare a bill and submit it to the Union 
National Assembly. 
b. The Council of Ministers shall submit the bill to the president of the Union 
for his approval and presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification 
c. The President of the Union shall sign the bill after ratification by the 
Supreme Council and shall promulgate it.  
 
3.    (a) If the Union National Assembly inserts any amendment to the bill and this 
amendment is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme 
Council, or if the Union National Assembly rejects the bill, the President of the 
Union or the Supreme Council may refer it back to the National Assembly. If the 
Union National Assembly introduces any amendment on that occasion which is 
not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the 
Union National Assembly decides to reject the bill, the President of the Union 
may promulgate the law after ratification by the Supreme Council.  
(b) The term ―bill‖ in this clause shall mean the draft which is submitted to the 
President of the Union by the Council of Ministers including the amendments, if 
any, made to it by the Union National Assembly.  
4. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the situation requires the promulgation of Union 
laws when the National Assembly is not in session, the Council of Ministers of 
the Union may issue them through the Supreme Council and the President of the 





 Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Union within a maximum of 
two weeks from the date of their signature and promulgation by the President of the 
Union after the Supreme Court has ratified them. Such laws shall become in force one 
month after the date of their publication in the said Gazette, unless another date is 
specified in the said law.  
 
Article 112 
 No laws may be applied except on what occurs as from the date they become in 
force and no retroactive effect shall result in such laws. The law may, however, stipulate 
the contrary in matters other than criminal, if necessity so requires.  
 
Chapter II—Laws Issued by Decrees 
 
Article 113 
 Should necessity arise for urgent promulgation of Union laws between sessions of 
the Supreme Council, the President of the Union together with the Council of Ministers 
may promulgate the necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force of 
law, provided that they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. 
 Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council within a week at the 
maximum for assent or rejection. If they are approved they shall have the force of law 
and the Union National Assembly shall be notified at its next meeting.  
 However, if the Supreme Council does not approve them, they shall cease to have 
the force of law unless that it has decided to sanction their effectiveness during the 
preceding period, or to settle in some other way the effects arising therefrom. 
 
Chapter III—Ordinary Decrees 
 
Article 114 
 No decree may be issued unless the Council of Ministers has confirmed it and the 
President of the Union or the Supreme Council, according to their powers, has ratified it. 




 While the Supreme Council is out of session and if necessity arises, it may 
authorize the President of the Union and the Council of Ministers collectively to 
promulgate decrees whose ratification is within the power of the Supreme Council, 
provided that such authority shall not include ratification of international agreements and 
treaties or declaration or [rescission] of martial law or declaration of a defensive war or 








 The Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the Union by this 
Constitution. The Emirates shall all participate in the establishment of the Union and 
shall benefit from its existence, services and protection. 
 
Article 117 
 The exercise of rule in each Emirate shall aim in particular at the maintenance of 
security and order within its territories, the provision of public utilities for its inhabitants 
and the raising of social and economic standards. 
 
Article 118 
 The member Emirates of the Union shall all work for the coordination of their 
legislations in various fields with the intention of unifying such legislations as far as 
possible.  
 Two or more Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Council, 
agglomerate in a political or administrative unit, or unify all or part of their public 
services or establish a single or joint administration to run any such service. 
 
Article 119 
 Union law shall regulate with utmost ease matters pertaining to the execution of 
judgments, requests for commissions of rogation, serving legal documents and surrender 




Distribution of Legislative, Executive and International Jurisdictions Between the 
Union and the Emirates 
 
Article 120 
 The Union shall have exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the 
following affairs:  
1. Foreign affairs. 
2. Defence and the Union Armed Forces. 
3. Protection of the Union‘s security against internal or external threat. 
4. Matters pertaining to security, order and rule in the permanent capital of the 
Union. 
5. Matters relating to Union officials and Union judiciary. 
6. Union finance and Union taxes, duties and fees.  
7. Union public loans. 
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8. Postal, telegraph, telephone and wireless services. 
9. Construction, maintenance and improvement of Union roads which the 
Supreme Council has determined to be trunk roads. The organisation of traffic 
on such roads.  
10. Air Traffic Control and the issue of licenses to aircrafts and pilots.  
11. Education. 
12. Public health and medical services. 
13. Currency board and coinage. 
14. Measures, standards and weights.  
15. Electricity services. 
16. Union nationality, passports, residence and immigration. 
17. Union properties and all matters relating thereto. 
18. Census affairs and statistics relevant to Union purposes.  
19. Union Information. 
Article 121 
 Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding Article, the Union shall have 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction in the following matters:  
 Labour relations and social security; real estate and expropriation in the public 
interest; extradition of criminals; banks; insurance of all kinds; protection of agricultural 
and animal wealth; major legislations relating to penal law, civil and commercial 
transactions and company law, procedures before the civil and criminal courts; protection 
of cultural, technical, and industrial property and copyright; printing and publishing; 
import of arms and ammunitions except for use by the armed forces or the security forces 
belonging to any Emirate; other aviation affairs which are not within the executive 
jurisdiction of the Union; delimitation of territorial waters and regulation of navigation on 
the high seas.  
 
Article 122 
 The Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not assigned to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Union in accordance with the provisions of the two preceding Articles. 
 
Article 123 
 As an exception to paragraph 1 of Article 120 concerning the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Union in matters of foreign policy and international relations, the 
member Emirates of the Union may conclude limited agreements of a local and 
administrative nature with the neighbouring states or regions, save that such agreements 
are not provided that the Supreme Council of the Union is informed in advance. If the 
Council objects to the [conclusion] of such agreements, it shall be obligatory to suspend 
the matter until the Union Court has ruled on that objection as early as possible.  
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 The Emirates may retain their membership in the OPEC organisation and the 
Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or may join them. 
 
Article 124 
 Before the conclusion of any treaty or international agreement which may affect 
the status of any one of the Emirates, the competent Union authorities shall consult that 
Emirate in advance. In the event of a dispute, the matter shall be submitted to the Union 
Supreme Court for ruling.  
 
Article 125 
 The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the appropriate measures to 
implement the laws promulgated by the Union and the treaties and international 
agreements concluded by the Union, including the promulgation of the local laws, 
regulations, decisions and orders necessary for such implementation.  
 The Union authorities shall supervise the implementation by Emirates‘ 
Governments of the Union laws, decisions, treaties, agreements and Union judgments. 
The competent administrative and judicial authorities in the Emirates should forward to 
the Union authorities all possible assistance in this connection. 
 
Part Eight 
Financial Affairs of the Union 
 
Article 126 
 The general revenues of the Union shall consist of the income from the following 
resources:  
1. Taxes, fees and duties imposed under a Union law in matters within the 
legislative and executive jurisdiction of the Union.  
2. Fees and rates received by the Union in return for services provided. 
3. Contributions made by member Emirates of the Union in the Annual Budget 
of the Union in accordance with the article herein coming after. 
4. Union income from its own properties. 
Article 127 
 The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a specified proportion of their 
annual revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of the Union, in the 
manner and on the scale to be prescribed in the Budget Law.  
 
Article 128 
 The law shall prescribe the method of preparing the general budget of the Union 





 The draft annual budget of the Union, comprising estimates of revenues and 
expenditure, shall be referred to the Union National Assembly at least two months before 
the beginning of the financial year, for discussion and submission of comments thereon, 
before the draft budget is submitted to the Supreme Council of the Union, together with 
those comments, for assent.  
 
Article 130 
 The annual general budget shall be issued by a law. In all cases, where the budget 
law has not been promulgated before the beginning of the financial year, temporary 
monthly funds may be made by Union decree on the basis of one [twelfth] of the funds of 
the previous financial year. Revenues shall be collected and expenditure disbursed in 
accordance with the laws in force at the end of the preceding financial year.  
 
Article 131 
 All expenditure not provided for in the budget, all expenditure in excess of the 
budget estimates and all transfers of sums from one part to another of the Budget must be 
covered by a law.  
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, in cases of extreme urgency, such expenditure or 
transfer may be arranged by decree-law in conformity with the provisions of Article 113 
of this Constitution.  
 
Article 132 
 The Union shall allocate in its annual budget a sum from its revenue to be 
expended on building and construction projects, internal security and social affairs 
according to the urgent needs of some of the Emirates.  
 The execution of these projects and the disbursement thereon shall be drawn from 
these funds, accomplished by means of and under the supervision of the competent Union 
bodies with the agreement of authorities of the Emirates concerned.  
 The Union may establish a special fund for this purpose.  
 
Article 133 
 No Union tax may be imposed, amended or abolished except by virtue of law. No 
person may be exempted from payment of such taxes except in the cases specified by 
law.  
 Union taxes, duties and fees may not be levied on any person except within the 
limits of the law and in accordance with its provisions.  
 
Article 134 
 No public loan may be contracted except by a Union law. No commitment 
involving the payment of sums from union Exchequer in a future year or years may be 




 The final accounts of the financial administration of the Union for the completed 
financial year shall be referred to the Union National Assembly within the four months 
following the end of the said year, for its comments thereon, before their submission to 
the Supreme Council for approval, in the light of the Auditor-General‘s report.  
 
Article 136 
 An independent Union department headed by an Auditor-General who shall be 
appointed by decree, shall be established to audit the accounts of the Union and its organs 
and agencies, and to audit any other accounts assigned to the said department for that 
purpose in accordance with [the] law.  
 The law shall regulate this department and shall define its jurisdiction and the 
competence of those working therein, and the guarantees to be given to it, its head and 




Armed Forces and Security Forces 
 
Article 137 
 Every attack upon any member Emirates of the Union shall be considered an 
attack upon all the Emirates and upon the existence of the Union itself, which all Union 
and local forces will co-operate to repel by all means possible.  
 
Article 138 
 The Union shall have army, navy and air forces with unified training and 
command. The Commander in Chief of these forces and the Chief of the General Staff 
shall be appointed and dismissed by means of a Union decree. 
 The Union may have a Union Security Forces. 
 The Union Council of Ministers shall be responsible directly to the President of 
the Union and the Supreme Council of the Union for the affairs of all these forces. 
 
Article 139 
 The law shall regulate military service, general or partial mobilisation, the rights 
and duties of members of the Armed Forces, their disciplinary procedures and similarly 
the special regulations of the Union Security Forces.  
 
Article 140 
 The declaration of defensive war shall be declared by a Union decree issued by 
the President of the Union after its approval by the Supreme Council. Offensive war shall 





 A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up under the chairmanship of the 
President of the Union. Among its members shall be the Vice President of the Union, the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Defence, Finance, Interior, the Commander in Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. It 
shall advise and offer views on all matters pertaining to defence, maintenance of the 
peace and security of the Union, forming of the armed forces, their equipment and 
development and the determination of their posts and camps.  
 The Council may invite any military adviser or expert or other persons it wishes 
to attend its meetings but they shall have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters 
pertaining to this Council shall be regulated by means of a law.  
 
Article 142 
 The member Emirates shall have the right to set up local security forces ready and 
equipped to join the defensive machinery of the Union to defend, if need arises, the 
Union against any external aggression.  
 
Article 143 
 Any Emirate shall have the right to request the assistance of the Armed Forces or 
the Security Forces of [the] Union in order to maintain security and order within its 
territories whenever it is exposed to danger. Such a request shall be submitted 
immediately to the Supreme Council of the Union for decision. 
 The Supreme Council may call upon the aid of the local armed forces belonging 
to any Emirate for this purpose provided that the Emirate requesting assistance and the 
Emirate to whom the forces belong agree.  
 The President of the Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union collectively, 
may, if the Supreme Council is not in session, take any immediate measure which cannot 




The Final and Transitional Provisions 
 
Article 144 
1. Subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, the provisions of this 
Constitution shall apply for a transitional period of five Gregorian years 
beginning from the date of its entry into force in accordance with provisions of 
Article 152.  
2. (a) If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost interests of the Union 
require the amendment of this Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional 
amendment to the Union National Assembly.  
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(b) The procedure for approving the constitutional amendment shall be the same 
as the procedure for approving laws.  
(c) The approval of the Union National Assembly for a draft constitutional 
amendment shall require the agreement of two-thirds of the votes of members 
present.  
 The President of the Union shall sign the constitutional amendment in the name of 
the Supreme Council and as its representative and shall promulgate the amendment. 
3. During the transitional period, the Supreme Council shall adopt the necessary 
measures to prepare a draft permanent Constitution to take the place of this 
temporary constitution. It shall submit the draft permanent Constitution to the 
Union National Assembly for debate before promulgating it.  
4. The Supreme Council shall call the Union National Assembly into extraordinary 
session at a time not more than six months before the end of the period of validity 
of this temporary Constitution. The permanent Constitution shall be presented at 
this session. It shall be promulgated according to the procedure laid down in 
paragraph 2 of this Article.  
Article 145 
 Under no circumstances, may any of the provisions of this Constitution be 
suspended, except when Martial Law is in force and within the limits specified by this 
law.  
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, sessions of the National Assembly of the Union 




 In case of necessity defined by law, Martial law shall be declared by a decree 
promulgated with the approval of the Supreme Council on the basis of a proposal made 
by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. 
Such decree shall be notified to the Union National Assembly at its next meeting.  
 Martial law shall be similarly lifted by decree issued with the approval of the 
Supreme Council when the need, for which it was imposed, no longer exists.  
 
Article 147 
 Nothing in the application of this Constitution shall affect treaties or agreements 
concluded by member Emirates with state or international organisations unless such 
treaties or organisations unless such treaties or agreements are amended or abrogated by 






 All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees, orders and decisions in the 
various member Emirates of the Union in effect upon the coming into force of this 
Constitution, shall continue to be applicable unless amended or replaced in accordance 
with the provisions of this Constitution.  
 Similarly, the measures and organisations existing in the member Emirates shall 
continue to be effective until the promulgation of laws amending them in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution.\ 
 
Article 149 
 As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this Constitution, the Emirates 
may promulgate legislations necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the said 
Article without violation of the provisions of Article 151 of this Constitution.  
 
Article 150 
 The Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws referred to in this Constitution 
as quickly as possible so as to replace the existing legislations and systems, particularly 
those which are not consistent with [the] provisions of the Constitution.  
 
Article 151 
 The provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over the Constitutions of the 
member Emirates of the Union and the Union laws which are issued in accordance with 
the provisions of this Constitution shall have priority over the legislations, regulations 
and decisions issued by the authorities of the Emirates.  
 In case of conflict, that part of the inferior legislation which is inconsistent with 
the superior legislation shall be rendered null and void to the extent that removes the 
inconsistency. In case of dispute, the matter shall be referred to the Union Supreme Court 
for its ruling.  
 
Article 152 
 This Constitution shall take effect from the date to be fixed in a declaration to be 
issued by the Rulers [signatory] to this Constitution.  
 Signed in Dubai on this day the 18
th
 of July, 1971, corresponding to this day the 
25
th
 month of Jamad Awwal 1391. 























































































































Appendix C:  Rulers of the Trucial States from 1947-Present 
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Bahrain 
Sheikh Salman ibn Hamad al-Khalifa, 1942-1961 
Amir ‗Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa, 1961-1999 
King Hamad bin ‗Isa al-Khalifa, 1999-Present 
 
Qatar 
Sheikh Ali bin Abdallah al-Thani, 1948-1960 
Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali al-Thani, 1960-1972 
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, 1972-1995 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 1995-Present 
 
Abu Dhabi 
Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 1928-1966 
Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 1966-2001 
Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayid al-Nahayan, 2001-Present 
 
Dubai 
Sheikh Said bin Maktoum al-Maktoum, 1912-1958 
Sheikh Rashid bin Maktoum al-Maktoum, 1958-1990 
Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum, 1990-2006 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktoum, 2006-Present 
 
Sharjah 
Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, 1924-1951 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Saqr al-Qasimi, 1951 
Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, 1951-1965 
Sheikh Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1965-1972 
Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1972-1987 
Sheikh ‗Abd al-‗Aziz bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1987-1987 
Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1987-Present 
 
Fujairah 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi, 1938-1952 (leading sheikh), 1952-1974 (ruler) 
Sheikh Hamad bin Muhammad al-Sharqi, 1974-Present 
Ajman 
Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid al-Nuaimi, 1928-1981 
Sheikh Humaid bin Rashid al-Nuaimi, 1981-Present 
 
Umm al-Qaywain 
Sheikh Ahmad bin Rashid al-Mu
c
alla, 1928-1981 
Sheikh Rashid bin Ahmad al-Mu
c
alla, 1981-2009 






Sheikh Sultan bin Salem al-Qasimi, 1919-1948 
Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1948-Present 
Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi, Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler (since 2003) 
 
Kalba 
Sheikh Hamad bin Said al-Qasimi, 1937-1951 
Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, 1951-1952 
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Prime Ministers  
 
Clement Attlee, 1945-1951 
Sir Winston Churchill, 1951-1955 
Sir Anthony Eden, 1955-1957 
Harold MacMillan, 1957-1963 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1963-1964 
Harold Wilson, 1964-1970 
Edward Heath, 1970-1974 
 
 
Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs 
 
Ernest Bevin, 1945-1951 
Herbert Morrison, 1951-51 
Anthony Eden, 1951-1955 
Harold Macmillan, 1955 
Selwyn Lloyd, 1955-1960 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1960-1963 
R. A. Butler, 1963-1964 
Patrick Gordon Walker, 1964-1965 
Michael Stewart, 1965-1966 
George Brown, 1966-1968 
Michael Stewart, 1968 
 
 
Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (est. 1968) 
 
 
Michael Stewart, 1968-1970 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1970-1974 
 
 
Political Residents at Bahrain 
Lt. Col. William Rupert Hay, 1946-1953 
Sir Bernard A. B. Burrows, 1953-1961 
Sir William H. T. Luce, 1961-1966 
Sir Stewart Crawford, 1966-1970 






Political Agents at Dubai 
C. M. Pirie-Gordon, 1953-1955 
J. P. Tripp, 1955-1958 
Donald Hawley, 1958-1959 
E. R. Worsnop (Acting), 1959-1961 
A. J. M. Craig, 1961-1964 
H. G. Balfour-Paul, 1964-1966 
D. A. Roberts, 1966-1968  
Julian Bullard, 1968-1971 
J. F. Walker, 1970-1971 
 
 
Political Officers at Abu Dhabi 
The Hon. M. S. Buckmaster, 1955-1958 
E. R. Morsnop, 1958-1959 
B. F. Henderson, 1959-61 
 
 
Political Agents at Abu Dhabi 
 
Col. John Edmund Hugh Boustead, 1961-1965 
A. T. Lamb, 1965-1968 
C. J. Treadwell, 1968-1971 
 
Political Officers at Sharjah 
Capt. J. E. H. Hudson, 1946-1947 
G. H. Jackson, 1948-1949 
R. D. Stobart, 1949-1951 
A. J. Wilton, 1951-1952 
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